MEMORANDUM

Michael Seneca appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging, among other things, violations of the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo a dismissal for lack of standing. Del. Valley Surgical Supply Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm.

Seneca’s claims remain property of his Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate because they accrued before Seneca filed his bankruptcy petition but were never scheduled or otherwise administered in his bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (d) (“Unless the court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not abandoned under this section and that is not administered in the case remains property of the estate.”); Canatella v. Towers (In re Alcala), 918 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir.1990) (causes of action which accrued before Chapter 7 petition is filed are part of the estate vested in the trustee); see also Cheng v. K & S Diversified In, Inc. (In re Cheng), 308 B.R. 448, 461 (9th Cir. BAP 2004) (“Property of the estate that is not scheduled or otherwise administered by the time the case is closed remains property of the estate forever.”). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Seneca’s action because Seneca is not the real party in interest and has no standing to pursue his claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a)(1) (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”); see also Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino Cnty. Superior Court Case Numbered SPR 02211, 443 F.3d 1172 , 1176 (9th Cir.2006) (bankruptcy code endows bankruptcy trustee with exclusive right to sue on behalf of estate).

Seneca’s contentions concerning the lack of oral argument, the propriety of removal to federal court, the adequacy of the district court’s explanation of its conclusions, and the district court’s consideration of judicially-noticed bankruptcy court orders are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.