1. Conspiracy to Commit Offenses against the United States—Rev. St. § 5440.

The statute relating to conspiracies to commit offenses against the United States (Rev. St. § 5440) contains three elements, which are necessary to constitute the offense. These are: (1) The act of two or more persons conspiring together; (2) to commit any offense against the United States; (3) the overt act, or the element of one or more of such parties doing any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.

S. Same—Conspiracy Defined.

A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal, by criminal or unlawful means. Pettibone v. U. S., 13 Sup. Ct. 542, 148 U. S. 203, cited.

8. Same—Manner of Conspiring.

The common design is the essence of the charge; but it is not necessary that two or more persons should meet together, and enter into an explicit or formal agreement for an unlawful scheme, or that they should directly, by words or in writing, state what the unlawful scheme was to be, and the details of the plan or the means by which the unlawful combination was to be made effective. It is sufficient if two or more persons, in any manner or through any contrivance, positively or tacitly, come to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful design.

4. Same—Parties to Conspiracy.

Where an unlawful end is sought to be effected, and two or more persons, actuated by the common purpose of accomplishing that end, work together in any way in furtherance of the unlawful scheme, every one of said persons becomes a member of the conspiracy, although the part any one was to take therein was a subordinate one, or was to be executed at a remote distance from the other conspirators.

5. Same.

Any one who, after a conspiracy is formed, and who knows of its existence, joins therein, becomes as much a party thereto from that time as if he had originally conspired. U. S. v. Babcock, Fed. Cas. No. 14,487, 3 Dill. 586, cited.

8. Same—Evidence—Acts of One Party.

Where several persons are proved to have combined together for the same illegal purpose, any act done by one of them, in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, is, in the contemplation of the law, the act of the whole party, and therefore the proof of such act will be evidence against any of the others who were engaged in the conspiracy.

7. Same—Declarations by Parties.

Any declaration made by one of the parties, during the pendency of the illegal enterprise, is not only evidence against himself, but against all the other conspirators, who, when the combination is proved, are as much responsible for such declarations, and the acts to which they relate, as if made and committed by themselves. This rule applies to the declaration of a co-conspirator, although he may not himself be under prosecution.

8. Same—Conspiracy as Distinct Offense.

The law regards the act of unlawful combination and confederacy as dangerous to the peace of society, and declares that such combination and confederacy to commit crime requires an additional restraint to those provided for the commission of the crime itself. It therefore makes criminal the conspiracy itself, with penalties and punishments distinct from those It attaches to the crime which may be the object of the conspiracy.

O. Same—Means Contemplated—Allegations and Prooes.

It is not incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that all the means sat out in the indictment were in fact agreed upon to carry out the conspiracy, or that any of them were actually used or put in operation. It is sufficient if it be shown that one or more of the means described in the indictment were to be used to execute that purpose.

10. Same—Overt Acts.

While at common law it was not necessary to aver or prove an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy, yet, under the statute relating to conspiracies to commit an offense against the United States, the doing of some act in pursuance of the conspiracy is made an ingredient of the crime, and must be established as a necessary, element thereof, although the act may not be in itself criminal. U. S. v. Thompson, 31 Fed. 331, 12 Sawy. 155, cited.

11. Same.

It is not necessary, however, to a verdict of guilty, that the jury should find that each and every one of the overt acts charged in the indictment was in fact committed; hut it is sufficient to. show that one or more of these acts was committed, and that it was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.

12. Obstructing the Mails—Rey. St. § SflDo.

Although the law, which now appears in Rev. St. § 3995, and which makes it an offense to obstruct and retard the passage of the United States mails, was originally passed prior to the introduction into the United States of the method of transporting mail by railroads, and the phraseology of the law conforms to conditions prevailing at that time (March 3, 1825), yet it is equally applicable to the modern system of conveyance, and protects alike the transportation of the mail by the “limited express” and by the old-fashioned stagecoach.

13. Same.

The statute applies to all persons who “knowingly and willfully” oh struct and retard the passage of the mails or the carrier carrying the same; that is, to those who know that the acts performed, however innocent they may otherwise he, will have the effect of obstructing and retarding the mail, and who perform the acts with the intent that such shall be their operation. U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 485, cited.

