This is a proceeding under the provisions of section 8449, Rev. St., to collect a fine of $500, provided by *698 law for a violation of the act. The averment in the complaint is that defendants “willfully, and unlawfully', and contrary to the provisions of section 3449, U. S. Rev. St., shipped, and caused to be shipped, transported, and removed, at and from their place of business, Nos. 221-225 Front street, to the premises Nos. 107-109 Front street, both in said city and county of San Francisco, with intent to have the merchandise hereinafter mentioned further transported to the city of Stockton, within said state and district, one case or package containing twelve quarts, in bottles, of spirituous liquors, under the following name and designation, with other marks, appearing on the outside of the said case or package.” After giving the designation and marks, the complaint continues: “Which said name or designation was then and there other than, and not, the true and proper name or brand known to the trade as designating the kind and quality of the contents of said case or package, which did not then and there contain the genuine Hennessy One Star Cognac, as the same was and is known to the trade.” To this complaint the defendants have interposed a demurrer upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The statute reads as follows:

In support of the demurrer, defendants rely upon the principles announced by Judge Priest in U. S. v. 132 Packages of Spirituous Liquors, 65 Fed. 980 , which sustains their views. But in that case a demurrer to the complaint was overruled by Judge Thayer. The views expressed by him as to the object, intent, and purpose of the-statute sustain the position contended for by the plaintiffs herein,— that the officers of the revenue would be aided, to. some extent, in the discharge of their duties, if dealers, in the manufacture or sale of spirituous and fermented liquors, were required to brand all casks and packages' containing spirituous liquors “which they shipped or removed from one place to another with the true name by which they were known to the trade,” and that it was immaterial that the statute as framed also had a tendency to protect trade-marks and prevent private frauds; citing in support of these views, U. S. v. Loeb, 49 Fed. 636 ; Opinion of Attorney General, 22 Int. Rev. Rec. 261 ; Commissioners’ Decision, 30 Int. Rev. Rec. 278 . Thereafter the case was tried, upon an agreed statement of facts, before Judge Priest, and he held that a compounder or rectifier of liquors, who labels his products as those of a well-known distiller and rectifier, and attempts to place-them on the market under such brands, removing them for that purpose from his warehouse to another place, does not thereby subject his liquors to forfeiture or himself to fine, under the provisions of section 3449. An appeal was taken to the circuit court of appeals, and it was there held that section 3449 is not a trade-mark regulation, but is for the prevention and detection of fraud on the revenue, and that *699 its validity is not in any manner affected by tbe fact that it incidentally innds to the discovery or suppression of private frauds. Among oilier things, the court said:

At the close of the opinion the court said:

As that action was against a distilling company, the court had no occasion to pass directly upon the point whether or not the act in question was intended to apply to any other persons than distillers, manufacturers, or rectifiers of liquors; and defendants argue that it must be limited to such persons. The statute does not, in terms, make any such limitation. The language of the court in the case cited is broad enough to include any person “who ships, transports, or removes any spirituous or fermented liquors” from one place to another in violation of the provisions of the statute. The demurrer is overruled.