The libel and interventions in this

case were filed to enforce liens against the steamer Alvira for materials furnished and labor performed in repairing and refitting said vessel, and also for services rendered in navigating the same in the Bay of San Francisco. The libel was filed on November 20, 1893, by W. W. De Laño et al., and is brought to recover the sum of $219.14, alleged to be due for materials furnished and services rendered in plumbing and ship-furnishing work done to the vessel, it being claimed that the same constitutes a lien by virtue of section 813 of the Code of Civil Procedure of this state. On November 25, 3893, W. H. Batchelder and some 13 other libelants filed a libel of intervention, each claiming specified amounts for personal services rendered, in various capacities, to the vessel on her trips as a passenger boat, aggregating $509.32. On the same day, Ingler & Atkinson and others filed a libel of intervention for materials furnished and labor performed on the vessel while she was undergoing repairs, liens being claimed therefor under the state law. The claims contained in this intervention are as follows: Ingler & Atkinson,, for materials furnished (lumber, moldings, sashes, doors, etc.) and joiner work done to the steamer Alvira, balance due, $718.56; E. (1. Buswell Paint Company, paints and painting, $369.95; Humboldt Lumber Company, lumber furnished, $163.21; Puget Sound Lumber Company, lumber, $416.58. On November 27, 1893, Costello & Boucher and others also filed a libel of intervention for materials furnished and work done in repairing the steamer Alvira,, and alleged to constitute liens upon the vessel by virtue of the state law. These claims are as follows: Costello'& Boucher (Oakland Boiler Works), materials furnished and work done, $340.83; J. M. Prairo, furnishing materials and doing work in blacksmithing and ironwork, $109.05. The claims set out in the original libel of De Laño et al. were not pressed at the hearing, the parties having arrived at some settlement or understanding concerning the same; «nd those of Batchelder et al. are also eliminated from consideration, they having been satisfied in full, and a dismissal filed, March 27, 1894.

The total demands against the vessel aggregated $2,846.64, but the claims of De Laño et al., for materials furnished, etc., and those of Batchelder et al., for personal services rendered, having been *146 withdrawn from consideration, the demands outstanding amount to $2,118.18, for which judgment in rem is sought. The question to be determined by the court is whether these remaining claims, which are all for materials furnished and labor performed in repairing and refitting the steamer Alvira, constitute liens against the vessel by virtue of the state law contained in section 813 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as follows:

The materials were furnished, and the labor performed, in repairing and refitting the steamer Alvira, under the following circumstances: The vessel was owned by J. I-i. Rideout, E. V. Rideout, and Alvira J. Rideout. J. R. Rideout was her managing owner. She was designed and employed as a freight boat, navigating the Bay of San Francisco and contiguous inland waters. On the 29th of July, 1893, she was chartered by the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company, a corporation formed and existing under the laws of the state of California. She was chartered for the period of one year, commencing August 1, 1893, at a -monthly rental of $250,. with the option to the charterer to purchase her, at the expiration of the charter, for $18,000, on certain specified terms. She was to navigate the Bay of San Francisco, and was chartered to be used as a passenger boat. The charter party provided, among other things, as follows:

The steamer Alvira was a freight boat. The Davie Ferry-& Transportation Company chartered her to do passenger service. To be of any nse to the company for that purpose it was necessary that she should be repaired and altered from a freight boat into one adapted to the transportation of passengers and such incidental freight service as is peculiar to boats engaged in the ferry *147 imsincss. That such was (.he mutual understanding of the parties is patent. It was in thus repairing and adapting the steamer Alvira for passenger duty that the expenses for materials and repairs were incurred. It appears that the Davie .Perry & Transportation Company became insolvent some time after the materials had been furnished and the repairs had been completed, and the remaining intervening libelants seek to enforce their claims against the vessel itself, basing their right to do so upon the lien given by section SI.‘1 of the Code of Civil Procedure of this state. Therefore, the ultimate fact to be determined is, have tlie intervening libelants a. lien, on the vessel proceeded against, for the materials furnished and the repairs placed by them upon the steamer Alvira?