14. Same.

The statute also applies to persons who, having in view the accomplishment of other purposes, perform unlawful acts, which have the effect of obstructing and retarding the passage of the mails. In such case, an intent to obstruct a.nd retard the mails will he imputed to the authors of the unlawful act, although the attainment of other ends may have been their primary object. U. S. v. Kilby, 7 Wall. 485, cited.

35. Same—Mail Trains.

A mail train is a train as usually and regularly made up, including not merely a mail car, but such other cars' as are usually drawn in the train. If the train usually carries a 1’nllman car, then such train, as a mail train, would include the Pullman car as a part of its regular make up. Therefore, if such a train is obstructed or retarded because it draws a Pullman car, it is no defense that the parties so delaying it were willing that the mail should proceed if the Pullman car were left behind, U. S. v. Clark, Fed. Cas. No. 14,805, 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 306, followed.

18. Same.

Any train which is carrying mail, under the sanction of the postal authorities, is a mail train, in the eye of the law.

17. Same—Intent.

It is not necessary that defendants should be shown to have had knowledge that the mails were on board of a train which they have detained and disabled. On the contrary, they are chargeable with an intent to do whatever is the reasonable and natural consequence of their acts; and as the laws make all railways postal routes of the United States, and it is within every one’s knowledge that a large jiortion of the passenger trains carry mail, it is to be presumed that any person obstructing one of those trains contemplates, among other intents, the obstruction of the mail. U. S. v. Debs, 65 Fed. 211, followed.

18. Combinations to Obstruct Interstate Commerce—Act July 2, 1890.

The word “commerce,” as used in the act of July 2, 1890, to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and in the constitution of the United States, has a broader meaning than the word “trade.” Commerce among the states consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes the transportation of per sods and property, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.

19. Same.

While the primary object of the statute was doubtless to prevent the destruction of legitimate and healthy competition in interstate commerce, by the engrossing and monopolizing of the markets for commodities, yet its provisions are broad enough to reach a combination or conspiracy that will interrupt the transportation of such commodities and persons from one state to another. U. S. v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 995, cited.

20. Same—Pullman Cars.

Pullman cars in use upon railroads are instrumentalities of “commerce.” U. S. v. Debs, 64 Fed. 763, cited.

21. Conspiracies—Combinations oe Railroad Employes — Unions and Protective Associations—Strikes.

The employes of railway companies have a right to organize for mutual benefit and protection, and for the purpose of securing the highest wages and the best conditions they can command. They may appoint officers, who shall advise them as to the course to be taken in their relations with their employer, and they may, if they choose, repose in their officers authority to order them, or any of them, on pain of expulsion from their union, peaceably to leave the employment because the terms thereof are unsatisfactory. But it is unlawful for them to combine and quit work for the purpose of compelling their employer to withdraw from his relations with a third party, for the purpose of injuring that third party. Thomas v. Railway Co., 62 Fed. 817, followed.

22. ¡Same.

A strike, or a preconcerted quitting of work, by a combination of railroad employes, is, in itself, unlawful, if the concerted action is knowingly and willfully directed by the parties to it for the purpose of obstructing and retarding the passage of the mails, or in restraint of trade and commerce among the states.

23. Criminal Law—Reasonable Doubt.

A reasonable doubt is one arising out of the evidence; not an imaginary doubt, a fanciful conjecture, or strained inference, but such a doubt as a reasonable man would act upon or decline to act upon when his own concerns are involved,—a doubt for which a good reason can be given, which reason must be based upon the evidence or want of evidence.

24. Same—Province of Jury—Credibility of Witnesses.

The jury are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses. A witness is presumed to speak the truth, but this presumption may be repelled by the manner in which he testifies, by the character of his testimony, or by the evidence affecting his character fof truth, honesty, or integrity, or his motives, and by contrary evidence. But the power of the jury to judge of the effect of evidence is not arbitrary; it must be exercised with legal discretion, and in subordination to the rules of evidence.