“In an indictment upon a statute, it is not sufficient to set forth the offense in the words of the statute, unless those words, of themselves, fully, directly, and expressly, without. any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the- elements *569 necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.” U. S. v. Carll, 105 U. S. 612 . The present indictment is based upon section 5404 of the Revised Statutes, which reads:

The indictment contains two counts, the first of which charges that the defendant, at a certain time and place within this judicial district, did corruptly, and by threats and force, and by a certain threatening letter written by him to one Clara Armstrong, who was at the time his wife, but living separate and apart from him, endeavor to influence, obstruct, and impede the due administration of justice in the circuit court of the United States for the ninth circuit, southern district of California.

The second count charges that the defendant, at the same time and place, did corruptly, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously endeavor to influence, obstruct, and impede the due administration of justice in the circuit court of the United States, ninth circuit, southern district of California, in the following manner, to wit:

It is essential to the sufficiency of an indictment that the acts charged be, if proved, sufficient to support a conviction of the offense alleged. In neither count of the indictment is it alleged what proceeding in the circuit court of the United States for the ninth circuit, southern district of California, the defendant endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede, nor, indeed, that there was any proceeding there pending to ho influenced, obstructed, or impeded, nor that there was any proceeding pending there at all. The threatening letter that the defendant is by the first count charged with having written to his wife is not set out or so described as to he capable of identification, and the sole act charged by the second count, against him is that he procured the arrest within this district of his wife, who was at the time living separate and apart from him, for the purpose and with the ini,out of procuring from her “a dissolution of the bonds of matrimony existing between them through such complaint and arrest.” It by no means necessarily follows from the alleged fact that defendant procured the arrest of his wife within this judicial district that such arrest was made under process issued out of a court of the United States. *570 The object of the indictment is, as said by the sfipreme court in U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 :

The indictment in the present case does not answer either of these requirements.

Demurrer sustained.