DISCUSSION

1. We deny Wasserman’s motion to dismiss the appeal Wasserman moved to dismiss this appeal based on the Wizgans’ failure to provide a record of the oral proceedings in the trial court. Rule 8.120 of the California Rules of Court states that, if an “appellant intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court, the record on appeal must include a record of these oral proceedings.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b).) Under certain circumstances, a reviewing court may dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to

3 procure an adequate record. (See rules 8.140, 8.276; Beckley v. Board of Administration Etc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 691, 693, fn. 1.) The Wizgans’ appeal is premised, in part, on their assertion that Wasserman failed to submit sufficient evidence at trial to support his claims. As Wasserman points out, to evaluate that contention fully, we must consider the testimony at trial. The Wizgans’ failure to provide any record of the oral proceedings below, however, prevents us from doing so. Nevertheless, because the Wizgans make other arguments that do not require consideration of the oral proceedings, we deny Wasserman’s motion and consider the appeal on the merits. 2. The Wizgans’ arguments lack merit The Wizgans make three primary arguments on appeal, which we consider in turn. First, the Wizgans contend Wasserman did not submit sufficient evidence to show that the value of Truepriced at the time of the transfer exceeded the value of Wasserman’s judgment against Raanan. The Wizgans’ failure to submit a record of the trial testimony is fatal to their claim. The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that “judgments and orders are presumed correct, and error must be affirmatively shown. [Citation.] Consequently, appellant[s] [have] the burden of providing an adequate record. [Citations.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant[s]. [Citation.] Without a record, either by transcript or settled statement, a reviewing court must make all presumptions in favor of the validity of the judgment.” (Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935.)

4 Because the Wizgans failed to provide a record of the trial testimony, we must presume it supports the judgment. Accordingly, we must presume Wasserman submitted testimony at trial sufficient to prove that the value of Truepriced at the time of the transfer exceeded the value of Wasserman’s judgment against Raanan. The Wizgans, therefore, have not met their burden of showing the judgment lacks the support of substantial evidence. The Wizgans next argue the trial court should have limited the judgment to the return of the Truepriced shares, rather than entering a money judgment against them. The Wizgans fail, however, to support their argument with any analysis or citations to relevant authority. “[A]n appellant must present argument and authorities on each point to which error is asserted or else the issue is waived.” (Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 867.) Matters not properly raised or that lack adequate legal discussion will be deemed forfeited. (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655–656.) In short, an appellant must demonstrate prejudicial or reversible error based on sufficient legal argument supported by citation to an adequate record. (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 556–557 (Yield Dynamics).) The Wizgans have not done so here. That alone provides a sufficient basis to reject their claim. The Wizgans’ argument also fails on the merits. Under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA), a transfer made by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditor. (Civ. Code, § 3439.04.) To the extent a transfer is voidable, the creditor may recover from the first transferee

5 of the asset a “judgment for the value of the asset transferred . . . or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, whichever is less.” (Id., § 3439.08, subd. (b); see Renda v. Nevarez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1231, 1235.) Here, the trial court found Raanan transferred the Truepriced stock to the Wizgans in order to defraud his creditor, Wasserman. Because the Wizgans were the first transferees of the asset, Wasserman could obtain a money judgment against them under the UVTA. (See Civ. Code, § 3439.08, subd. (b).) Lastly, the Wizgans contend the judgment should be set aside on equitable grounds because the court likely would have stayed the trial had it been aware of the conservatorship petitions. The Wizgans’ argument fails for several reasons. First, they have not supported it with meaningful analysis or citations to the record, which alone provides a sufficient basis to deny their claim. (See Yield Dynamics, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 556–557.) Second, although the Wizgans moved to stay the judgment temporarily based on the filing of the conservatorship petitions, there is no indication that they also moved to set aside the judgment. Their failure to raise the issue in the trial court forfeits it on appeal. (See Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 489 [“It is well settled that the failure to raise an issue in the trial court typically forfeits on appeal any claim of error based on that issue.”].) Finally, even if we were to overlook these issues, there is nothing in the record showing a court granted the conservatorship petitions, nor do the Wizgans claim they were incompetent at the time of trial. Absent such evidence, there is no basis to set aside the judgment on equitable grounds.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Bruce Wasserman shall recover his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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