The claimants of the vessel, as 1 understand their position, da not insist that the repairs were not necessary to fit the vessel for (he business she was chartered to engage in, or that they were not reasonable. But, however that may be, the evidence shows that the materials and repairs wore necessary for the purpose for which 1he vessel was chartered, and were reasonablé. The claimants certainly have not shown that they were otherwise; but they insist that no lieu accrued in favor of the interveners because the latter,, as they claim, gave credit to the Davie Perry & Transportation Company, and not to the vessel.

As this is the home port of the Alvira, and as her owners reside here, and her owner pro hae vice, the Davie Perry & Transportation Company, has its place of business here, the intervening libelants, if they recover at all, must: do so by virtue of the lien created by the state statute, subject, however, to the principles of admiralty law which obtains in the vesting and enforcement' of marititme liens. By the general maritime law, no implied lien accrues in favor of supply or material men upon vessels in their home ports. To secure themselves for such advances, an express hypothecation is. necessary. The implied lien only vests where vessels are in foreign ports, and a necessity for supplies or materials exists, as well as a necessity for «‘edit, and such credit is actually given to the vessel. These are well-settled rules of (lie general maritime law, and have been repeatedly enunciated by (he supreme court of the United States. The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 442 ; The Lottawaima, 21 Wall. 558 ; The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1 , 13 Sup. Ct. 498. See, to the same effect, Tlie Samuel Marshall, 49 Fed. 754 ; Id., 4 C. C. A. 385 , 54 Fed. 396 . This limitation in tlie general maritime law as to domestic liens gave rise to the state lien laws. Their object; was to afford to supply and material men, in the home port of a vessel, the same protection which, by the general admiralty law, was secured to supply and material men upon foreign vessels. As was stilted bv Judge Hoffman in The Columbus, 5 Sawy. 488 , Fed. Cas. No. 3,044:

The validity of these state statutes giving domestic liens was recognized by the supreme court in the case of. The Lottawanna, supra, and has never since been questioned. In the case of The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1 , 13 Sup. Ct. 498, the latest expression by the supreme court of the law on the subject of maritime liens, the following propositions were regarded as settled. Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the court, said:

Although the facts of that case are not analogous to those in the case at bar, the question there being whether a prior recorded mortgage of the vessel had priority over liens created by thé state *149 statute, yet the general remarks of the learned justice are in point, as showing that liens granted by state statutes are placed on the same footing with liens recognized by the general admiralty and maritime law. But, while the court's of admiralty are held to have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce these state liens upon vessels, yet, in enforcing them, they do not adopt; and apply these statutes in all their terms; they do not necessarily enforce all their provisions; nor do they follow the const ruction placed upon them by the state tribunals. In applying and enforcing them they subject them to the general principles of the admiralty and maritime la.w, or rather to those principles of the admiralty law which obtain and apply to maritime liens. In other words, they adopt the local statutes in so far as they create a lien of a maritime character. The Guiding Star, 18 Fed. 268 . While it was intended to place domestic liens on an equal footing with foreign liens, yet this, of itself, does not render foreign and domestic liens for supplies and repairs in all respects the same. The lien given to a vessel deemed to he foreign is not always, in all its features, exactly similar to, or a perfect counterpart of, the lien provided by slate statutes to vessels in their home port. The two are sometimes qualified by differences which even the application of ihe broad and general principles of admiralty law do not, in all cases, harmonize. As was said by Judge Hoffman in The Columbus, supra:

The two liens noi: being always identical, ihe general principles of the maritime law which apply to maritime liens cannot always he unqualifiedly applied to the lions created by the state law. The court of admiralty must, therefore, often discrimina to between the two. For instance, it is ihe law, by the weight of authority, that where a vessel is in a foreign port, and her owner is with her, supplies or materials furnished, or repairs done, to her-, are presumably furnished on the personal credit of the owner, and therefore no lien accrues in favor of the supply or material man. The Mary Morgan, 28 Fed. 196 , and cases there cited; Stephenson v. The Francis, 21 Fed. 722 ; The Now Then, 5 C. C. A. 206 , 55 Fed. 523 ; The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. 416 . But, however pertinent the reasons may be for the existence of such a rule respecting vessels in foreign ports, they do not apply to the liens given in the home port by state statutes. Domestic liens for supplies or repairs furnished at the request of the owner or of his agent would never obtain in a *150 home port, were the same principle which is held to apply to vessels in foreign ports to be enforced, for the very idea of a “home port” assumes that the owner resides there or transacts his business there. We thus see the difficulty that would arise if this principle by which maritime liens are measured and governed where the vessel is in a foreign port, and her owner is with her, were attempted to be applied, in its full terms, to local liens. Manifestly, the very object of the local lien—the lien itself—would be defeated. It is this attempt to apply in all cast's general principles that tends to confuse the subject of local liens. The peculiar facts and equities of each case must often go far in determining the inherent justness of claims for supplies, materials, or repairs furnished in the home port. The observations of Loche, J., in The Cumberland, 30 Fed. 451 , are directly in point. He said:

