This appeal is from a summary judgment which upheld an arbitration award. The arbitrator rested his award upon a collective bargaining agreement between the appellant employer, Anaconda, and the appellee, Great Falls, a labor organization. The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 185 and ours is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .

The parties disagreed as to the order of priority in which employees of Anaconda were to be returned to work following a strike which occurred in January 1964. The union contended that provisions within the collective bargaining agreement relating to “layoffs in a department” were applicable to the order of recall after this strike. The company here takes the position that the seniority provisions of the contract could have no application because they did not specifically apply to post-strike recall. The dispute was submitted to arbitration in the form of a broad question which reads:

The collective bargaining agreement contained no specific provisions relating to the order of recalling employees after strikes. It did, however, provide an order of seniority for recalling employees after layoffs. The provision reads:

A hearing was conducted, and the arbitrator determined that Anaconda had violated the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement because it failed to recall the employees in order of their departmental seniority. 1 In his opinion, the arbitrator recognized that seniority provisions normally have no application to the order of recalling employees after a strike. As to the present dispute, however, he concluded on the basis of presented evidence that the company “must be held” to have interpreted the collective bargaining agreement iñ line with the position taken by the union. He wrote:

Anaconda now insists that the arbitrator did not confine himself to an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and that hence, the District Court should have overturned the award under the teaching of United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 , 80 S.Ct. 1358 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). There the Supreme Court held:

363 U.S. at 597 , 80 S.Ct. at 1361 .

Anaconda’s contention is based upon a portion of the arbitrator’s opinion in which it is pointed out that the collective bargaining agreement contains no specific provisions pertaining to the order of recalling employees after strikes. 2 That being true, Anaconda reasons that the arbitrator necessarily exceeded the scope of his authority in reaching his decision.

We cannot accept Anaconda’s position. It is taken upon a ground which is too narrow, and it reflects a fundamental misconception of the nature of a col *752 lective bargaining agreement and the role of the arbitrator chosen by the parties to interpret such a compact. To hold that once an arbitrator determines that there are no specific provisions in the collective bargaining agreement dealing with the subject of the dispute he is powerless to continue to a resolution of that dispute would require us to disregard the salutary principles set forth in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).

In Warrior, the Supreme Court emphasized that collective bargaining agreements should not be treated as mere contracts, that they are in the nature of generalized codes designed to cover a myriad of possible problems which their draftsmen could not be expected to anticipate. 363 U.S. at 578, 80 S.Ct. at 1350. Hence, the Court recognized that there would often be “gaps” to be filled by reference to the practices of the particular industry and shops covered by the agreement. Accordingly, the Court emphasized that the arbitrator, who is given the primary responsibility of interpreting the collective bargaining agreement in furtherance of industrial peace, should not be confined to the express provisions of the contract.

363 U.S. at 581-582, 80 S.Ct. at 1352.

It is clear to us that the arbitrator here involved fulfilled his responsibility in a manner comporting with the concepts expressed in Warrior. The disputants requested him to determine whether the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement were violated. It is significant that the submitted question was a broad one, calling for a determination of the ultimate issue, the proper order of recalling employees. The parties did not request the arbitrator to determine, in the beginning, the preliminary question of whether or not, under the terms of the agreement, he was authorized to resolve the question which was presented to him. In resolving that question, the arbitrator found no specific provisions relating to the order of recall after strikes on the face of the agreement. There was, however, the provided seniority schedule applicable to employees returning to work after a layoff. By application of the “common law of the shop,” the arbitrator concluded that these layoff provisions were subject to an interpretation supporting his disposition of the dispute.

The testimony revealed that after a strike which occurred in 1959, employees had been returned in order of their departmental seniority according to the agreement’s layoff provisions. Furthermore, there was testimony that one of Anaconda’s representatives, in response to an inquiry, had advised the union that when the strike here involved was settled the employees would be recalled “by de *753 partmental seniority.” Upon the basis of this evidence, the arbitrator found an implied agreement to interpret the contract as requiring that the employees should have been recalled in that order.

We hold that the arbitrator, interpreting the contract with the aid of evidence of the relevant history and of the conduct of the parties, properly performed his role as defined by Warrior.

Affirmed.

. The arbitrator’s conclusion reads as follows :

. The arbitrator wrote: