By its complaint filed in the court below the government sought to recover from the defendant railroad company penalties for five alleged violations of section 2 of the act of Congress known as the Hours of Service Act (34 Stat. p. 1415 [Comp. St § 8678]),.relating to telegraph operators, which reads as follows:

All.of the alleged causes of action involved the same telegraph operator at the same station, the only difference being the number of hours he was required to work on the five days in question, which varied each day, according to the allegations, from 15 hours and 20 minutes to 18 hours and 30 minutes. It is therefore sufficient to state the first of the alleged causes of action, it being typical of all of them.

In brief, it is that the defendant company was a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad in the state of Oregon; that on September 1, 1919, at Kerry, Or., the defendant required and permitted its telegraph operator, J. G. Nash, to be and remain on duty for a longer period than 9 hours in a 24-hour period — that is, from 6 a. m. until 11:50 p. m. that night, a total of 17 hours and 50 minutes; that the Kerry office was one continuously operated night and day; and that Nash, while on duty at Kerry, used the telegraph or telephone in dispatching, -reporting, transmitting, receiving, and delivering orders per-' taining to and affecting the movement of trains engaged in interstate commerce.

The defendant company by its answer put in issue all of the allegations of the complaint.

By stipulation of the parties a jury was waived and the case tried to the court, which, after such trial, and on the 16th day of August, 1920, entered a general finding of facts in favor of the defendant, upon which judgment against the plaintiff was entered. Subsequently, and on the 13th day of December, 1920, the plaintiff in the case presented to the court a request for certain special findings of fact, which the court refused to grant, and to which refusal exceptions were entered.

It appears from the evidence contained in the bill of exceptions that the defendant to the action (defendant in, error here) is an Oregon cor *627 poration organized and existing for the transportation mainly of saw-logs to the Columbia river, but was required by the laws of that state (Lord’s Oregon Laws, §§ 6857, 6858) to “afford all persons equal facilities for the transportation of freight upon payment or tender of reasonable transportation therefor.” Its road extends from Kerry, a station on the Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railroad, southerly about 25 miles, all within the state of Oregon.

[1] The findings and judgment of the trial court, to which no objection or exception was taken, being to the effect that the defendant company was not engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore not subject to the provisions of the congressional act upon which the complaint is based, we see no escape from the conclusion that they are conclusive here, and that there is nothing for this court to review. • Sections 649 and 700 of the Revised Statutes provide as follows:

For the abolition of the Circuit Courts and the transfer of their powers and duties to the District Courts, see sections 1266-1268 of the Compiled Statutes of 1918. These statutory provisions are perfectly plain. The first cited is to the effect that where in an action at law a' jury is duly waived and the trial had to the court the finding of the latter may he either general or special, and, whether the one or the. other, shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury; and section 700 is to the effect that where such an action is so tried and determined by the court without the intervention of a jury, the rulings of the court in the progress of the trial, if excepted to at the time and duly presented by a bill of exceptions, may be reviewed upon a writ of erroi or upon appeal, and when the finding is special such review may extend to the determination of the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment.

[2] It is apparent from the record that it presents no case to which the provisions of the last mentioned section can apply. And that, on the trial of an action at law without a jury, it is not error for the court to refuse to make special findings, is well settled. Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall. 125 , 19 L. Ed. 608 ; Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U. S. 71, 73 , 13 Sup. Ct. 481, 37 L. Ed. 373 . It may be well again to direct attention to the difference between the federal statutes and those of many of the states upon the subject. Judge Taft (now Chief Justice) did so in speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit in the *628 case of Humphreys v. Third National Bank, 75 Fed. 852, 855 , 21 C. C. A. 538 , 541, where he said:

The judgment is affirmed.

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