This is an appeal from an order of deportation made by United States Commissioner Van Dyke. The affidavit on which the warrant of arrest was issued by said commissioner charges that on the 16th of June, 1893, “one Chung Shee (a Chinese woman) did come into the United States from a foreign, place, and, having come, has remained within the United States; that the said Olnmg Shee has been found and now is unlawfully within the United States; and that at all the times herein mentioned the said Chung Shee was and is a Chinese laborer,” etc.

The evidence adduced upon the trial before me establishes the following facts:

First. The defendant is a woman, 20 years of age, and a subject of the emperor of China.

Second. About June, 1893, the defendant, under the name of Chung Shee, arrived at the port of San Francisco, Cal., on tire steamer Peru, from Ghina, and sought admission to the United States on the ground that she was the wife of a Chinese merchant then living in said city of San Francisco, and so testified upon the proceedings below and in this paragraph mentioned. After an examination by the collector at that port, she was refused permission to land. A writ of habeas corpus was subsequently, on July 21, 1893, issued by Judge Morrow. *278 On the 31st of the same month a report was filed in the case by a special referee, recommending that the prisoner be remanded. On the 1st of August, 1893, an order, by Judge Hawley, was made, directing the return of Chung Shee to the steamship Peru, to be hence taken to Hong Kong, China. On the 10th of August, 1893, at San Francisco, the United States marshal made upon said order the following return: “I hereby certify that I executed the within order on the 10th day of August, 1893, by placing the within-named Chung Shee on board the steamship Rio De Janeiro, bound for the port of Hong Kong.” With reference to the identity of Chung Shee and this defendant, there has been some conflict of testimony, but I am satisfied, that the defendant is the person who, under the name of Chung Shee, sought and was denied landing at San Francisco, as testified to by the witnesses for the government.

Third. On January 30, 1894, a petition for habeas corpus was presented to the Honorable C. B. Bellinger, United States district judge for the district of Oregon, by the defendant, under the name of Lum Lin Ying, alleging:

i On this petition the writ therein applied for was issued, and on the 2d of February the judgment of the court was duly rendered, discharging the petitioner from the detention and restraint complained of in said petition, and thereupon she was permitted to land. The opinion of Judge Bellinger is reported in 59 Fed. (582. Chung Chew, the alleged husband of the defendant, was at the time a merchant, residing at Portland, Or. For four or five months thereafter, Chung Chew and the defendant lived together as husband and wife in said city, when they moved to Los Angeles, Cal., where they resided up to the time of Chung Chew’s death, which occurred about the latter part of October, 1894. Since the date last named, the de *279 fendant, claiming to be the widow of Chung Chew, has continuously resided in Los Angeles.

My opinion is that the judgment of the district court, of Oregon is conclusive of the present case. On this subject the rule of law is thus stated by an eminent text writer:

Again, it has been held that in proceedings upon habeas corpus the determination of the court upon the facts has the effect of a verdict of a jury. Bonnett v. Bonnett, 61 Iowa, 199 , 16 N. W. 91 . Indeed, the authorities without exception seem to hold that when a person has been discharged upon habeas corpus the issues of la,w and fact involved are res adjudicata, and the person so discharged cannot, for the same cause, be again lawfully arrested. Church, Hab. Corp. § 386; Ex parte Jilz, 64 Mo. 205 ; In re Crow, 60 Wis. 349 , 19 N. W. 713 ; Yates’ Case, 6 Johns. 337 . On this point the government contends that “in the federal courts the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to a decision in a habeas corpus proceeding,” and cites as authorities Ex parte Kaine, 3 Blatchf. 5 , Fed. Cas. No. 7,597, and Ex parte Cuddy, 40 Fed. 65 . These cases, however, so far from sustaining, are against, the government’s contention, in the first the court, after declaring that in proceedings upon a writ of habeas corpus the federal courts follow, not the laws and regulations of the states, hut the common law of England, proceeds thus:

Thus it will he seen from this opinion that it is only where the prisoner is remanded that the decision of the court is not final. The same may be said of Ex parte Cuddy, supra. From the opinion of Justice Field in this last case the following quotation is made in the government’s brief:

The latter part of this quotation would be meaningless, except upon the idea that Justice Field was discussing a case wherein the prisoner was remanded. The same is true of the opinion of the court in Re Perkins; 2 Cal. 430 , cited in the government’s brief. While, therefore, these decisions do not expressly so hold, the implication *280 from them is unavoidable that where, on'a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner is discharged, the decision is a final determination in his or her favor.

