This is an application by the bankrupt for an order permitting him to prosecute to judgment a certain action, commenced by him prior to the date of his being adjudged a bankrupt, and now pending in one of the courts of the state, to recover damages for his malicious prosecution and arrest upon a criminal charge. The present motion is necessarily based upon the assumption that the right to any damages which may be recovered in the action to which it refers is vested in the trustee in bankruptcy, for, if the bankrupt’s original right to recover damages for such alleged malicious prosecution is not vested in such trustee, it must follow that this court has no jurisdiction to exercise any control over the bankrupt in the matter of prosecuting such suit; and, upon consideration of the question, I am* satisfied that the cause of action for the malicious prosecution and imprisonment alleged to have been suffered by the bankrupt constitutes no part of his estate in bankruptcy. This is made very clear by a reference to section 70 of the bankrupt act. That section provides that there shall be vested in the trustee, except so far as such property is exempt, the title of the bankrupt to—

A cause of action for damages arising out of a personal wrong suffered by the bankrupt is not embraced in the foregoing description of property, the title to which, by operation of law, vests in the trustee of the bankrupt. The right to sue for a personal tort, such as slander, malicious prosecution, assault, etc., is strictly personal. It cannot be assigned, is not subject to levy and sale upon judicial process, and the statute does not contemplate that the bankrupt’s right to maintain an action to recover damages for such wrongs shall constitute any part of his estate in bankruptcy. The law follows, in this respect, section 14 of the bankruptcy act of 1867 (14 U. S. Stats. 517), in the, construction of which it was uniformly held that rights of action for personal torts did not vest in the assignee in bankruptcy. In re Crockett, 2 Ben. 514 , Fed. Cas. No. 3,402; Noonan v. Orton, 34 Wis. 259 ; Dillard v. Collins, 25 Grat. 343. In the first of these cases it was held that a cause of action for fraudulently and deceitfully recommending a person as worthy of trust and confidence did not pass to the assignee in bankruptcy by virtue of section 14 of the bankruptcy act of 1867; and in Noonan v. Orton it was decided that an action for an abuse of an attachment process was an action for a personal injury, and did not vest in the assignee, although the wrong injured the bankrupt’s business; while in Dillard v. Collins it was held that a plea that the plaintiff had been adjudged bankrupt under the act of 1867 was not a good plea to an action of slander. The decisions under the bankruptcy laws of England are to the same effect, and section 70 of the present bankruptcy law of the United States, defining what property of the bankrupt shall vest in the trustee, is not more comprehensive than the act of 6 Geo. IV. c. 16, which provided that all the real and personal estate of the bankrupt, and “all the present and future personal estate of such bankrupt, wheresoever the same may be found or known,” should be assigned to the assignee of the bankrupt.

In construing this statute, it was said by Lord Denman, C. J., in Rogers v. Spence, 13 Mees. & W. 580:

In Hancock v. Caffyn, 8 Bing. 858, Tindal, C. J., in passing upon a question arising under the same statute, said:

And Park, J., said, in the same case:

In Howard v. Crowther, 8 Mees. & W. 601, it was held that the right of action for seduction of a servant did not pass to the master’s assignees in bankruptcy. In that case, Lord Abinger, C. B., said:

The same rule was declared by Lord Denman, C. J., in Drake v. Beckham, 11 Mees. & W. 319, as follows:

In Wethcrell v. Julius, 10 C. B. 267, the declaration contained two counts; the first one being for damages for an alleged malicious prosecution and imprisonment. To this count there was a plea by the defendants to the effect that .after the committing by the defendants of the grievances therein alleged, and before the commencement of the action, the plaintiff had been adjudged bankrupt, and that by reason thereof the cause of action set forth in that count of the declaration became vested in the assignee in bankruptcy. This plea was overruled,* and in the course of its opinion the court said:

As already indicated, my conclusion is that the wrong suffered, by the bankrupt by reason of his alleged malicious prosecution and imprisonment was personal to himself, and the right to sue and recover damages therefor is not vested in the trustee of his estate in bankruptcy. The bankrupt therefore has the right to determine for himself whether the action to recover damages for tlxe injury alleged to have been sustained by him shall be further prosecuted or not, and this court is without jurisdiction to make any order in the premises. For these, reasons, the application for leave to prosecute is denied.