(after stating the facts). 1. Did tin1 land department have jurisdiction to cancel the entry of Henry C. Hackley? This question must be answered in the affirmative.' In Mortgage Co. v. Hopper, 12 C. C. A. 293 , 64 Fed. 553 , this court had *653 occasion to examine many of the authorities cited by the respective counsel herein. The same questions here urged were there elaborately discussed. In the course of that opinion the court said:

The principles thus announced are fully sustained by the decision of the supreme court in the case of Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S. 372 , 15 Sup. Ct. 635, where the court held that the commissioner of the general land office may direct the proper local land officer to hear and pass upon charges of fraud, and the final proof of the pre-emption claim upon which the requisite cash entry has been paid, and lias jurisdiction to review the judgment of the local land officer in respect thereof: and the secretary of the interior has jurisdiction to review such judgment of the commissioner, and to order such an entry. shown io he fraudulent, to he canceled.

The court, after referring to the statutes and to numerous authorities. and quoting from Harkness v. Underhill, 1 Black, 316, 325 . Hosmer v. Wallace. 97 U. S. 575, 578 , and Knight v. Association, 142 U. S. 161, 167 , 12 Sup. Ct. 258, said:

*654 The entire opinion is instructive. Its reasoning is sound, clear, and conclusive upon the question here involved. This opinion is referred to and followed with approval in Parsons v. Venzke, 164 U. S. 89 , 17 Sup. Ct. 27.

2. It is argued upon behalf of the appellees that the decision of the secretary of the interior ordering the cancellation of the entry is null and void. This contention is sought to be maintained upon the ground that sections 2450 and 2451 of the Revised Statutes require the adjudication to be made by a board consisting of the secretary of the' treasury, attorney general, and secretary of the interior, and that the secretary- of the interior, without a determination by the board, could not lawfully cancel the entry. -These sections must be read and construed with reference to the other provisions of the act, and especially with reference to the provisions of section 2457, which reads as follows:

With the limitations thus placed upon .the construction to be given to sections -2450 and 2451, we are of opinion that the views contended for by appellees cannot be sustained. No authorities are cited to support their contention, and we apprehend none can be found, except the opinion rendered by the circuit court in this case ( 75 Fed. 946 ), and by the same court in Land Co. v. Hollister, 75 Fed. 941, 945 . The only decision of the supreme court with reference to the provisions of these sections to which our attention has been called is Foley v. Harrison, 15 How. 443 , 447. In that case the court held that under the act of August 3, 1846 (which includes .sections 2450 and 2451), the commissioner of the general land office had power to decide finally on the claims of the respective, parties to certain lands, and that his decision and a patent issued thereon were conclusive. In the course of the opinion the court said:

In the numerous decisions of the supreme court sustaining the authority of the commissioner of the general land office and of the secretary of the interior to affirm, modify, or annul the entries of public land made in the local land offices, no reference is made to the pro *655 visions oí sections 2450, 2451. Notwithstanding this fact, we are asked to assume that that court must have overlooked these provisions of the statute. We decline to act upon any such assumption.

3. The next question for consideration is whether or not the appellees were innocent purchasers for value, and are entitled, as such, to he protected, notwithstanding the fraud, if any, committed by (he entryman. The certificate or receipt which Hackley received from the land office invested him with the equitable title to the land in controversy. By this purchase he obtained the right to a patent to Che land, provided his acts were in all respects such as, under the law, justified the issuance to him of a patent thereto. His purchase of the laud was necessarily subject to the rules and regulations of the land depart meat. It was subject to the control of the commissioner of the general land office. The decisions of the local laud office and of the commissioner were liable to be reversed by the action of the secretary of the interior. The law is well settled that the purchaser of an equitable title takes only such an interest in the property as his grantors had at the time of the purchase. This being true, it logically follows that when Bailey took the deed from Hackley, and when the appellees took the deed from Bailey, they only acquired a title to the laud which was subject to the final action of the land department, and to such steps or proceedings as might thereafter be had in the courts to affirm, modify, or annul the final decision of the officers of the laud department in regard thereto. Having purchased the land before the issuance of the patent, while the government still held the legal title, they obtained only an equitable title, and are not entitled to protection as bona fide purchasers. This result n; cessarily follows from the views expressed and authorities cited in the first subdivision of this opinion.

