Appellant brought this action against the brokerage firm, as well as some of its directors, officers and employees. He claims he suffered losses of $14,125 in the collapse of the price of a speculative over-the-counter stock purchased through the firm. Appellant alleges, inter alia, securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and of Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 1 Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10-5 . The District Court denied appellant’s motion to declare this a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Civ.P. 1 On appeal, appellant claims error in the order denying his motion. 2 Appellee moves to dismiss the appeal as improper.

On these facts, the “death knell” doctrine 3 is not applicable. Weingartner v. Union Oil Company of Cali *144 fornia, 431 F.2d 26 , 27-29 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 , 91 S.Ct. 459 , 27 L.Ed.2d 451 . The “death knell” doctrine exists, but its application should be carefully limited. It ought not to serve as a basis for intermediate, and therefore unwarranted, review of District Court orders denying class action status.

The order denying class status is subject to review after there has been a final judgment on the merits of the plaintiff's individual claim. Weingartner v. Union Oil Company of California, 431 F.2d 26, at 30 (9th Cir. 1970). The order denying appellant’s motion not being final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), this appeal must be dismissed.

. In his order of January 27, 1971, United States District Judge Oliver J. Carter commented on the nature of the purported class of those purchasers of the stock who retained the shares through the date of the collapse of the price.

. Appellant contends that his claim for relief meets all the requirements of Rule 23, F.R.Civ.P., at subsections 23(a)(1), 23 (a)(2), 23(a)(3), 23(a)(4), 23(b)(1) (A) and 23(b) (3).

. Where an order of a District Court denying class action treatment would terminate the individual claim of the plaintiff, and in effect sound the “death knell” for his action, the decisions of the Second Circuit permit review. Green v. Wolf Corporation, 406 F.2d 291 (2nd Cir. 1968) ; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1966). Where, by reason of the dollar amount at stake or otherwise, plaintiff’s claim retains its vitality despite the denial of class ac-. tion status, the order is not subject to review under 28 U.S..C. § 1291 (1970) ; Caceres v. International Air Transport Association, 422 F.2d 141 (2nd Cir. 1970) ; City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corporation, 410 F.2d 295 (2nd Cir. 1969).