. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington.

The defendant in error, plaintiff in the court below, sued the United States on nine causes of action, at the time of the accruing of which he was district attorney of the United States for the district of Washington. The causes of action may be summarized as follows: (1) For services as attorney for the defendants upon the trial, in the circuit court, district of Washington, at the July term, 1890, held at Tacoma, of the case of the Catholic Bishop of Nesqually against Gen. John Gibbon et al., involving the title to the land occupied as a garrison and military post at Vancouver, in this state, $2,500, in addition to $2,500 paid to him for said services. (2) For services as attorney for the United States upon the hearing, in the United States circuit court of appeals for the Ninth circuit, at San Francisco, in April, 1892, of the case of the United States against the steam tug Pilot, on appeal from the district court of this district, $287.21, in addition to $212.79 paid to him for said services. (3) For services as attorney for the defendant upon the hearing, on appeal, in the said United States circuit court of appeals, in April, 1892, of the case of Dunsmuir against Bradshaw, as collector of customs for the collection district of Puget Sound, which was an action to recover a sum of money which had been exacted by said collector as a penalty under a statute of the United States, ‘$500. (4) For services as attorney for the United States upon the hearing, in said United States circuit court of appeals, in April, 1892, of the case of the United States against Gee Lee, appealed from the United States district court for this district, $250. (5) For services as attorney for the defendants, in the superior court of the state of Washington for King county, and in this court at a term held at Seattle, in March, April, May, and June, 1893, in two cases against Edwin Eells, as United States Indian agent, and certain officers of the United States army, involving questions as to the right of the. government to prevent the building of a railroad across lands which had been allotted and patented to certain Indians pursuant to a treaty made by the United States with the Puyallup tribe (see Ross v. Eells, 50 Fed. 855), $1,500. (6) For actual and necessary traveling expenses in going from his place of abode to the- several places at which terms of the United States courts are held in this district, and returning from examinations, before United States commissioners, of persons accused of violation of laws of the United States, between January 1 and May 30, 1893, a balance of $1,379.84. There was an allegation, in the statement of each cause of action, that the value of the services rendered by .the plaintiff was not fixed by the statutes of the United States, and was reasonably worth the sums charged, respectively.

The answer of the United States denied these allegations, but admitted the rendering of the services. As a further defense, the United States alleged as follows: “That, during all the time mentioned in said complaint, the personal compensation of the United States attorney, consisting of fees, per diem, and all other emoluments by law pertaining to said office, including an annual salary, was limited by the statutes of the United States, of which the said plaintiff had full notice and knowledge, to the sum of six thousand dollars per annum, as full compensation and reward for all the services which said plaintiff rendered, or should or might have been required to render, to the United States, or to any officer or agent of the United States, in all cases in which the United States was a parts’ or interested, or in which the said plaintiff should be directed, by the president, the attorney general, or the solicitor of the treasury of the United States, to appear, prosecute, defend, advise, or render any other service whatever, excepting only such services as he might be required to render in suits and proceedings arising under the revenue laws, and for services rendered by direction of the secretary or solicitor of the treasury, on behalf of any officer of the revenue, in any suit against any' such officer for any act done by him, or for the recovery of any money received by such officer, and paid into the treasury of the United States, in the performance of the official duty of such officer. (3) That, in suits and proceedings arising under the revenue laws, which should be conducted by said plaintiff, and in which the United States should be a party, the said plaintiff would be entitled to be paid 4 per centum upon all moneys collected or realized in any such suit or proceeding. (4) That, in all cases in which said plaintiff should appear, by direction of the secretary or solicitor of the' treasury, on behalf of any officer of the revenue, in any suit against such officer, for any act done by him, or for the recovery of any money received by Mm, and paid into the treasury of the United States, in the performance of the official duty of such officer, said plaintiff should receive such compensation as should be certified to be proper by the court in which such suit was brought, and approved by the secretary of the treasury. That, in addition to the amounts in this defense above stated, the said plaintiff was entitled to receive, from the earnings of his office, the necessary expenses of his office, including necessary clerk lure, all to be audited and allowed by the proper accounting officers of the treasury department, of the United States.” The answer also alleges full payment of said items of charge, and “that none of the suits and proceedings mentioned in the complaint herein were suits or proceedings against any officer of the revenue, for any act done by him as such officer; or for the recovery of any money received by such officer, and paid into the treasury, in the performance of the official duty of such officer, except the case,mentioned in the third paragraph of the third cause of action of said complaint, and that as to said suit, tito compensation claimed by plaintiff was not certified to be proper by the court in which said suit was brought, and was not approvod by the secretary of the treasury. That none of the sums of money claimed by plaintiff in said complaint are for services rendered by him in any suit or proceeding arising under the revenue laws, and conducted by 'him, in which the United Stales was a party, and in which any moneys had been collected or realized. Wherefore defendants say that the said plaintiff is not entitled to have and recover from them any sum of money whatever, and, having fully answered heroin, pray to be hence discharged, ana to recover their reasonable costs and disbursements herein expended.”

