(after stating the facts as above). [1] The first question which arises is whether the complaint states a cause of action. In Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 247 ( 11 L. Ed. 576 ), the court said:

In Bither v. Packard, 115 Me. 306, 312 , 98 Atl. 929, 932 , the court said:

To the same effect are Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395 , 4 Sup. Ct. 426, 28 L. Ed. 466 ; Taylor v. Currey, 192 Ill. App. 502 ; Early v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 167 Mo. App. 252 , 149 S. W. 1170 ; Cullen v. Sea Board Air Line, 63 Fla. 122 , 58 South. 182 ; Knight v. Forbes, 19 Ga. App. 320 , 91 S. E. 445 , in which the court said that such an action needs for its support no actual contractual relation, for the .law will imply a quasi contractual relation to uphold it whenever the circumstances so require.

[2, 3] One cannot recover money voluntarily paid with a full knowledge of all the facts, although no obligation to pay existed, but money may be recovered where paid under circumstances of fraud, misrepresentation, and threats amounting to a duress which prevents the free exercise of the will, or where it is paid on a wrongful demand, to save the party paying from some great or irreparable mischief or damage from which he could not otherwise be saved, and while money paid under apprehension, or induced by threats of suits or actions, is not in general paid under such duress as to make the payment compulsory, such threats may, in connection with other circumstances, such as the inexperience of the person threatened, or the peril to which Lis business is exposed, if the threats are carried out, constitute such duress that money paid under the influence thereof may be recovered as for money had and received. Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1 , 8 Am. Rep. 287 ; Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. v. Brown, 100 Pa. 338 ; Guetzkow Bros. Co. v. Breese, 96 Wis. 591 , 72 N. W. 45 , 65 Am. St. Rep. 83 ; Vyne v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112 , 1 N. W. 997 ; Baldwin v. Hutchison, 8 Ind. App. 454 , 35 N. E. 711 ; Brown v. Worthington, 162 Mo. App. 508 , 142 S. W. 1082 ; Rees v. Schmits, 164 Ill. App. 251 ; Sartwell v. Horton, 28 Vt. 370 ; Parmentier v. Pater, 13 Or. 121 , 9 Pac. 59 .

*547 Here the complaint alleges the inexperience of the officers of the plaintiff, their mental disturbance in view of the threats and fraudulent representations, the large pecuniary interest involved in their business, and the powerful combination arrayed against them, represented by the Gallegos Committee, acting for and on behalf of more than 40 insurance companies, practically the whole insurance world, with power to destroy the credit of the plaintiff in error, and to prevent it from obtaining insurance upon its property. The combination against the plaintiff in error which is set forth in the complaint is not unlike that which was condemned in Carew v. Rutherford, supra, and we think the facts alleged are sufficient to constitute a cause of action for money had and received.

[4] The second question here is which of the two following provisions of the statute of limitations of Oregon applies to the cause of action,

The action for money had and received has always been regarded as an action in assumpsit, based upon a promise to repay which the law implies, where one has possession of money which in equity and good conscience belongs to another. “Having money that rightfully belongs to another, creates a debt; and whenever a debt .exists without any express promise to pay, the law implies a promise, and the, action always sounds in contract.” Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 610 . In that case it was held, that where one person fraudulently procures money of another, the law will imply a promise to repay it, and the injured party need not sue in tort, but may sue in assumpsit for money had and received. In Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 337, 340, the court said:

That there is in such a case an implied promise to pay is generally recognized in the authorities, and it is so held in the state of Oregon. First National Bank v. Hovey, 34 Or. 162 , 55 Pac. 535; Hornefius v. Wilkinson, 51 Or. 45 , 93 Pac. 474 . In 1 Wood on Limitations (4th Ed.) page 95, it is said :

*548 Page 96:

Among the cases cited are Ivey’s Adm’r v. Owens, 28 Ala. 641 ; Lamb v. Clark, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 193; Kirkman v. Philips’ Heirs, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 222; Miller v. Miller, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 133, 19 Am. Dec. 264 ; Whitaker v. Poston, 120 Tenn. 207 , 110 S. W. 1019 ; Fanson v. Linsley, 20 Kan. 235 ; Norden v. Jones, 33 Wis. 600 , 14 Am. Rep. 782 .

We may assume that the statute of limitations of Oregon was framed with a view to existing recognized forms of actions, and that when a limitation of six years was placed upon the commencement of actions “on a contract or liability express 'or implied,” it was intended to apply the same to all actions in assumpsit including that for money had and received. Such seems to have been the construction placed upon- similar statutes of limitation in other states. In Trower v. City and County of San Francisco, 157 Cal. 762 , 109 Pac. 617 , the court said:

In Kentucky it was held that an action for money had and received was governed by the statute of limitations applicable to cases “arising on a contract express or implied.” Clark v. Logan County, 138 Ky. 676 , 128 S. W. 1079 . In Missouri, the statute barred after five years all actions on “contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied.” It was held that the action for money had and received was governed thereby. Garrett v. Conklin, 52 Mo. App. 654 . In Leather Manuf. Bank v. Merchants’ Bank, 128 U. S. 26 , 9 Sup. Ct. 3, 32 L. Ed. 342 , the action was brought to recover money paid on a forged check. The court held that under the New York statute the action was one on a “contract, obligation or liability, express or implied.” The action in the present case, having been commenced within six years, we think the cause of action was not barred.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court below for further proceedings.