DISCUSSION

I. K.C. argues that probation condition 6A is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define “sexual touching.” He points out, for example, that lewd or lascivious conduct prohibits touching of a child with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the child, but the touching need not be done in a sexual manner. (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 452.) The void-for-vagueness doctrine derives from the due process concept of fair warning, which bars the government from enforcing a provision that forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500.) “To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has violated the condition.” (Ibid.)

3 In determining whether a probation condition is sufficiently definite, a court is not limited to the condition’s text. (People v. Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th 494, 500.) The court may consider other sources of law, including judicial construction of similar provisions. (Ibid.) A probation condition should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language. (Id. at pp. 500-501.) We independently review a probation condition’s alleged vagueness as a question of law. (People v. Stapleton (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 993.) Probation condition 6A provides fair warning of the conduct it prohibits. A reasonable person would interpret this provision to proscribe unconsented touching of another person that involves any sexual connotation, either due to the parts of the body involved or K.C.’s intent in touching the person. The term “unconsented” provides guidance and permits K.C. to avoid violating the condition in those instances where he has that person’s consent. That different penal statutes define and proscribe particular sexual crimes in different terms makes no difference; K.C. must avoid all unconsented sexual touching. The condition is sufficiently definite to preclude constitutional infirmity. [[II. K.C. asserts that the disposition minute order conflicts with the oral pronouncement of judgment and therefore must be corrected. The Attorney General agrees. The oral pronouncement of judgment stated that K.C. “must not engage in any unconsented sexual touching of any person,” whereas the minute order omits the word “unconsented” and prohibits “any sexual touching of any person.”

4 The oral pronouncement of judgment controls when there is a discrepancy between the clerk’s minute order and the oral pronouncement. (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2 [“The record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls over the clerk’s minute order]”.) Accordingly, the trial court shall correct the disposition minute order to add the word “unconsented.” (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185- 187.)]]

DISPOSITION

[[The trial court shall correct the disposition minute order to add the word “unconsented.”]] The order is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.

5 Fred J. Fujioka, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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