There was an amended complaint filed, containing throe other causes of action for balances due for fees and emoluments fixed by statute, for the years 1800, 1891, and 1892, respectively, in the amounts of $799.71, $810, and $490.83. The allegation of the complaint: was the same in all the causes of action, except as to the amounts due. Selecting from the first cause of action, they were as follows: “(1) filial he is a resident of the city of Spokane, county of Spokane, state of Washington. (2) That, from the 19th day of February, 1890, until 1he 30th day of May, 1893, he was the lawfully appointed and duly commissioned and qualified attorney for the defendant, in and for the district of Washington. (3) That, during his said term of office, to wit, between February 18, 1890, and December 31, 1890, he became entitled to receive from the defendant the sum of six thousand six hundred and nineteen and ss/ioo dollars, as compensation, for fees, salary, disbursements for clerk hire, office expenses, and attendance upon the courts of the United States, and upon commissioner's courts, and for traveling from ids place of abode to the place of holding said courts or said examinations; that, of said sum, defendant has paid plaintiff the sum of five thousand eight hundred and nineteen and BS/u><> dollars, leaving a balance due and unpaid plaintiff of seven hundred and ninety-nine and 71/u>o dollars. (4) That thereafter. and before the bringing of this suit, plaintiff demanded payment of the same from defendant, but that defendant has not paid Hie same, and refuses to pay the same.”

The answer of the United States to this amended complaint admitted paragraph 1 of each of the causes of action, but denied all other allegations, except that it had paid plaintiff the amounts stated to have been paid.

The circuit court made findings of fact from the testimony, which may be condensed as follows: That plaintiff was district attorney for the district of Washington from the 19th of February, 1890, to the 30th of May, 1893, and was'a resident of the city of Spokane, state of Washington. That he performed the services stated in the first cause of action, and that they were reasonably worth the sum of $5,000, of which the plaintiff was paid $2,500, the amount fixed by the attorney general as special compensation, the law providing no specific compensation. That he performed the services stated in the second cause of action, and that they were reasonably worth the sum of $400, which was allowed by the attorney general, the law providing no specific, compensation. That defendant paid plaintiff $212.79, retaining the balance of $187.21, claiming that this was in excess of the personal compensation and emoluments plaintiff was entitled to receive for the year in which the services were rendered. That the services were performed as alleged in the third cause of action, and that the value of the services was not fixed by law, and they were worth $250, and were fixed by the attorney general at that sum. That it has not been paid, but lias been retained on tlie claim tliat it is in excess of earnings above the maximum allowed by law for 1802, the year the services were performed. That, for said years, defendant charged plaintiff, as part of his maximum of personal compensation, the compensation allowed by law for travel, on a mileage basis, and that such compensation was in excess of said sum of $187.21, and said sum of $250. That plaintiff performed the services as alleged in the third cause of action; that their value was not fixed by law, were worth the sum of $500, and were fixed at $310 by the attorney general, and that said sum has not been paid, and will not increase bis compensation, for the year, above the legal maximum. That the services alleged in the fourth cause of action were performed as alleged. That they were begun while plaintiff was district attorney, and finished after-wards, and compensation was respectively fixed for them by the attorney general at $400 and $000. That congress, since tlie beginning of tlie action, has appropriated the said sum of $000 to i>ay plaintiff, and he has received the same, but the $400 has not been paid. That “plaintiff is lawfully entitled to receive and retain the following maximum personal compensation in the way of fees and emoluments for the year 1893, to wit: Fees, $2,405.75; mileage, $1,629.00; commissions on proceeds of forfeited opium, $11.00; cleric hire, printing, and other incidental expenses, approved by the attorney general, $776.00, — aggregating the sum of $4,883.55. He has been paid, including the sum of $600 appropriated for his services in Ross v. Bells (Puyallup Indian case), $3,842.35. There is a balance due him for said year 1S93, of $1,041.20, composed of the sum of $400, due for special services, before his removal from office, in the Ross-Eells case, and of $041.20, which was withheld hy defendant as being in excess of his maximum personal compensation. There was charged against plaintiff, as part of his maximum personal compensation for said year 1S93, as mileage, $1,629.00, which amount is in excess of the amount of $1,041.20 above referred to. That, during plaintiff’s term of office, to wit, February 19, 1890, and December 31, 1890, there was withheld from him, as excess of his maximum personal compensation, the sum of $560.38, and during the year 1891 there was withheld from him, as excess of his personal compensation, the sum of $750. In each of said years there was charged against plaintiff, and included in his emolument accounts, as part of his maximum personal compensation, an amount of mileage in excess of said sums, without which there would have been no surplus of earnings above tlie maximum.”

As conclusion of law, the court found and gave judgment for the following sums: $187.21, balance due on second cause of action; $250, due on third cause of action; $400, on fourth cause of action; $500.38, for fees earned in the year 1890; $750, for fees in 1891; $641.20, for fees in 1891, — the same being, respectively, fixed by law, and being withheld as being in excess of maximum.

In 33 assignments the United States assign these findings and rulings as error. The case is presented on the judgrrient roll alone.