In the fall of 1920 the plaintiff was a candidate for the office of United States Senator in the state of Nevada. During the campaign preceding the election the defendant, in the Nevada State Journal, published a number of articles concerning the plaintiff and his candidacy, jl'wo of these were entitled “A Promising Record” and “Ghosts of the Past.” The present action was instituted against the publishing company and one Kilborn to recover damages for the publication of the two last-mentioned articles, the plaintiff claiming that the first accused him of the crime of bribery and the second of the crime of murder. Inasmuch as no question is made concerning the publication of the articles, or of their libelous character, if false, we deem it sufficient to say in this connection that the inference of the plaintiff is not overdrawn. The complaint contained two causes of action, based on the two publications. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff as to both causes of action, against both defendants, for both compensatory and punitive damages. Judgment was entered upon the verdict, and the case is now before us on writ of error.

The brief of the plaintiffs in error contains no formal assignments of error, but it is claimed generally: First, that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict as against the plaintiff in error Kil-born; second, that the articles were privileged communications, or the publications were made on an occasion of privilege; and, third, that the evidence was insufficient to justify a verdict for punitive damages.

1. It appears from the testimony that the plaintiff in error Kilborn was the owner of all the stock of the Nevada State Journal Publishing Company for about 10 years prior to October 5, 1920, and was president of dhe corporation. But it is claimed in his behalf that on the latter date he assigned the stock to his wife, tendered his resignation as an officer of the corporation, and thereafter took no part in the management or control of the paper, and had no part in the publication of the articles complained of. The record shows that the purported assignment from Kilborn to his wife was signed by the wife, and not by Kilborn, and that the stock transfer bears no revenue stamp as required by law. These facts, of course, are not controlling; but they were competent and proper for the consideration of the jury. It further appears that Kilborn was in and ‘about the newspaper office at or about the time of the publication of the two articles; that some of the information contained in the second article was communicated to *62 him in person after October 5, and immediately before the publication; that when a retraction was demanded, after the publication of the article, hé declined to retract,. stating that he had in his possession an affidavit upon which the article was based, and that the affidavit justified the publication. No complaint is made of the charge of the court and these facts were ample warrant for the submission of the question of the responsibility of Kilborn for the publication of the libels to the jury, and the verdict is controlling here.

2. In the discussion of the next question counsel claims that there is a distinction between a privileged communication and a communication on an occasion of privilege; that- in the latter case there can be no recovery, except for express malice. In view of the fact that the jury has found actual or express malice here, the distinction is not very material, even if such a distinction exists in law or in fact. We will therefore first direct our attention to the question of actual or express malice. Upon that question the court charged the jury as follows:

When we consider the defamatory character of the publications, their admitted falsity, the entire absence of inquiry or investigation to ascertain the truth of the charges before publication, th^ refusal to retract after publication, the assertion of the substantial truth of the charges in the answers filed a year later, and all the surrounding circumstances, the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of actual or express malice is beyond question.

3. We will now return to the question of privilege. Upon that question the court instructed the jury as follows:

This instruction is in harmony with the great weight, of authority. Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163 , 3 Am. Dec. 212 ; Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77 ; King v. Root, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 113, 21 Am. Dec. 102 ; Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158 , 31 Am. Rep. 757 ; Upton v. Hume, 24 Or. 420 , 33 Pac. 810 , 21 L. R. A. 493, 41 Am. St. Rep. 863 ; Post Pub. Co. v. Moloney, 50 Ohio St. 71 , 33 N. F. 921; Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353 , 83 N. W. 110 , 51 L. R. A. 451; Post Pub. Co. v. Hallan, 59 Fed. 530, 8 .C. C. A. 201.

Other questions not discussed in the briefs were referred to upon the argument, but are not of sufficient importance to call for special consideration.

There is no error in the record, and the judgment of the court below is affirmed.