The further argument of the government in this connection is (page 5 of its brief) that the decision of a collector denying an alien admission into this country is similar to an order, upon preliminary examination, discharging or committing a person accused of crime With this argument I cannot agree. The order of a committing magistrate does not purport to determine the question of innocency or guilt, and therefore the discharge of the accused, whether at the preliminary examination or a review upon habeas corpus, does not, of course, bar subsequent inquiry, indictment, or trial. It was to this situation that the supreme court of South Carolina referred in the case of State v. Fley, 2 Brev. 338 , in the quotation made at page 6 in the government’s brief, where the court declare that it would be monstrous to say that the discharge of a prisoner upon habeas corpus shielded him from subsequent prosecution. The determination, however, of an alien’s claim to enter the United States is wholly different. When the power and duty of so determining are committed to any officer, no matter whether such officer belongs to the executive or judicial branch of the government, the decision of such officer is an adjudication of the right involved, namely, the right of the alien to enter the country, and such adjudication is final, unless the law expressly or impliedly provides for an appeal from or review of the decision. And this is the doctrine of the case which the government invokes to the support of its argument. In re Day, 27 Fed. 678 . In that case, the court says:

The court then proceeds to hold that the act of August 3, 1882, does not authorize any review, by habeas corpus or otherwise, and that the decision of the commissioners is final and conclusive. This case, therefore, so far from upholding, is directly against, the government’s contention on the point in question. I would say here, in passing, that, under the Chinese exclusion acts, I think the decision of the collector of customs is not final, but that the truth of the matter may be determined on habeas corpus, or in a proceeding against such persons for being unlawfully in the country: U. S. v. Loo Way, 68 Fed. 475 . This rule, however, has been so changed by a subsequent act of congress that now the decision of the collector of customs, if adverse to the alien, is final, unless reversed on appeal by the secretary of the treasury. 28 Stat. 390 .

In opposition to the conclusiveness of the Oregon judgment in favor of the defendant the government further contends that the refusal of our government to allow aliens to enter or remain in this country is an exercise of political'power, and therefore the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the determinations of any of the *281 officers or tribunals uuder and pursuant to exclusion acts of congress. This contention does not seem to me to be well founded. While it is true that the exclusion of foreigners is an exercise of political sovereignty, yet, where a general law has been passed for that purpose, the application of such law to individual cases is essentially a judicial function, and I can see no reason why the principle of res judicata should not be applied. Indeed, that the principle does apply to such cases is the sole question decided in the Day Case, supra. There the court dismissed a writ of habeas corpus ou the ground that the decision oí the commissioners refusing to allow certain foreigners to come info the country was final, and that the matter could not Toe made the subject of any subsequent inquiry. By reference to »:lie decision in that case, it will be seen that a large number of authorities are cited in its support.

'Tim further argument of the government that the Oregon judgment does not cover the issues involved in this proceeding seems to me equally untenable. Wlialever may have been the reasoning of Judge Bellinger in Ms opinion, the judgment of the court upon the poíilion lor ike writ of habeas corpus, as found in the transcript of Mie «'cord In evidence, was as follows:

The precise question passed upon by Judge Bellinger was the right of ihe defendant to enter and remain in the United iltales, and he traquiwiiomMy had jurisdiction to hoar and determine the matter. Tills point has been expressly decided by the supreme court of the Doited HioJes. Judge Blatchford, delivering the opinion, says:

Just such an. adjudication as that here described was had in the case of the defendant at Portland, Or., upon the writ of habeas corpus already mentioned. Defendant’s “title to be here” was then “adjudicated by the proper court of the United States,” and “upon the question of her being allowed to land.” The government, however, insists that the Oregon judgment was obtained through fraud, and is, therefore, open to collateral attack, and cites to this point, among other cases, U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 -67. I cannot so find or hold. If fraud was practiced upon the court, it consisted wholly in the introduction of false testimony, and it is well settled that this is no ground for vacating a judgment. Such was the express holding of the court in U. S. v. Throckmorton, supra. Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, says:

Recognizing and applying the principle enunciated in the foregoing extracts from U. S. v. Throckmorton, supra, I cannot do otherwise than hold that no such fraud has been shown in the present case as invalidates the judgment of the Oregon court. Whether that court was misled by false testimony, or erred in its conclusions o£ law, are questions not here open to inquiry. It is to be presumed, in favor of its judgment, that the evidence required by law as to the right of the defendant to come into the United States was adduced upon the hearing. That judgment cannot be collaterally assailed in this proceeding, and must be held to establish the lawfulness of the defendant’s residence in the United States. This ruling renders it unnecessary to decide the other points submitted in defendant’s brief.

The judgment and order of the commissioner will be reversed, and the defendant discharged.