The court having heretofore announced its findings in favor of petitioners, so far as concerns the acts of bankruptcy charged in the petition, the only question now to be disposed of is whether or not respondent is such a corporation as may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt; or, more specifically, whether or not respondent is a corporation “engaged principally in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, or mercantile pursuits.” The purposes for which respondent was formed are set forth in its articles of incorporation as follows:

A circular letter issued and distributed by respondent contains the following statement as to its location:

Hie circular letter already mentioned describes the character of respondent’s business, as follows:

In another publication made by it, respondent refers to its location, and characterizes its business thus:

The proof shows that respondent’s institution is not a charity, but conducted on the lines indicated in the foregoing extracts, and for profit. Patients are lodged and furnished with the usual accommodations of a hotel at the sanatorium, the rates charged being $25 per week, and upward. Cigars are kept on sale at the sanatorium by the respondent for the benefit of those who desire them.' Petitioners furnished cigars and groceries to respondent for use at its sanatorium.

*273 Section 4 of the bankrupt act is as follows:

While the artificial atmosphere used at respondent’s sanatorium is doubtless the product of a manufacturing process, I am not prepared to hold that manufacturing' is respondent’s principal business. Nor is there any proof showing that respondent’s business is that of printing or publishing. I am of the opinion, however, that respondent may be properly classified as a trading or mercantile corporation; that is, a corporation principally engaged in trading or mercantile pursuits. To the proposition that “a corporation created for the purpose of carrying oti or pursuing any lawful business defined by its charter, and clothed with power so to do for the sake of gain, is clearly a business corporation, and amenable to the provisions of the bankruptcy act,” pettioners cite: Bump, Bankr. p. 773; Railroad Co. v. Jones, 1 Fed. Cas. 275 ; Adams v. Railroad Co., Id. 91; Rankin v. Railroad Co., 20 Fed. Cas. 274 . These authorities, however, are interpretations of the bankruptcy act of 1867, of which section 37 is as follows: “flee. 37. And be it further enacted that the provisions of this act shall apply to all moneyed, business or commercial corporations and joint stock companies,” etc. ( 14 Stat. 535 ), and, of course, are not .determinative of the meaning of the bankruptcy act of 1898; but the meaning of said last-mentioned act must be ascertained from its own peculiar phraseology. In construing said act, however, a. few general definitions will be helpful. The word “mercantile” is defined thus: “Pertaining to merchants, or the business of merchants.” Webst. Did. “A merchant” is “one whose business it is to buy and sell merchandise,” and “merchandise” is “a term including all those things which, merchants sell, either wholesale or retail, as dry goods, hardware, groceries, drugs, etc.” Bouv. Law Dict. “Merchant” includes “hotel keeper.” Campbell v. Finck, 2 Duv. 107 . It has been held that one who keeps on livery, or boards, horses belonging to other persons, is a merchant. In re Odell, 18 Fed. Cas. 574 . See, also, Black, Bankr. p. 82. “Trader” is thus defined:

The principal question is whether the person has the intention of getting a living by his trading. If this is proved, the extent or duration of the trading is not material. 3 Camp. 238; 2 Bouv. Law; Dict. 741; In re Cowles, 6 Fed. Cas. 672 . A baker who buys flour and makes it into bread for sale is a trader. In re Cocks, 5 Fed. Cas. 1154 . A stair-builder is a trader. In re Garrison, 10 Fed. Cas. 49 . *274 These authorities, I think, fairly outline the character of a merchant or trader, within the meaning of the bankruptcy law, although there are some cases which give to the words more restricted significations, as In re Smith, 22 Fed. Cas. 394 .

Respondent contends that, inasmuch as the ultimate object of its business is the cure of consumptives, it is not a corporation principally engaged in trading or mercantile pursuits, resting its argument largely on the word “principally,” used in section 4 of the bankruptcy act above quoted. This word “principally,” it seems to me, does not denote the object or end of a pursuit, as claimed by respondent, but is employed here to distinguish a calling, usual occupation, from an isolated single transaction. Thus, if an incorporated charity — a public free hospital, for instance — should buy a horse to be used in conveying patients to .and from the hospital, and, finding' the horse unfit for such use, should sell it, this one purchase and sale would not bring the hospital within the classification of a corporation principally engaged in trading or mercantile pursuits; but if an incorporated company such as a private hospital be conducted in a business way for profit, and not on charitable lines, it is, I think, a trading or mercantile corporation, within the meaning of the present bankruptcy law, no matter what may be the result or effects it purposes to accomplish with or upon its patrons. A decree adjudging respondent a bankrupt will be entered.