This case presents the question whether, once a major dispute (respecting certain proposed changes in working conditions as embodied in a collective bargaining agreement) has run its course pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (resulting in impasse and strike), and the agreement by its terms has come to an end, other changes in working conditions can, under the terms of the Act, unilaterally be imposed by the carrier.

The union contends that notwithstanding the fact that the agreement had expired by its terms, it nevertheless continued in force and effect by operation of the Act, and that no change from the working conditions status quo as it existed under the agreement can be imposed without complying with the procedures for settlement of major disputes established by the Act.

The District Court held against the union upon this proposition. International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Reeve Aleutian Airways, 330 F.Supp. 332 (D.Alaska 1971).

Appellant union is the certified representative of mechanics and related personnel employed by appellee company. The collective bargaining agreement between the parties provides:

On January 30, 1968, the union notified the company that it was “opening * * * the agreement for amendment and modification.” Twenty changes were specified for negotiation. The company gave no notice of any intended change.

*992 Negotiations followed between the company and the union, and on April 3, 1968, the company requested the services of the National Mediation Board. Bargaining continued with the assistance of a mediator of the Board without success. On September 11, 1968, the Board suggested arbitration, but the union declined. On September 18, 1968, the Board notified the parties of the termination of its mediatory efforts and informed them that they were required to maintain the status quo for thirty days thereafter. On October 19, 1968, having been unable to resolve their differences, the union called a strike against the company.

On September 24, 1969, the union terminated the strike. No agreement had been reached between the company and the union concerning changes or modifications in the contract. On September 25, 1969, the union wrote to the company notifying it that the strike had been discontinued, informing it that the agreement “continues to be in full force and effect,” including its union security and dues deduction provisions, and requesting the company to honor the conditions of the agreement including those terms. On September 30, 1969, the company informed the union that it refused to honor the request made, since the company had consistently taken the position that there was no contract between it and the union following the termination date.

This action was brought by the union, seeking a declaratory judgment that the agreement continued in effect by operation of the Act save as to the provisions which had been subjected to the Act’s procedures. The District Court, on motion of appellee, dismissed the complaint and this appeal followed. We affirm. The relevant provisions of the Act are set forth in the margin. 1

The District Court held:

We agree with the District Court’s construction of the Act. It is the provision of § 6 to the effect that “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered” upon which the union relies and the construction of which is here brought in question.

The status quo, thus frozen, applies to working conditions whether or not they are embodied in agreements. Detroit & Toledo Shoreline RR. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 , 90 S.Ct. 294 , 24 L.Ed.2d 325 (1969). From this the union concludes that any proposed change in status quo, whether or not embodied in an agreement, must undergo the statutory procedure of notice, negotiation and mediation.

But this is not what the Act says. The Act is concerned with procedures to be followed respecting proposed changes in agreements. Once a change has been noticed, the status quo provision of § 6 comes into play. It serves to freeze conditions, whether or not they are the subject of agreement, but it does not come into play until a proposed change in agreement has been noticed.

Cases upon which the union relies do not support its contentions.

Detroit & Toledo dealt with a unilateral change imposed by the carrier during the status quo period. The same is true of Manning v. American Air Lines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817 , 85 S.Ct. 33 , 13 L.Ed.2d 29 (1964). Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 384 U.S. 238 , 86 S.Ct. 1420 , 16 L.Ed.2d 501 (1966), dealt with a contract that had no termination date and that continued in force until a new contract had been reached. The question there was whether the contract continued in effect during the course of a strike. It was held that the strike, did not serve to terminate the contract. Here, however, it is not the strike but the contract terms themselves that have brought the contract to an end.

Our case is similar to Flight Engineers Int’l Ass’n v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 359 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). 2

Judgment affirmed.

. § 2 Seventh of the Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh, provides:

§ 6 of the Act, 45 U.S.C. § 156 , provides :

. There the court stated ( 359 F.2d at 310 ) :