The present hearing is on demurrer to the bill, and raises, among others, the following question: Has a district court of the United States jurisdiction, under the bankrupt act now in force, over a suit brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside a transfer of property made by the bankrupt, either as a preference or without consideration, in violation of said act, when the complainant and defendant are citizens of the same state? Upon this question the courts are divided. Among the numerous cases cited in complainant’s briefs to the affirmative are In re Gutwillig (D. C.) 90 Fed. 481 ; In re Brooks (D. C.) 91 Fed. 598 ; In re Sievers, Id. 365, affirmed (on points, however, other than the jurisdictional one) in Davis v. Bohle, 34 C. C. A. 372 , 92 Fed. 325 ; Carter v. Hobbs (D. C.) 92 Fed. 594 ; Trust Co. v. Benbow (D. C.) 96 Fed. 514 . The negative is supported by Burnett v. Mercantile Co. (D. C.) 91 Fed. 365 ; Mitchell v. McClure, Id. 621; In re Abraham, 35 C. C. A. 592 , 93 Fed. 768 ; Hicks v. Knost, (D. C.) 94 Fed. 625 ; Camp v. Zellars, 36 C. C. A. 501 , 94 Fed. 799 . My views accord with the latter line of decisions. The supreme court cases referred to in complainant’s briefs (Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292 , 11 L. Ed. 603 ; Ray v. Norseworthy. 23 Wall. 128 , 23 L. Ed. 116 ; Lathrop v. Drake. 91 U. S. 516 , 23 L. Ed. 414 ; and Glennv v. Langdon, 98 U. S. 20 , 25 L. Ed. 43 ) concern the bankrupt acts of 1841 and 1807, and are ineffective as aids to the interpretation of the bankrupt act of 1898, for the reason that the limitations upon the jurisdiction, of United States courts prescribed in the latter act do not appear in the former acts. The grant of jurisdiction to the district courts by the bankrupt act of 1898 is found in section 2 of said act, and the directly pertinent provisions of said section, so far as concerns the point now under consideration, are as follows:

The limitations referred to in the clause, "except as herein otherwise provided,” just quoted, are found in section 23 of the said act, and are as follows:

Complainant contends that, inasmuch as a bankrupt himself could not maintain a suit to set aside a transfer made by him in fraud of the bankrupt act, therefore subdivision “b,” § 23, of said act, above quoted, does not apply to a suit of that character, but only includes suits upon causes of action which existed in the bankrupt prior to' his bankruptcy. The vulnerability of this argument is clearly shown by Judge Bellinger, in an opinion briefly expressed, but remarkably lucid and comprehensive, in Burnett v. Mercantile Co., supra. I quote from the opinion as follows:

Another excellent statement of the question is found in Be Abraham, supra, where Judge McCormick says:

To the same effect, in Mitchell v. McClure, supra, Judge Buffing-ton says:

Comparing tke provisions of section 2 of the bankrupt act of 1898, above quoted, with the corresponding clauses of the bankrupt act of 1867, which were as follows: “The jurisdiction conferred upon the district courts as courts of bankruptcy shall extend: * * * *289 Second. To the collection of all the assets of the bankrupt,” — Judge Buffington, in the same case (Mitchell v. McClure, supra) further says:

I am fully satisfied, after careful consideration of the question, that the purpose of congress in the enactment of said section 23 was, in part, to make the boundaries, under said act, between federal and state judiciaries, as to “all controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy,” coincident with the lines of demarkatiou then existing, thus giving an adverse elaim-mt, against whom a trustee in bankruptcy asserted a cause of action, the privilege of being sued in local courts, and thereby saving to such claimant the burdensome expenses and costs necessarily incident to litigation in a distant tribunal, except in cases where, if the bankrupt had been plaintiff, and proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted, the suit, because of diverse citizenship, or a federal question not related to the bankrupt act itself, and a requisite amount in controversy, could have been brought in the United States courts. This construction is at once indicated by the caption of said section 23, and required by the peculiar phraseology of subdivision “b,” which confines the trustee, not to courts where the bankrupt might have maintained (that is, successfully prosecuted) the suits, but to courts where the bankrupt “might have brought or prosecuted them.” These words manifestly refer to the ordinary requirements of federal jurisdiction, and not to the merits of controversies. Baid section, then, being designed to restrict the juris *290 diction of federal courts, constructive enlargement of sueb jurisdiction is inadmissible. The argument in Re Sievers, supra, that because said subdivision “b” is found between subdivisions “a” and “c” of the same section, both of which latter- subdivisions in terms refer to circuit courts of the United States, therefore subdivision “b” must be limited to the same courts, is fully answered by the title or headline of the section, “Jurisdiction of United States and State Courts.” Said argument is based on the postulate, undoubtedly correct, that subdivisions “a” and “c” refer exclusively to circuit courts of the United States. Now, if subdivision “b” also refers exclusively to said courts, then the section contains no reference whatever to state courts, and the title or headline, which was enacted by congress as a part of the section, is in direct conflict with the body of the section, and must be absolutely ignored. Surely, a construction which leads to such results ought not to be adopted, over one which, while giving due effect to each of the clauses herein quoted, harmonizes all with the manifest policy of the statute on the subject to which they relate. Demurrer sustained, and bill dismissed, for want of jurisdiction.