Keeping in mind, therefore, the obvious purpose of state laws in giving the lien, viz. to give to domestic supply and material men the same protection which the maritime law afforded to foreign material and supply men, and remembering that though foreign and domestic liens are, in their general features, similar, yet they are not identical, and giving the proved facts in this case their proper-weight, we proceed to inquire, what are the general principles of admiralty and maritime law which properly obtain and apply to the liens claimed in the case at bar?

The general principles of admiralty law which must exist to give efficacy to a inaritime lien for supplies, materials, or repairs are the following: (1) There must be a necessity for the supplies, materials, or repairs; (2) there must also be a necessity to obtain credit; and (3) credit must have been given to the vessel. Proof that the supplies, materials, or repairs were necessary carries with it a presumption of the second requisite,—that there was a necessity for credit;' the necessity for credit being presumed to exist where the supplies, etc., were necessary and are proved to have been such. The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129 . In that case the supreme court say:

The third requisite, so far as this case is concerned, will determine whether the intervening libelants have a lien or not. There is no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion as to the first two requisites. That tlie materials and repairs were necessary is abundantly established by the evidence. The vessel was chartered to do passenger service. At that time she was fitted up and was being run *151 as a freight boat. Unless altered, she was totally useless to the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company. I find, therefore, that: tlie materials and repairs furnished were necessary for the purpose for which the vessel was chartered, and that the charges for the same, so far as appears from the evidence, were reasonable. But ihe question of difficulty is, to whom did the intervening libelants give credit.,—to the vessel or to the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company?

The intervening libelants all testify that they were not. informed, and did not know, who were the actual 'owners of the vessel, nor did they know that, the relation which the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company bore to the vessel was simply that of charterer. Tt. is true they did not inquire. The materials and repairs were furnished at the instance of John McGrath and Cápt. Ebert. The lat-an- was the general manager of the company, and 01 tiered some of the materials, hut it seems that McGrath did most of the ordering. Alien preparations were first being made to carry on the repairs and alterations, Capt. Ebert: accompanied' Mr. McGrath to several of the intervening libelants’ places of business, and introduced the latter, telling them to comply with such orders as McGrath might give them for materials and repairs. McGrath, was employed by the company, and acted as a sort: of foreman joiner. As such he had charge and superintended thi1 repairs and alterations which were made on the Alvira. He testifies that he was authorized to order such materials or work as he desired. As to what he said when ordering these materials and work, he testified as follows on cross-examination:

On redirect examinaiion he testified:

Gapt. Ebert was not produced act a witness by either side. The claimants do not produce a single witness to impeach (lie testimony of McGrath. On the other hand, that witness is corrobora Led by *152 the interveners, who testified as to the fact that the materials and repairs were ordered for the vessel particularly, and not for the company generally, and that McGrath said nothing whatever to them about the vessel not being liable for the expenses. Nothing appears in the evidence to the effect that McGrath or anybody else ever advised the interveners—certainly not until after the repairs had been fully completed—-that the vessel was under charter, and that theDavie Ferry & Transportation Company was the charterer, and not the owner, of the vessel; and the evidence discloses no fact or facts which, either directly or indirectly, were calculated to put the interveners, as reasonable men, upon inquiry. They were told to send the bills to the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company, who would pay them, and in each instance, according to the testimony of McGrath and of the interveners, they were told that the materials or repairs were for the vessel Alvira, particularly designating her. To the entries in the books or ledgers, and the bills, of the material men, I do not attach much importance one way or the other. As a rule, they seem to have contained the name of the company and the name of the vessel,—Alvira. But the latter was omitted in some instances, and in others the name of the company was left out. However, as just stated, I do not attach particular importance to these entries. While the entries are entitled to some weight, and, in connection with other facts, may serve to assist in the inquiry, yet they are not always deemed reliable evidence, and other judges, conscious of the opportunity afforded to unscrupulous supply or material men of making evidence for themselves, have inclined to a rule which, under ordinary circumstances, or the peculiar-facts of a particular case, would give but little, weight to such evidence. In the language1 of Taft, Circuit Judge, in The Samuel Marshall Case, 4 C. C. A. 392 , 54 Fed. 403 :

Nor would the mere fact that the entries were made solely against the company, without mentioning the name of the vessel, of itself, under the circumstances of a ¡particular case, have much weight to show that credit was intended to be given to the company, and not to the vessel. The supply or material man may have made such an entry simply to indicate who was to pay the bills, intending all along to give credit to the vessel. In other words, the intention of the parties must be gathered from all the facts of the case. In the case at bar the interveners all say that they intended to hold the vessel; that they thought the vessel was good for the materials and repairs; that they simply sent their bills to the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company, upon the latter’s request to do so, for payment. The mere fact' that they looked to the company for the payment of their bills does not, of itself, show that they did not *153 intend to give credit to the vessel. Somebody must pay the bills. The ship itself—the inanimate thing—cannot do so. “Goods, as goods, cannot offend, forfeit, unlade, pay duties, or the like, but men 'whose goods they are.” Vaughan, C. J., in Sheppard v. Gosnold, Vaughan, 159, 172. .Nor. I take it, would the fact that they gave personal credit prejudice their lien, provided it satisfactorily appeared that they gave credit to the vessel as well. And I think It may be safely said that in almost every case, in domestic ports, a personal credit incidentally accompanies live «-edit given to the vessel. As was said by Judge Benedict in The India, 11 Fed. 176 :

Aside from the testimony of McGrath and of the interveners, the following testimony of one of the material men is significant as tending to show that credit was intended to be given to the vessel. G. L. Ingler, a member of the firm of lugler & Atkinson, who furnished the Alvira with shipwork, doors, windows, sashes, moldings, and áuch like, to the value of $1,307, of which, however, $588.19 has been paid by the Gavie Ferry & Transportation Company, leaving a balance due which is one of the items of this suit, testifies as follows :

On cross-examination he testified as follows:

On redirect examination he states that he furnished (he materials on the promise that the boat would be good for it. lie simply looked to (he company for the'payment of the bills; he did not look exclusively to it for the money.

Another fact of some significance is that there were credits for the materials and supplies of 30 to 60 days’ time. The company had been organized but a short time previously, and it does not appear *154 likely that materials would be furnished, and repairs made, in amounts ranging all the way from $109.05 to $1,307, with no other security than the bare promise of the company to settle in 30 to GO days’ time. The only security possessed by the interveners Avas the lien given by the state laAv upon the vessel. Taking all the facts of the case into consideration, I cannot but conclude that they intended to give credit to the vessel, and not to rely exclusively upon a personal credit of the company.

In the case of The Patapsco, 13 Wall. 329 , a principle of admiralty laAv was' declared which, while it relatéd to supplies furnished a ship in a foreign port, ai>pears to be applicable to this case. It was'held that, Avhere the credit is given to the vessel, there is a lien, and the burden of displacing it is on the claimant of the A-essel. “He must show affirmatively that the credit Avas giAren to the company, to the exclusion of a credit to the Vessel.” This the claimants have certainly failed to do in the case at bar. The libelants proved, to the satisfaction of the court, that the repairs were necessary for the purpose for which the Abrirá was chartered, and that they were reasonable; and, further, that they intended to give credit to the vessel, and not to the DaA-ie Ferry & Transportation Company exclusively. According to the rule laid doAvn by the supreme court in the case cited, the burden then lay on the claimants to establish affirmatively that credit had not been given to the vessel. Failing in this, the lien attached.

