Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70 of Alameda County

The Union appeals from an order holding it in criminal contempt for violating a temporary restraining order. We reverse because the order expired by operation of law after removal of the cause to the federal court and before the alleged contumacious conduct occurred.

Granny Goose Foods, Inc., and Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. (“Employers”), commenced the action in a California state court by filing a complaint charging the Union with breach of a collective bargaining agreement. It simultaneously filed an application for a temporary restraining order. On May 15, 1970, the state court, ex parte, issued a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted, made returnable on May 26, 1970. On May 18, 1970, Employers filed an amended complaint virtually identical to the original complaint except for the addition of new parties. On the same date the state court, ex parte, issued a modified temporary restraining order reflecting the change in parties and likewise modified the order to show cause, returnable May 26,1970.

On May 19, 1970, the Union filed a petition to remove the action to the federal court. The following day it filed an…

(dissenting):

The issue upon which this court is called to rule, is the effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1450 on the duration of a temporary restraining order issued by a state court in a case which is then removed to the federal court.

Had the case not been removed, the California Code of Civil Procedure would have caused such a temporary restraining order issued ex parte to be extinguished in a maximum of 20 days; had the same order been issued originally in the federal court, it would have ceased to exist in the same period of time.

When such a case, with an outstanding restraining order issued and pending, is removed, it becomes subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1450 which provides in pertinent part: “All injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in [a removed] action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the district court.”

The majority of the court is of the opinion that the purpose of this section is to “prevent a break” in the continuity of a restraining order that “could otherwise occur” during the change from state to federal court. It would seem that if such were the purpose, the statute could have very simply said so. Or, the…