Petitioners are Pacific Northwest employers engaged in the processing of lumber and the manufacture of wood products. Each was the subject of an enforcement inspection by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and was cited for various violations of safety standards. Each contested the citations and in each case the citations (with the exception of certain of the citations for noise level violations) were upheld by order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 660 (a), each petitioner now seeks review by this court of the Commission order affecting it to the end that that order be set aside. The petitions for review have been consolidated in this proceeding.

Radial Saw Violations

Many of the citations issued by OSHA had to do with the manner in which petitioners utilized industrial size radial arm saws in their manufacturing and processing operations. OSHA contends that the manner of operation in each case is contrary to the safety standards established by the OSHA regulation contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.213 (h)(1). 1 That standard reads in part as follows:

The citations were for failure to provide such a device. Throughout these proceedings petitioners have contended that such a device is unsafe and unfeasible.

Petitioners offer two challenges to the regulation. First, they contend that the standard from which the regulation was drawn was not a valid “national consensus standard” as required by the statute. Second, they contend that even if the source standard was a valid consensus standard, the Secretary destroyed the consensus by omitting certain portions of the standard in adopting 29 C.F.R. § 1910.213 (h).

OSHA contends that review of the validity of (h)(1) is time barred by the Act. Section 6(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (f), provides in part:

Legislative history indicates, however, that this limitation was intended to apply only to pre-enforcement review of the standards and that if review of an enforcement order is timely sought under § 660(a), the validity of the standard can be challenged in those proceedings. The Senate Report states:

S.Rep.No.91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 5177, 5184. The Conference Report merely states that “a 60-day limitation on the appeal time [was] accepted by the conferees.” Conf.Rep.No.91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 5228, 5232.

*202 Accordingly, we hold that the limitation provided by § 655(f) applies to pre-enforcement review only, and that the validity of the standard can be challenged in this review of the enforcement order under § 660(a). We read Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1976), as holding to this effect.

Petitioners first challenge the regulation as not adopted pursuant to statutory authority. The Secretary did not comply with the notice and hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act in adopting the regulation. However, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (a) authorizes the Secretary “as soon as practicable” to promulgate any “national consensus standard” as an occupational safety or health standard “without regard to chapter 5 of Title 5.” OSHA contends that the standard here in question qualifies as a national consensus standard. That term is defined in § 3(9) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652 (9), as follows:

from standards adopted by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Legislative history indicates that Congress was satisfied that the procedures customarily followed by ANSI were such that ANSI standards would meet the statutory definition of national consensus standards. The Senate Report states:

S.Rep.No.91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 5177, 5182. Senator Javitts, a leading proponent of the Act, agreed that “a national consensus standard, under this Act, is a standard which has been developed by one of two organizations at the present time: the American National Standards Institute or the Fire Underwriters Association.” Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, at 504 (1970).

For several reasons petitioners contend that the challenged standard, 1910.213(h)(1), was not properly adopted as a consensus standard pursuant to § 652(9). Petitioners argue that the requirements of § 652(9) were not met because the sawmill and plywood industries were not represented on the ANSI committee which formulated the standard. 2 However, the National Lumber Manufacturers Association was represented on the committee, as was the National Safety Council, of which appellant Weyerhaeuser was a member. Petitioners further argue that the ANSI standards were not valid consensus standards because the individual employers who composed the ANSI member organizations were not consulted or required to reach consensus with regard to the standards. Congress, however, was *203 aware of ANSI’s procedures, and approved the adoption of ANSI standards as national consensus standards.

Petitioners also contend that the ANSI source standard was intended only as a guide and that no consensus can be said to have been reached to the effect that the standards should be literally enforced in all cases. ANSI standards generally are stated to be guides, however, and this fact did not discourage congressional approval of the ANSI procedures. 3 The same can be said of petitioners’ complaint that the Secretary adopted the ANSI standards here involved as meeting the requirements of consensus standards without conducting his own investigation as to whether the statutory definition had been met.

The resort by Congress to consensus standards was to meet the pressing need for adoption of OSHA standards on an exceedingly broad industrial front without undue delay. The procedures by which consensus standards were formulated were felt to provide sufficient assurance as to industry-wide consensus to justify exempting such standards from the requirements of the APA. Protection against misguided or inappropriate application of a particular standard is afforded by the Act’s provisions for modification of standards under 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b), should experience indicate that safety could better be achieved by other means, and for variances under 29 U.S.C. § 655 (d), where the circumstances surrounding the particular use indicate that other practices will sufficiently achieve safety. In this case no petitioner sought modification or variance as to any of the charged violations.

Petitioners contend that Congress improperly delegated legislative and administrative power to a private organization, ANSI. We do not find an undue delegation of power. See Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir., Nov. 26, 1979, at 991). OSHA in practice did not surrender to ANSI all its standard-making function. As was the case here, it selected among the ANSI standards with apparent discrimination.

