This suit was brought as an action at law in the superior court of California, for the purpose of recovering damages alleged to have been .suffered by the plaintiff because of the neg- *99 ligcnt acts of the defendant. It was alleged in the complaint that Albert Bloom suffered injuries while at work on the deck of a vessel belonging to the defendant, from which injuries he died, leaving surviving him the plaintiff, who alleged herself to have been dependent on her husband for support. While, formally, plaintiff sued as representative of the estate of Albert Bloom,, she did not allege that there were any other heirs.

The cause of action is apparently authorized by the provisions of section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, which declares that — ■

The defendant appeared in the state court, and showed that it was a foreign corporation and obtained an order removing the cause to this court. It has filed an answer to the complaint of the plaintiff, and has set forth a special and affirmative defense as to which the plaintiff has demurred on the ground that the matter so alleged does not constitute any defense in law. The affirmative defense so alleged is as follows:

Section 24 of the Judicial Code defines the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States. Subdivision 3 thereof provides that—

In so far as by the amendment referred to Congress has attempted to deprive the District Court of admiralty jurisdiction which it formerly possessed, that effort is without validity. In the recent case of Sheehy v. Canadian Farmer, 290 Fed. 601 , decided here on June 2, 1923, that subject was carefully considered. There may be quoted from the opinion filed in that case the following, as expressing the view of this court on that question:

The conclusion thus announced is an answer to the contention that in every case where the federal courts have in admiralty possessed clear jurisdiction to administer a remedy, state Legislatures, by compensation acts, and under the sanction of the act of Congress amending section 24 of the Judicial Code, might take away that jurisdiction. Under the facts as pleaded in the complaint here presented, however, a further question arises as affecting matters which may be urged in defense.

This action is brought'to recover damages for the death of the husband of the plaintiff, caused by the wrong of the defendant, which wrong was a maritime tort. Damages for the death of a person so caused are not allowed under the general maritime law. Where a remedy has been afforded, it has rested solely upon express statutes. For instance, the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 .provides for the recovery of damages for the death of any seaman by the personal representative of the deceased. By act of March 30, 1920 (41 Stat. E. 537), an action is authorized to be brought to recover damages because of the death of a person caused by wrongful act and occurring on the high seas. The facts of this case, as they are alleged in the complaint, bring it under neither of these statutes; hence it is left to be determined whether, under the statute of the state of California, this action may be maintained as a suit at law, or whether, because the death alleged was due to a maritime tort, admiralty will enforce the state remedy as being within its proper field. Prior to the decision in The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 , 7 Sup. Ct. 140, 30 L. Ed. 358 , it had been affirmed by so.me of the federal judges that, regardless of’ the existence of any statute, a cause of action .for damages for the death of a person asserted in the interest of his heirs or dependents and growing out of a maritime tort would be enforced. In some of the cases it was even intimated that a cause of action for injuries suffered to the deceased in his lifetime, as distinct from resulting damages to his heirs or dependents, might survive the death of the person injured. The decision in The Harrisburg, however, definitely settled the law. The court, after reviewing many of the decisions and noting the conflict between them, pointed out -that where actions of the kind referred to had been maintained in admiralty, the argument was used that it was “not that the maritime law, as administered in common-law courts, is different from the common law in this particular, but that the common law is not founded on good reason, and is contrary to ‘natural equity and the general principles of law.’ ”

And the court proceeded to say:

With the admiralty courts alone rests the jurisdiction to enforce a maritime claim in rem; the jurisdiction in personam may be concurrent with the state courts.

And see The Corsair, 145 U. S. 347 , 12 Sup. Ct. 949, 36 L. Ed. 727 ; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 404 , 28 Sup. Ct. 133, 52 L. Ed. 264 ; Monongahela River Coal & Coke Co. v. Schinnerer, 196 Fed. 375 , 117 C. C. A. 193 .

In State of Maryland v. Miller (D. C.) 180 Fed. 796 , Judge Rose said:

See, also, Trauffler v. Detroit & C. N. Co. (D. C.) 181 Fed. 256 ; Humboldt Lumber Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. Christopherson et al. (C. C. A. 9th) 73 Fed. 239 , 19 C. C. A. 481 , 46 L. R. A. 264.

We come next to the question as to whether the statute of California gives an unqualified right to a remedy for damages which may be enforced in a court of justice. If it gives no such right, even though the tort complained of lies in the maritime field, admiralty can afford no relief; neither can an action at law be sustained. And here we find that the purported right given by section 377 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is deprived of any applicability to the cause of action attempted to be stated, by reason of the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of California (Cal. Statutes 1917, p. 834). That act, which provides for compensation to be paid by an employer to the dependents of his employee whose death has occurred by reason of injuries growing out of his employment, confers authority to adjust such awards solely on a board of a quasi administrative character. That act provides that compensation provided to be paid by its terms shall be “in lieu of any other liability whatsoever,” and that a proceeding to obtain such award shall be “the exclusive remedy against the employer.” Certain exceptions are made covering cases where the injury is caused by the personal act of the employer, ctp., in which cases the employee may, at his option, maintain an action *102 for damages. 'The courts of California have construed the provisions of that act and have held that under its terms no right of action against the employer (as provided in California Code of Civil Procedure, § 376) is given a mother for the death of a son caused as the result of injuries received during his employment, but that relief must be sought solely before the compensation board. McLain v. Llewellyn Iron Works, 56 Cal. App. 58 , 204 Pac. 869 . In other words, that the mother was not a person entitled to claim the right given by the general statute of the state which provided for damages for death occasioned by the wrongful act of another.

In order that the court of admiralty may give effect in a maritime cause to the remedy which must first be authorized by a statute, it would seem that the remedy should be of such character as would permit it to be enforced in a court of justice. As was said in The Plarrisburg, supra:

Under the law of California the plaintiff here, under the facts alleged, could not go into a court of law and assert a claim for damages under the provisions of section 377 of the 'California Code of Civil Procedure. That section does not apply to her case at all. Any claim that she has must be dealt with by a board of commissioners, and she must receive allowances of money in the manner and at the times and for the period which the law and the commissioners acting under it may determine that she is entitled to. Such rights as are given under the California Employers’ Liability Act cannot suitably be enforced in the District Court of the United States under admiralty proceedings. From this it must necessarily be concluded that the plaintiff’s demurrer to the separate and affirmative defense should be overruled, and an order will be entered accordingly.