This view of the laAv Avould dispose of the case; but counsel for claimants advances another proposition. It is contended that the lien given by the state laAv could not attach because the expenses for the materials and repairs Avere incurred, not by the claimants (the owners), but by the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company (the charterer); that the materials and repairs were primarily for the benefit of the charterer; and that the latter, and not the vessel, is personally liable for the same. The interveners maintain that they are, notwithstanding, entitled to the domestic lien, because they furnished the materials and completed the repairs in good faith, not knowing or being informed that the Vessel was under charter, or who the own'er or owners were. The rights and liabilities of charterers are succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Curtis in Webb v. Peirce, 1 Curt. 108 , Fed. Cas. No. 17,320, in the following-language: •

But the fact alone that a vessel is operated by a charterer does not prevent, in proper cases, a maritime lien for supplies, materials, or repairs from attaching. It is Avell settled that in foreign ports the charterer may create liens on the vessel,—may hypothecate her under the same conditions as the general owner could. Their rights *155 in that regard are identical. In such case “(he whole object of giving admiralty process and priority to privileged creditors is to furnish wings and legs to the vessel to get back for the benefit, of all concerned; that is, to complete her voyage.” Heetion 42, Hen. A dm. Jur. &■ I’roc., contains the following:

This would seem to dispose of the contention of counsel for claim-mils that, as the general owner was not originally or personally bound for these materials and repairs, therefore (lie vessel could not be.

.In the case of The India, 14 Fed. 478 , 16 Fed. 263 , previously referred to, which was a case of coals furnished to a vessel in a foreign port upon the order of the agent of the charlerer, the latter resided in New York, and the coal was furnished in Philadelphia. It bring the port of a different state, it was, for that, reason, by virtue of The General Hniith Case, supra, considered as foreign for the purposes of applying the principles of the admiralty law. Judge Benedict held that the lien attached to the vessel, although the general owner could not be held personally liable. I!e said:

In that ease the court treated of a lien accruing in a foreign port; but there does not appear to be any good reason why the same principle of admiralty law, Unit one who intrusts another with the full possession, control, and management of a vessel is deemed to consent that liens for necessary supplies, materials, or repairs may be created on such, should not apply, in proper cases, in determining whether domestic liens have or have not attached, and with entire justice. An owner who charters his vessel must be deemed to consent that such liens may accrue. He is charged with notice that they may accrue. This, it seems to me, is nothing hut fair and equitable to the domestic supply or material man. who may know nothing of the real relation existing between the general and special owner, and be deceived by taking the ostensible owner for the real owner. In other words, as to innocent supply men, the general owner is subject, in proper cases, to the principle of an equitable estoppel. But, by giving notice to the supply or material man *156 of the fact that the vessel is in the hands of a charterer, the general owner may protect his property from maritime liens. Therefore, the general principle that the owner is deemed to consent to the accruing of liens where the entire possession, control, and management of a vessel is intrusted to another is qualified by this condition: If the supply or material man know of the charter or the relation in which the' ostensible owner holds, or if he be advised of the real status of such relation by the general owner or by the charterer, or is placed in possession of such facts as would put, or ought to put, a reasonably prudent man on inquiry, the pre-. sumption arises that the supplies, materials, or repairs were furnished upon the credit of the charterer himself, and there is no lien. And the onus lies on the supply or material man to remove this presumption. The reason for this is plain. Courts of admiralty do not favor secret liens; otherwise, owners would often fall an easy prey to liens created by injudicious or unscrupulous charterers. Moreover, the supplies, materials, or repairs are generally furnished exclusively for the benefit of the charterer; at least it may be said that he is the party primarily benefited thereby, the owner, as a general rule, being only incidentally benefited, if at all.

