Dunkley

[1] Defendant, an attorney, is charged with a violation of the following provision of subdivision “b” of section 29 of the Bankruptcy Act:

The indictment alleges the following facts:

It is then formally averred that defendant, in the manner and form aforesaid—

The sufficiency of the indictment is challenged by demurrer on the ground that it states no offense, the claim being that the word “extort” as used in the statute means “to take unlawfully, as an officer, by color of his office, any money or thing of value, that is not due, or more than *1002 is due, or before it is due,” and there is no allegation that defendant was an officer. It is quite true that at common law extortion was the unlawful taking by an officer, by color of his office, from any man any money or thing of value that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due, and so the offense is defined by Blackstone. But the word “extort” has come to have a much wider meaning than this, and, as generally understood, it means the wrongful exaction of money or property; the taking or obtaining of anything from another by compulsion or oppressive exaction, whether by an officer or otherwise. The statutes…