Petitioners’ second contention is that even if the ANSI source standard did represent a consensus, that consensus was destroyed when the Secretary omitted certain portions of the source standard in adopting 1910.213(h)(1). The regulation is derived from ANSI’s “Safety Code for Woodworking Machinery.” 4 The Secretary did not, however, adopt the code in its entirety. A substantial portion was not adopted, and petitioners contend that the deletions so alter that which remains that it cannot meet the definition of a national consensus standard. Emphasis is placed on two eliminated portions: The first is a paragraph defining the scope of the code. It reads:

The second is a headnote to the division entitled “Woodworking Machinery,” in which (hXl), the section on radial saws, is to be found. That note reads:

Petitioners contend that deletion of the notes served to extend the code into areas it was not intended to cover. OSHA responds that neither the headnote nor the scope note purports to fix safety standards; that both are commentary and have no place in a regulation purporting to set forth what must be done in order to render certain machinery safe. The notes do, however, bear on the scope of the consensus.

OSHA correctly observes that the headnote is essentially a direction to the enforcing agency that exemptions should be liberally granted. Since § 655(d) of the Act provides for the granting of variances, adoption of the headnote would have been superfluous.

However, from the language of the eliminated notes and from testimony given before the administrative law judges by persons .who had participated in the proceedings by which agreement was reached upon the ANSI woodworking standards, it is clear that the standards relative to radial saws were not intended to apply to all uses to which such saws might be put. The standards were intended to apply to woodworking — the sort of operation one might find in the shop of a cooper, or carpenter, or cabinetmaker. There was no consensus that the standards should apply to the manufacture of structural plywood or to sawmill operations. If anything, the consensus was that they should not apply to such operations.

Giving support to this view is a foreword to the 1954 ANSI code which reads in part:

Petitioners assert that many of the cited violations of (h)(1) related to saws engaged in sawmill operations or in the manufacture of structural plywood. As to such saws so engaged, it is contended, the substance of (hXl) cannot be said to constitute a national consensus standard and, without compliance with the provisions of the APA, (h)(1) is invalid. We agree.

OSHA asserts in its brief and asserted at oral argument that no cited saw was engaged in sawmill operations or the manufacture of structural plywood; that if a cited saw was operated in connection with a sawmill or a plywood operation it was not in a milling area but in a woodworking area. This would appear to dispose of petitioners’ contentions. However, upon the record it is not clear whether any of the saws in question were or were not actually being used in' sawmill or plywood operations.

We hold that (h)(1) serves as a national consensus standard as to radial saws engaged in woodworking operations, including those carried on in a woodworking area of a sawmill or plywood factory, but cannot serve as a national consensus standard as to saws engaged in sawmilling operations or the manufacture of structural plywood. A remand is necessary in order that the Review Commission may determine whether the citations here involved were for violations of (h)(1) so limited. If they were not, then all citations charging a violation beyond the limited scope of (h)(1) must be dismissed.

Petitioners contend that (h)(1) is invalid because compliance with the regulation actually creates a greater hazard to safety than noncompliance. At the hearing before the administrative law judge they presented testimony of a saw expert and of a saw user-employee to the effect that compliance would increase rather than reduce hazard. The administrative law judge ruled in their *205 favor on this issue and was reversed by OSHRC.

OSHRC has placed a three-fold burden on employers seeking to assert the greater hazard defense. The employer must demonstrate (1) that the hazards of compliance are greater than the hazards of noncompliance, (2) that alternative means of protecting employees are unavailable, and (3) the unavailability or inappropriateness of obtaining a variance. Petitioners have failed to make any showing as to the availability and appropriateness of obtaining a variance and protest OSHRC’s reliance on that failure.

In General Electric Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 576 F.2d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 1978), the court dealt with this question. It concluded that if the greater hazard defense could be raised in an enforcement proceeding without first exhausting the variance procedure, employers would tend to bypass that procedure. The court stated:

We agree with that holding. As was stated in Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327 (6th Cir. 1978):

Sound Level Violations

Petitioner Weyerhaeuser was charged with violating OSHA Regulation 1910.95, dealing with occupational noise exposure. 5 Petitioner contends that there was no proof of excess duration of employee exposure since the compliance officer’s noise level readings lasted only for a few seconds each and the sound level fluctuated in each case throughout the entire work shift.

It appears that although the compliance officer took noise readings both during operation of the work area machines and when they were merely idling, OSHRC relied only on the idling level to determine exposure. It was that level, together with testimony that employees worked in these areas at least seven-and-a-half hours daily that formed the basis for the Commission’s conclusion that employees were exposed at the least to the idling levels for impermissible time periods.

Weyerhaeuser points out that this did not take into consideration the fact that on occasion some machines shut down entirely. With a noise level fluctuating far above the idling level, acceptance of the idling level as a minimum, even when some machines were occasionally shut down, does not appear unreasonable to us. We conclude that the citation was supported by substantial evidence.

Weyerhaeuser contends further that the formula for defining a violation was impermissibly vague. That formula provided a means for ascertaining the sound level when based on various fluctuating readings. As we have noted, however, the Commission did not base its conclusion upon the formula but on the idling noise level.