4. Finally, it is argued on behalf of appellees that the decision of the secretary of the interior canceling the entry of Hackley “was solely the result of Ms misconstruction, misinterpretation, and misunderstanding of the law, and that it was not the result of his judgment upon the facts presented for his consideration.” There were 11 other entrymen whose cases were considered at the same time as Haekle.v’s, and the decision of the secretary of the interior applies to all the cases. In his decision the secretary said:

Lohr conducted the negotiations concerning all the lands. He “conducted the negotiations for the purchase of Hackley’s entry, but made no agreement prior to April 80, 1883, the date of his entry.” This witness was asked the following question: “Did it occur to *656 you, when you were locating these entrymen, and subsequently buying up their claims for the mutual benefit of S. S. Bailey and yourself, that you were operating in direct violation of the spirit of the timber law?” And he answered: “I did not believe that I was violating any law, any more than I would buy locations made by other parties, so long as I used due diligence in making purchases when parties had the right to sell, according to the advice, given me.” This witness also stated that he had been paid by Mr. Bailey his full share of the profits arising from the sale to Hawley and Alger, and had no interest in the result of the trial.

In addition to the testimony given at the hearing, the secretary referred to the fact that one Carson, a special agent of the government, had investigated the cases, and reported all the entries as fraudulent.- Hone of the entrymen were called as witnesses for the transferees, nor was Bailey sworn or offered as a witness on his own behalf. The secretary, in reviewing the testimony, said:

In the administration and disposition of the public lands the decisions of the land department upon the questions of fact are deemed conclusive. It is only questions of- law that are reviewable in the *657 courts. Bishop of Nesqually v. Gibbon, 158 U. S. 165, 166 , 15 Sup. Ct. 779, and numerous authorities there cited. The secretary of the interior found as a fact that the entry was made by Ilackhy “for the purpose of acquiring the land for speculative purposes”; that the entry was not made “in good faith, in harmony with the spirit and letter of the law.” Did the secretary of the interior err in his construction or interpretation of the law? We are of opinion that this question must he answered in the negative. Section 2 of the act of congress of June 3, 1878, provides that any person desiring to avail himself of the provisions oí this act shall file with the register of the proper district a written statement, among other things:

U. S. v. Budd, 144 U. S. 154 , 12 Sup. Ct. 575, is relied upon to support the view that the secretary of the interior acted upon an erroneous construction of this act. That case was in many essential particulars different from the case at bar. There the entry was made by Budd, who paid the purchase price and received tie receiver's receipt, and thereafter a patent was issued to him by the government. Prior to the issuance of the patent, he sold and conveyed the land to one Montgomery. The suit was brought by the United 8tab's against Budd and Montgomery to set aside the patent, on the ground that it was obtained wrongfully and fraudulently, and in defiance of the restrictions of the statute. The case was disposed of upon the familiar principle that in this class of cases the respect: due to a patent, the presumptions that all the preceding steps required by the law had been observed before its issue, the immense importance and necessity of the stability of titles dependent upon the official instruments, demand that-the effort to set them aside, to annul them, or to correct mistakes in them, should only be successful when the allegations on which this is attempted are clearly stated and fully sustained by proof. Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 381 , 7 Sup. Ct. 1015; Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. U. S., 123 U. S. 307 , 8 Sup. Ct. 131; U. S. v. Des Moines Navigation & Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 510 , 12 Sup. Ct. 308. The particular charge there made and relied upon by the government was “that: Budd, before his application, had unlawfully and fraudulently made an agreement with his co-defendant Montgomery, by which the title he was to acquire from the United States should inure to the benefit, of such co-defendant.” The evidence in that case failed to establish this charge by (he proofs demanded, under the rule as above staff'd. The land department and the circuit court so held, and the supreme court af *658 firmed the judgment. The court, in the course of its opinion, said that all that the act “denounces is a prior agreement, — the acting for another in the purchase. «If, when the title passes from the government, no one save the purchaser has any claim upon it, or any contract or agreement for it, the act is satisfied.” This language should be construed with reference to the particular charge made by the pleadings in that case. We are of opinion that it was not intended by the court to apply to all of the provisions of the act contained in section 2. In that case the testimony about other entries was excluded. Here, by stipulation, twelve entries were tried as one, and the entire testimony in all the cases was admitted. In the present case, in many respects, the questions involved are entirely the reverse* of those presented to the court in TJnii ed States v. Budd. Here, if any presumptions are to be indulged in, they must be invoked in behalf of thé action of the land department. It must be clearly and convincingly shown that the secretary of the interior acted without authority of law, or that he erred in his judgment as to the legal construction of the act.

We are of opinion that the evidence upon which the secretary of the interior acted was sufficient to justify the inference that there was some prior understanding, although not directly shown, between Hackley, the entryman, and Lohr, acting with and for Bailey, that his acts should inure to their benefit, and that he applied to purchase the land on a speculation, and not “in good faith, to appropriate it to his own exclusive use and benefit”; and that such acts are as much in violation of the statute as if the entryman had directly made a contract in writing with a person, by which the title which he might acquire from the government should inure to such person; and that the facts elicited upon the trial of this case in the circuit court are not of such a character as to authorize the court to enter a decree in favor of the appellees herein.

The decree and judgment of the circuit court are reversed, with directions to the court to dismiss the bill, with costs in favor of appellant.