The libelants are seamen, and have sued for wages claimed to be due them, respectively, for services as members of the crew of the barkentine J. M. Griffith. The voyage for -which they engaged was, by the shipping articles, not to exceed six calendar months, and is particularly described in said articles as follows, to wit: “From the port of San Francisco to Port Hadlock, and thence to San Francisco for final discharge, either direct or via one or more ports of the Pacific coast.” The facts material to this opinion are undisputed, and as follows, to wit: Three of the libelants —Bradley, Anderson, and Francis — signed the agreement above indicated, on the 25th of March, 1895, at San Francisco, Cal., and the others — Bill and Lyunggren — on the 9th and 22d days of April, 1895, respectively, and at Port Hadlock, Wash. Said agreement, besides describing the voyagé, contains, among others, this provision:

And also the following provision:

On or about the 28th day of March, 1895, the vessel sailed from San Francisco to Port Hadlock, and from thence to the port of San Pedro, in the state of California, arriving at said last-named port about the 7th day of May, 1895.' The vessel’^ cargo was discharged at said port of San Pedro, and thereafter, on the 15th day of May, 1895, the libelants, without the consent of the master of said vessel, abandoned said vessel, when the same was ready and about to sail for Port Hadlock. The libelants contend that by going to San Pedro the vessel deviated from the course of the voyage designated in the shipping articles, and, further, that the voyage so designated did not include a return or second voyage to Port Hadlock, and that this deviation and proposed return to Port Hadlock were such breaches of the shipping articles, by the master of the vessel, as justified libelants in leaving the same at San Pedro; and therefore they are entitled to recover their wages, up to the time they left, at the rate specified in said articles. Defendant insists that the libelants, by abandoning the vessel at San Pedro, under the circumstances named, were guilty of desertion, and therefore forfeited their wages.

The first question to be determined involves the interpretation of the contract; that is, whether or not the voyage therein described included the port of San Pedro, and a return thence, or second voyage, to Port Hadlock. If it did not, the libelants are entitled to recover, for by going to San Pedro, and proposing a return thence to Port Hadlock, the master of the vessel violated his contract with the libelants, and they had a right to leave the vessel. If, however, the voyage included San Pedro and a return to Port Hadlock, there arises the further question, w-hat sort of proof is essential to establish the fact of desertion, and was such proof adduced on this trial? Recur *319 ring to the question first above indicated, it will be observed that San Francisco, by the terms of the contract, was the port of final discharge, and the vessel was to go there from Port Hadlock, either directly or by one or more ports of the Pacific coast. Did the words, “via one or more ports of the Pacific coast,” authorize the vessel to sail by San Francisco, to a port not intermediate between Port Had-lock and San Francisco, but several hundred miles to the south of the latter port, and then return, or make a second voyage, to Port Hadlock? Among the authorities cited to this point in the briefs of the respective parties there are two which seem to me determinative of the question. In Anon., Fed. Cas. No. 449, the voyage was described as follows; “From the port of' Baltimore to the port of Curacoa, and elsewhere,” etc. In construing this phraseology, the court used the following language:

The principle of the above case has been adopted and applied by Justice Story in a case where the voyage was described thus; “From Boston to the Pacific, Indian, and Chinese Oceans, or elsewhere, on a trading voyage, and from thence hack to Boston.” In this last case, it was held (quoting from the syllabus):

This case is strikingly in point, as further shown by the following fads, which I quote from the statement accompanying the opinion of the court:

The language of Justice Story was as follows: .

Applying to the case at bar the principle of the two decisions above mentioned, I cannot do otherwise than hold that the words, “direct or via one or more ports of the Pacific coast,” embrace only such ports as are intermediate between Port Hadlock and San Francisco. If the words, “direct or via one or more ports of the Pacific coast,” authorized the vessel to sail by San Francisco to San Pedro, and then return to Port Hadlock, there is no reason why it could not have gone to the extreme southern port of South America, or even from Port Hadlock to the extreme northern port of said' coast. Such a construction would be manifestly against the intention of the parties as shown in the contract, and cannot prevail. I think the language above quoted, fairly interpreted, means that the vessel might proceed from Port Hadlock to San Francisco, either immediately — that is, without intervening delays — or might stop at one or-more intermediate or way ports. This conclusion renders it unnecessary for me to pass upon any of the other questions submitted by the parties in their respective briefs. Judgment will be entered for the libelants.