PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Point Adams Packing Co. (Point Adams) and its hull underwriters brought this action against Astoria Marine Construction Co. (Astoria Marine) and The Bender Welding and Machine Co., Inc. (Bender) as a result of the sinking and loss of the crab fishing vessel, Scottie, owned by Point Adams. Jurisdiction of the district court was based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 , 1333. After trial to the court, the district judge entered judgment ordering that the plaintiffs recover nothing and dismissing the action against the defendants.

Point Adams appeals, claiming that the court below erred in its conclusions on the breach of warranty claim against Bender and the negligence claim against Astoria Marine. Jurisdiction of this court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We find no error and affirm.

FACTS

The Scottie was a ninety-foot crab fishing vessel owned by Point Adams. It was built by Bender and delivered to Point Adams in 1969. The Scottie was used in the Alaskan fishing waters from 1970 until it sank in September of 1973. The sinking was caused by flooding in the craft’s lazarette 1 and engine room. Water initially entered the lazarette from an unknown cause and passed through an eight-inch pipe into the engine compartment.

The Scottie, and its sister vessel, the Stevie, were built by Bender for Point Adams in 1969. By a letter agreement, the *765 Point Adams-Bender construction contract was modified to include language which provided that the vessels would be built to the best commercial marine practice. Point Adams claims that this established an express warranty and that pursuant to the express warranty, Bender should have installed a high-water alarm in the lazarette. This alarm would have provided an early warning that water had entered the lazarette.

In April of 1973, the Scottie was taken to Astoria Marine’s shipyards. Point Adams instructed Astoria Marine to install an eight-inch pipe from the lazarette to the engine room. The pipe was installed in order to house the hydraulic lines which ran from the engine room to the lazarette and which passed through the vessel’s crab tanks. Point Adams claims that had this pipe been closed or capped, then the water would not have passed through from the lazarette into the engine room.

DISCUSSION

Bender’s Liability

For purposes of this decision, we assume that the best commercial marine practice language, included in the construction contract, created an express warranty which would have necessitated the installation of a high-water alarm in the lazarette.

It is a well-settled rule that a contract to build a ship is not governed by admiralty law concepts. People’s Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393 , 61 U.S. 393, 401-402 , 15 L.Ed. 961 (1858); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 , 81 S.Ct. 886 , 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961); and see 1 Benedict on Admiralty (7th ed., 1974), § 188. The district court decided that Alabama law controlled Point Adams’ claim arising from the breach of the express warranty in the shipbuilding contract with Bender. 2

The relevant Alabama law provided that:

Ala.Code tit. 7A, § 2-607(3), (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607(3)). The Alabama courts have held that this section requires a buyer to give notice of the breach of an express warranty to the seller, and have further held that the failure to give such notice bars recovery. 3 See Bennett v. United Auto Parts, Inc., 294 Ala. 300 , 315 So.2d 579 (1975); Page v. Camper City & Mobile Home Sales, 292 Ala. 562 , 297 So.2d 810 (1974); Redman Industries v. Binkey, 49 Ala.App. 595 , 274 So.2d 621 (1973); and cf. Smith v. Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc., 122 So.2d 591 (Ala.Sup.Ct.1960).

The district court found that:

Clerk’s Record (C.R.) 380.

In view of these findings and the controlling Alabama law, we believe that *766 the district court was correct in its conclusion that Point Adams’ failure to give the required notice barred its claim for breach of express warranty. 5

ASTORIA MARINE’S LIABILITY

Contracts for the repair of ships are governed by admiralty law. 6 New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy, 258 U.S. 96, 99 , 42 S.Ct. 243 , 66 L.Ed. 482 (1922); 1 Benedict on Admiralty (7th ed., 1974), § 189. Point Adams claims that Astoria Marine, having repaired the Scottie by installing the conduit pipe, neither fulfilled its warranty of workmanlike service, nor satisfied its duty to warn Point Adams of the potential danger of the open conduit.

We agree with the district court that Point Adams did not state any grounds by which liability could be established against Astoria Marine. In his opinion, Judge Burns made the following factual findings and drew the following conclusions, which we adopt as part of our opinion:

C.R. 381-382A.

Point Adams fails to show that the district court applied the wrong legal standard. The cases which Point Adams relies upon do not mandate a different result. 7 Furthermore, the factual findings and conclusions of the district court were supported by substantial evidence. 8

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

. As used in this case, lazarette refers to a space at the vessel’s stern, below deck, which was used for storage and which contained part of the steering mechanism.

. Point Adams does not argue that its claim should be controlled by the law of any other state, but it does suggest that “admiralty breach of warranty law” should apply instead. However, this argument is based upon Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 345 F.Supp. 395 (N.D.Cal.1971) which addressed the jurisdictional question of whether a district court sitting in admiralty could recognize implied warranties, and not the choice of law question as to what law should control the express warranty claim arising from the contract to build the ship.

. The cases cited by Point Adams do not stand for the proposition that notice is not required in breach of warranty cases. See Geohagan v. General Motors Corp., 291 Ala. 167 , 279 So.2d 436 (1973); Storey v. Day Heating & Air Conditioning Co., Inc., 56 Ala.App. 81 , 319 So.2d 279 (1975).

. On appeal, Point Adams argues that it is no defense to an action based on express warranty that an inspection may have revealed the defect. From this, Point Adams reasons that since there is no duty to inspect, there should be no duty to give notice. This argument is *766 premised on this court’s decision in United States v. Franklin Steel Products, Inc., 482 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 , 94 S.Ct. 1416 , 39 L.Ed.2d 472 , which is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the agreement in Franklin Steel provided that despite inspection and acceptance, the seller warranted that the goods would satisfy certain detailed specifications. 482 F.2d at 402, n. 1 . Second, the defects which breached the warranty were latent and could not have been discovered by visual inspection. 482 F.2d at 403 . The alleged defect in the present case was patent, as the district court observed, “any reasonable inspection would have disclosed its absence.” C.R. 380. And third, the decision in Franklin Steel was apparently not controlled by the U.C.C. as this case is.

. Because of our finding that the failure to give notice precludes any recovery against Bender, we need not decide whether the absence of the alarm was the proximate cause, or whether Point Adams’ claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

. The reason for the distinction between contracts to repair, and contracts to build ships, with only the former coming under admiralty jurisdiction, was best explained by the Supreme Court when it said:

North Pacific Steamship Co. v. Hall Brothers Marine Railway and Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119, 127 , 39 S.Ct. 221, 223 , 63 L.Ed. 510 (1919).

. In Albina Engine & Machine Wks. v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 295 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1961), the repair contractor’s liability resulted, in part, from its failure to comply with the standard of care imposed by a city ordinance. And, the present case is more like Campania Naviera Limitada v. Black, et al, 183 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1950), than the extraordinary situation in Pan-American Petroleum Transp. Co. v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 281 F. 97 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 586 , 42 S.Ct. 589 , 66 L.Ed. 1076 .

. The-findings and conclusions are included in Judge Burns’ unpublished opinion dated and entered March 24, 1977, District of Oregon, Civil No. 75-281.