But in the case at bar the liens cannot be considered as secret, for the reason that the owners knew all the time the exact situation of affairs. They knew that repairs and alterations would have to be made, and that they were being made. In fact, it is in evidence that Capt. Rideout himself, the managing owner, visited the vessel while the repairs were in progress, and even went so far as to suggest some improvements or modifications of the work. The owners, therefore, knew as well as the charterers that the repairs and alterations were being made, and yet not one of them ever gave notice to any of the interveners that they would not be liable for any liens that might accrue from such repairs and alterations. They did not, so far as the evidence discloses, even apprise any of the interveners of the character in which the company operated the vessel. It is testified by Capt. Rideout that he did make some effort to give notice to several of the material men, but this attempt proved ineffectual. It was, confessedly, not given to any of the interveners who now press their claims, and certainly not until after the materials had all been furnished and the repairs entirely completed. Had the owners not known that these materials and repairs were being furnished, a different phase of the matter would be presented; but it appears affirmatively that they were fully aware of what was being done. Can they now be heard to complain, when, with full knowledge of all these facts, they tacitly assented to these material men placing over $2,000 worth of repairs on the steamer? Are they not estopped, as against these material men, by their own laches, when, having had ample opportunity to protect their property from the vesting of maritime liens, they either omitted or declined to take the necessary steps to secure such protection? To refuse to enforce these liens, in the face of the conduct of the owners, would not be equitable, it seems to me, under the *157 circumstances, uor would it be consistent with the object of the statute in providing the domestic lien.

But counsel for the claimants contend that the duty devolved upon • the material men to And out who the owner of the vessel was, and the relation the vessel bore to the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company. But what was Hiere which, from all Hie facts in the case, it may he said, placed tiie material men on inquiry? The vessel had been chart (‘red by the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company for the term of one year. One of the stipulations of the charter party gave the charterer the option of purchasing the vessel for $18,000 at the expiration of the chartin' party. It also provided that repairs and alterations might be made by the charterer, and that no lien should accrue therefor. The material men knew nothing of these arrangements or stipulations in the charter party, nor, so far as the evidence shows, did they know that the vessel was chartered at all, or that the company was anything more or less than the general owner of the vessel. Certainly, if complete possession, management, and control are indicative of ownership, the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company was the ostensible owner. To be sure, the interveners did not make inquiry for the purpose of being informed as to tbe actual fact. But, in view of the circumstances of this case, they were hardly called upon to do so. There was nothing calling for an inquiry. To all appearances the company was the owner. It ran the vessel; hired the captain, officers, and crew. In fact, the captain employed was a son of Hie managing owner. The company paid the running expenses; engaged to make the necessary repairs and alterations. Everything seemed regular. There was nothing, so far as the evidence discloses, which would tend to arouse the suspicions of a reasonably prudent person; nothing which might he calculated to place one on inquiry. Certain it is that nothing that the owners ever said or did can be regarded as any notice to the material men, or as being sufficient to put them on inquiry. In view of all the facts of ihis case, I do not think that the interveners’ failure to institute inquiries, when not in possession of such facts as would tend to alarm a reasonably prudent person, and impose the duty of ascertaining the condition of affairs, can be said to justify a court, governed by equitable principles, in refusing to enforce the liens claimed, particularly when the owners, who did know the exact situation of affairs, failed to protect their property by giving timely notice to the material men. In the absence of notice, or of facts sufficient to put them upon inquiry, the interveners had a right to rely upon the apparent authority and ownership of the Davie Ferry & Transportation Company. In The Cumberland, supra, Judge Locke used the following language:

The same judge, sitting as a member of the circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit, iu the case of Norwegian S. S. Co. v. Washington, 6 C. C. A. 313 , 57 Fed. 224 , said:

The case of The John Farron, 14 Blatchf. 24 , Fed. Cas. No. 7,341, decided by Johnson, J., in the circuit court for the second circuit, is quite similar in principle to the case at bar. It was held that a domestic lien attached, under the following circumstances, somewhat analogous to the present case. The statute of New York of April 24, 1862 (Laws 1862, p. 956, § 1), gave a lien on a vessel for a debt contracted by her “master, owner, charterer, builder, or consignee,” "or the agent of either of them,” within the state, on account of labor or materials furnished in the state for repairing such vessel. H., the owner of a vessel, contracted in writing to sell her to S., and delivered possession and control of her to S., who, as her apparent owner, contracted in New York, upon her credit, a debt for repairs *159 to her. In the contract of sale it was agreed that S. should have possession, and might make repairs, hnt that such repairs should not-be a lien on the vessel or a claim against EL; but the creditor had no notice of such agreement. The case had been appealed from the district court, where it was held that the lieu could not attach. Subsequent to that decision, and before the case; was determined in the circuit court, the supreme court decided The Lottawanna Oase, upholding the validity of domestic liens. In view of this fact, and of the further fact that the owner had intrusted the possession of the vessel, under the contract of sale, to the prospective vendees, by which tlu\v were enabled to appear as owners to third persons, Judge Johnson held that the lien should be enforced against the vessel, although the owner incurred no personal liability. The learned judge said:

