This case comes up on exceptions to the second amended libel. The original libel ivas filed on October 27,1806, and was brought against the barkentine Marion, her tackle, apparel, furniture, etc., and the cargo of said vessel, consisting of 850 barrels of salmon, to recover for seamen’s wages. The libel-ants shipped on a fishing voyage from the port of San Francisco to Cook’s Inlet, Alaska, and other Alaskan ports. They did not ship on a lay, but were to be paid a definite sum per month as *105 wages. Xo one appeared to claim tlie barkentine. Tin; 850 barrels of salmon, (lie proceeds of the voyage, were claimed by 0. E. Whitney & Co. as their property, and were released upon their giving a good and sufficient bond in The sum of $2,000. The vessel, not having been claimed, was sold by the United states marshal. Tlie proceeds of the sale, however, were insufficient to satisfy in full the claims of the libelants for tvages, and they now seek, by these supplementary proceedings, to obtain full satisfaction from the cargo—the 850 barrels of salmon caught on the voyage—for the several balances due them. For this purpose an amended libel was filed on November 17, 1890, seeking to reach and subject: the cargo to the several deficiencies in favor of the libelants. Exceptions were presented to the amended libel, and, after hearing duly had. these were sustained. A second amended libel was thereupon tiled on January 5, 1897, to which exceptions have again been presented, filíese exceptions raise two questions: (1) Whether the libel sets out any facts sufficient to entitle the libelants, or any of them, to any lien on the cargo or any portion thereof; (2) whether the libel should have been verified.

The second amended libel, after alleging that the libelants shipped as seamen and fishermen on hoard the barkentine Marion, the nature and extent of the voyage, the rate of wages, and the seAreral amounts due them, loss deductions for slops and advances, and the further fact that the vessel was, upon the original libel, sold to satisfy their claims, and that the amount; realized was insufficient to pay in full their respective claims for wages, sets forth:

The only question is whether, under these allegations, the libel-ants have a lien upon the cargo which will be recognized and enforced in the admiralty, fifite general rule with respect to the lien of seamen for their wages is that they have a lien upon the ship and freight. Pars. Mar. Law, 579; Brown v. Lull, 2 Sumn. 443, 452 , Fed. Cas. No. 2,018. Rule 13 of the general admiralty rules of the supreme court provides that:

*106 It will be noticed that nothing is said in this rule about any proceeding against the cargo to enforce the lien. In the case of Sheppard v. Taylor, 5 Pet. 675 , where it. was sought to enforce the lien for seamen’s wages upon the cargo, it was said by the court, through Mr. Justice Story:

But it has been decided that where the owner of the ship is also the owner of the cargo, the seamen have a lien on the cargo in the nature of a charge upon the freight. Poland v. The Spartan, 1 Ware, 130 , Fed. Cas. No. 11,246; Skolfield v. Potter, 2 Ware, 402 , Fed. Cas. No. 12,925; In re Low, 2 Low. 264 , Fed. Cas. No. 8,558; The Antelope, 1 Low. 130 , Fed. Cas. No. 484; Story v. Russell, 157 Mass. 157 , 31 N. E. 754 . The reason for this is clear. The sailor has a paramount lien on the ship and freight. If the owners of the vessel be also the owners of the cargo, no freight eo nomine is earned, unless we assume that the owners of the cargo pay to themselves, as owners of the vessel, the freight which is due. The seamen, therefore, in such a case, would be deprived of any recourse against the freight, upon which, by the general admiralty law, they have a lien. As .was said in Sheppard v. Taylor, 5 Pet. 675 , “freight is the natural fund out of which seamen’s wages are entitled to be paid.” To protect the seaman against such a contingency, thereby depriving him virtually of, his lien on the freight, the rule referred to in the cases cited has been evolved; that is to say, his lien upon the cargo is recognized and enforced where the owner of the ship is also the owner of the cargo. It is, in effect, a lien on the cargo for a charge in the nature of freight. Poland v. The Spartan, supra. I find nothing inconsistent with this doctrine in the case of Sheppard v. Taylor, supra, cited by counsel for claimant of the cargo. While it is true that the owners of the ship in that case were also the owners of the cargo, and no freight eo nomine was earned, still there were three distinct funds, representing respectively the value of the vessel, the cargo, and the freight. It is obvious, therefore, that no recourse could be bad against tbe cargo. Nor can rule 13 be deemed to conflict with the views stated; for, while the rule says nothing about any proceeding against tbe cargo, yet the distinction must not be overlooked or confounded that the proceeding against tbe cargo, in this and other cases of a similar nature, is really against the freight which the cargo has incurred. As was aptly said by Judge Ware, in Poland v. The Spartan, supra:

*107 I am of fhe opinion that the allegations of the second amended libel are sufficient to base a proceeding against the cargo to enforce the lien of tin; libelants for their balance of wages.

With respect to the verification of the libel as amended, rale 3 of the rales of 1he district court of the United Whites for the Southern district of New York, which were adopted as tire rules of this court, provides:

Rule 5 provides that:

The libel, in its amended form, does not pray for any attachment, the cargo leaving been released upon a stipulation given therefor upon the original libel; nor does it require an answer under oath. As I understand that all the libelants are absent from the jurisdiction of the court, and the original libel was sworn to, I shall not require the amended libel to be sworn to in the absence of any special reasons therefor. The exceptions to the second amended libel will therefore be overruled.