The record in this case consists of many hundred pages, but we have reviewed and considered it carefully, and, being satisfied with the conclusions of the learned judge of the district court as to the cause of collision and the culpability of the Willamette, adopt Ms statement. It is as follows:

Judgments were rendered against the Oregon Improvement Company in favor of the libelants, respectively, and subsequently summary judgments against it and L. S. J. Hunt and John Collins, stip-ulators. From these judgments the company and the stipulators appeal, and assign as error;

These assignments of error will be considered in order.

1. The act: to provide for the times and places to hold terms of the United. States courts in the state of Washington provides as follows:

Against the contention of appellants the respondiente urge that this act in not applicable to suits in admiralty, and cite the ease of In re Louisville Underwriter, 134 U. S. 488 , 10 Sup. Ct. 587. Thin view is not without plausibiliiy, but we do not think it ⅛ necessary to definitely pasts upon it, as we have based our decision upon oilier grounds. That record shows that the claimant made no objection to ihe jurisdiction of the court, but appeared in the action, prayed to be permitted to defend it, claimed and secured the release of the vessel upon giving' a bond and signing stipulation. Afterwards, it filed exceptions to the libels, but this point was not taken, but claimant moved and obtained an oidor transferring the case to the .Northern division, its domicile, and tee case was there tried. It will be observed that the act constitutes the state one district, and there is nothing to affect its subsiantial jurisdiction. Mesne and final process issued in either division may be served and executed in all, and that the venue in either was not imperative against the consent of defendants is evident from the following provision of section 4:

*878 The venue of actions under statutes like the Washington statute has always been held to be a privilege which the defendant could exact or waive, even as to districts. The right of a defendant to be sued in that of his domicile may be waived, and is waived by not objecting. Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129 , 14 Sup. Ct. 286. If to be sued in the district of one’s domicile (usually the state in which one resides) is in the nature of a personal exemption, which may be waived, surely to be sued in a division of a district is of like nature, and may be waived. Under the act of February 18, 1875 ( 18 Stat. 316 , 320, c. 80), which exempted national banks from suits in state courts in counties other than the county or city in which the bank was located, it was held in Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141 , 10 Sup. Ct. 37, that such exemption was a personal privilege, which could be waived and was waived by appearing in such suit brought in another county, and not claiming the immunity granted by congress. Nor do we conceive that it makes any difference, in the circumstances of this case, that it is in rem. If the owner had not appeared, a different question would have arisen. By its appearance, claimant became a party (The J. W. French, 13 Fed. 916 ), and assumed the situation of defendant, as regards the original libel-ant, Nelson, and the then intervening libelants, and answered; and on its motion, as we have seen, the action was transferred to and tried in the division of its residence, and in which the ship was seized, and judgments rendered against it. As to the effect of this, in addition to the cases cited, see, also, Barry v. Foyles, 1 Pet. 314 ; Pollard v. Dwight, 4 Cranch, 421 ; Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476 ; Railway Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127 , 11 Sup. Ct. 982; Eddy v. Lafayette, 49 Fed. 807 .

2. The question presented in the second assignment of error — that is, the power of a court of admiralty to entertain jurisdiction of suit by the representatives of a deceased person when the right of action survives by the local law — has not been passed on definitely by the supreme court, though it has come up incidentally in several cases. Whenever it has arisen in the district courts, with but few exceptions, the jurisdiction has been entertained, and by a few eminent judges it has been asserted without the aid of local law. The reasoning of the latter has been left unsubstantial by the decision of the supreme court in Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754 , but it shows the disposition of judges. The research of other courts has made it unnecessary to review or especially cite these cases. This has been ably and accurately done in Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522 ; The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 , 7 Sup. Ct. 140; Ex parte Gordon, 104 U. S. 515 ; The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335 , 12 Sup. Ct. 949; and no disapproval is expressed of the cases reviewed. It may not be unnecessary repetition to refer to the case of The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. 98 , in which Judge Brown, of the Southern district of New York, comments on previous decisions, and vindicates the jurisdiction of the district court with great strength of reasoning; and the cases Holmes v. Railway Co., 5 Fed. 75 , and The Clatsop Chief, 8 Fed. 163 , in which Judge Deady, in the Oregon district, sustained, re- *879 speetively, an action in personam and an action in rem, a statute in Oregon giving tlie right of action; and In re Humboldt Lumber Manuf’rs’ Assn, 60 Fed. 428 , decided by Judge Morrow, of the Northern district of California, following and approving Judge Brown’s reasoning. The case of The City of Norwalk was affirmed on appeal by the circuit court of appeals, and the conclusion and reasoning of Judge Brown approved. 20 U. S. App. 570, 9 C. C. A. 521 , and 61 Fed. 364 . The court, speaking by Judge Lacombe, said:

This action was in personam, but the reasoning of the” court and of Judge Brown applies as well to actions in rem. If a collision is culpable, it is undoubtedly a marine tort, and the supreme court said in The City of Panama, 101 U. S., on pages 453-464:

If a claim for compensation, if the party die, can be made to survive by statute to his representatives, it would not be very complete reasoning to hold that the remedy cannot also be made to survive. Indeed, there is language of Justice Grey in the case of The H. E. Willard, 52 Fed. 387 , which supports the view that, the right being created, the admiralty courts of the United States will enforce it by their own rulos of procedure. The learned justice said: “When a right maritime in its nature has been created by the local law, the *880 admiralty courts of the United States may doubtless enfdrce that right according to their own rules of procedure;” citing a number of cases, among which is The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335 , 12 Sup. Ct. 949. In the case at bar, however, it is enough to say that, the tort being a maritime one, it would seem on principle and authority, if the local law is competent to preserve the right of action, it is competent to give it the efficiency of a lien to be enforced in the appropriate federal tribunal. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 581 .

3. The fourth assignment of error is not very clear. If it means that the judgments are excessive as to amounts, it is not well taken. We cannot say the judgment of the court was not well exercised, and that the amounts awarded are excessive compensation for the injuries inflicted. If it means more than this, it is covered by the fifth assignment of error, which we shall now proceed to consider. The assignment is general, and it is not certain that the points specifically urged here were drawn to the attention of the district court. However, the right of the libelants who intervened to recover after the ship was released is discussed by both parties in their briefs, and submitted for decision. At the time judgments were rendered the construction of admiralty rule 34, and the extent of the jurisdiction to entertain petitions of intervening libelants, was disputable, but has since been settled by the supreme court in The Oregon (decided May 6th of this year) 158 U. S. 186 , 15 Sup. Ct. 804, 814, in which it is held that a stipulation given for the release of a vessel upon the original libel to recover damages done to a vessel with which she collided does not bind the sureties to respond to claims set up by intervening petitions filed subsequently to the release, and hence the court should not entertain jurisdiction of such intervening petitions.

It follows, therefore, that the judgments of the district court in favor of the intervening libelants Emma E. Miller, and E. W. Vest, Ida F. Richardson, Thomas Foran, and John Rankin, should be reversed, and that the judgments in favor of Jacob Nelson, D. J. Wyncoop, and Ella E. Wyncoop, and D. J. and Ella E. Wyncoop, and Philip L. Reese, administrator, should be affirmed; and it is so ordered.