The counsel for claimants object that, in the above case, the statute of Yew York mentioned the classes of persons who could contract a debt which would become a lien on the vessel, viz. “'master, owner, charterer, builder, or consignee,” “or- the agent; of either of ihepi;” and as the debt in that ease was contracted by the charterers, and the statute of this state makes no such specification of persons competent to incur debts for which liens would attach, that; therefore the case is different in principle from the case at; bar, and is not; of authority. But I do not think the distinction is well take n, for by the law of this state, previously referred to, a lien attaches to vessels “for work done or materials furnished in this state for their construction, repair, or equipment.” The preceding subdivision of the same section, relating to “supplies” and “services,” giies a lien when such are furnished and rendered “at the request of their respective -owners, masters, agents, or consignees.” thus specifying the persons at;- whose instance debts for “supplies” or “services” may become liens. The subdivision relating to liens “for work done or materials furnished in this stale for their construction, repair, or equipment,” it will be noticed, makes no such specification. This very fact disposes of counsel’s objection, for the effect of the subdivision is to make all persons, who possess the authority, competent to contract; for work or materials, including, of course, charterers. Therefore, whatever question there may he whether, under the peculiar phraseology of the local lien law, a “charterer” would be competent to contract for “supplies" or “sen-vices’" for which a lien would attach in this stab', there would seem to be no doubt that such a person may contract for “repairs” or “materials,” *160 and that a lien would Test therefor, provided, of course, that, tested by those general principles of admiralty law which are held to apply to domestic liens, it proves otherwise valid.

Counsel for claimants rely greatly upon The Samuel Marshall Case, 49 Fed. 754 ; Id., 4 C. C. A. 385 , 54 Fed. 396 . The opinions in that case contain a very satisfactory statement of the law of domestic liens, both in the decisions of the district judge and of the appellate tribunal (circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit); but upon a careful reading of the case I do not find anything inconsistent in the law, as there expounded, with that of the case at bar. The facts are of a different character, and this, of course, must be taken into consideration. In that case both the lower court and the appellate tribunal held that actual notice had been given to the supply man. In the case at bar no actual notice was given to the material men, nor am I able to find, from the evidence produced, that they were in possession of such facts as ought to have put them upon inquiry, or that their failure to be informed was due to carelessness or indifference. In the case of The Samuel Marshall the owner had no actual notice of the furnishing of the coal, and had, therefore, no opportunity of protecting himself by notifying the supply man. In the case at bar the owners were fully apprised of the fact that repairs were being made, and that materials were being furnished therefor. There, the coal for which a lien was claimed was something which the charterer was bound to furnish, and for which the owner received no direct benefit; here the owner derives some benefit in getting back an improved vessel. I do not allude to this last feature as constituting a distinguishing mark which would require the application of different principles of admiralty law, but simply to show that the facts of the Samuel Marshall Case are not analogous,fin their main features, to the case at bar.

Oapt. Rideout claims that the vessel, as a freight boat, has not been increased in value, although over $2,000 worth of repairs and alterations have been made. But this statement is flatly contradicted by other witnesses, entirely disinterested, so far as it appears, who say that the Alvira is a much better boat than she was before. Of course, it is to be remembered that the vessel is now fitted up as a passenger boat. Certainly, Capt. Rideout cannot be heard to object against this, for he himself consented to it, and, it seems, very willingly, as it is in evidence that the vessel had. been unemployed for some months. A witness testified that she could be turned into a freight boat again, if desired, at an expense of about $100, and that she would be in a much better condition than she was prior to the repairs. Capt. Rideout says that it would require some $500, but, when asked to detail the items, he was unable to do so.

Taking into consideration all the facts and equities of this case, and the law applicable thereto, it is my opinion that the interveners are entitled to the process of this court to enforce the lien provided by section 8Í3 of the Code of Civil Procedure of this state, and a decree for their several claims will be entered in their favor, with costs.