(after stating the facts as above). The Willamette Navigation Company, being a bailee for hire, *466 whether as carrier or warehouseman, could lawfully insure the entire interest in the paper rolls entrusted to its care for carriage or storage, and, if loss occurred, would be entitled to demand and collect from the insurer the entire amount of the loss sustained covered by the insurance. In such case, however, it would hold the excess above its own interest in the paper for the use and benefit of the owners of the paper, or others concerned therein. Phœnix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312, 323 , 6 Sup. Ct. 750, 29 L. Ed. 873 ; Munich Assur. Co. v. Dodwell & Co., 128 Fed. 410 , 63 C. C. A. 152 ; California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 133 U. S. 387, 409 , 10 Sup. Ct. 365, 33 L. Ed. 730 . To be more explicit: In Beach’s Law of Insurance, § 875, it is said:

And in Joyce on Insurance, § 925:

We applied these principles in Munich Assurance Co. v. Dodwell & Co., supra. We said:

Turning to the policy of insurance, it will be seen that the insurance is for “account of themselves, loss, if any, payable to assured.” It is contended by the respondent, the appellee here, that, by reason of this clause in the policy and its wording, the insurance covers, only the libelant’s interest in the paper, as carrier, and not the interest of the shipper or of other persons involved, and that, if it had been intended to cover the shipper’s or other interest, it would have read “on account of whom it may concern,” as in the Phoenix Insurance Company Case, or “their own or held by them in trust or on commission,” as in the California Insurance Company Case, or have contained some expression of the kind more comprehensive in its nature than that we are asked to consider.

*467 We are of the view that the contention of counsel is sound. The insurance, being for “account of themselves,” comprises a particular person; that is, the assured, to whom the loss is payable. “The general rule is that a policy made in the name of a particular person will not protect the interest of any other person, unless the words ‘for whom it may concern’ or their equivalent indicate that it is intended that the interest of some other person be covered.” Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance, vol. 1, p. 787. The rule is stated in like effect by Wallace, J., in The Sydney (C. C.) 27 Fed. 119, 125 , and previously applied in the same case by Brown, J. (D. C.) 23 Fed. 88, 93 . The principle is stated in slightly different terms in Wise, Assignee of Eubank, v. St. Louis Marine Ins. Co., 23 Mo. 80, 83 , as follows:

So it was held in Finney et al. v. Bedford Commercial Ins. Co., 8 Metc. (Mass.) 348, 41 Am. Dec. 515 , that when a part owner of a vessel effects insurance therein in his own name only, and there is nothing in the policy indicating that it was designed to cover the interest of any other person, it could not be shown by parol evidence that other persons were concerned also, and that their interests as well were intended to be insured. Likewise it was held in Graves v. Boston Marine Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, 419 , 2 L. Ed. 324 , that a policy in the name of one joint owner of a vessel “as property may appear,” without a clause stating the insurance to be for the benefit of all concerned, does not cover the interest of any other joint owner., To a like purpose, see Russell v. New England Marine Ins. Co., 4 Mass. 82 , and Woodbury Savings Bank & Bldg. Ass’n v. Charter Oak F. & M. Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 374 .

The language of the present policy is explicit and restrictive, and unless some, interest of the libelant is to be subserved there can be no action on the policy. In this view it may well be that, if libelant has incurred a liability to the shippers under its contract of affreightment, such liability would be covered by the language “for account of themselves,” for it is reasonable to suppose that that was one of the purposes of the insurance, to reimburse the libelant for loss that it might be required to make good to the shipper. But the libelant has incurred no liability to the shipper. The libel is based upon the alleged fact that “the said steamer stranded and sunk.” The evidence obviously sustained the allegation.

Nor is it shown that the cause of stranding is attributable to negligence in navigation; so that recovery must ensue, if at all, upon the single allegation of stranding. On referring to the bill of lading, it will be found that this very cause is one of the excepted perils of carriage. This is the provision relating thereto”

*468 That the carrier might so limit liability to the shipper as the bill of lading purports to do is obvious under the authorities. York Co. v. Central Railroad, 3 Wall. 107 , 18 L. Ed. 170 ; Hart v. Penna. Railroad Co., 112 U. S. 331 , 5 Sup. Ct. 151, 28 L. Ed. 717 ; Phœnix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Transportation Co., supra. So that the libelant incurred no liability whatever to the shipper arising from the alleged fact of stranding. There is no basis whereupon it has any standing for recovery under the policy by reason of the shipper’s - loss. The libelant lays no claim to loss arising otherwise.

It follows from these considerations that libelant is without right of recovery upon the policy for the cause alleged in the lihel.

The order dismissing the libel will therefore be affirmed.