NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 23 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT RADCLIFFE, CHESTER No. 21-56284

CARTER, MARIA FALCON, CLIFTON C.

SEALE III, ARNOLD LOVELL, Jr., D.C. No. 8:05-cv-01070-DOC-MLG Plaintiff-Appellants,

and MEMORANDUM*

CHARLES JUNTIKKA AND

ASSOCIATES LLP, Counsel for Plaintiffs,

Appellant,

and

JOSE HERNANDEZ, KATHRYN PIKE,

LEWIS MANN, ROBERT RANDALL,

BERTRAM ROBISON,

Plaintiff-Appellees,

and

CADDELL & CHAPMAN, Counsel for Plaintiffs; LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN LLP, Counsel for Plaintiffs;

FRANCIS MAILMAN SOUMILAS, P.C.,

Counsel for Plaintiffs; NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, Counsel for Plaintiffs; CONSUMER LITIGATION

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ASSOCIATES, P.C., Counsel for Plaintiffs;

CALLAHAN, THOMPSON, SHERMAN &

CAUDILL LLP, Counsel for Plaintiffs; PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C., Counsel for Plaintiffs,

Appellees,

v.

EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,

LLC; EXPERIAN INFORMATION

SOLUTIONS, INC.; TRANS UNION LLC,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 17, 2023** San Francisco, California

Before: WARDLAW, NGUYEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Counsel Charles Juntikka (Juntikka) appeals the district court’s denial of his

motion to vacate an arbitration award that allocated attorneys’ fees among class

counsel from a class action against three credit-reporting companies. Juntikka

contends that the arbitrator exceeded her powers in violation of the Federal

Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, when she relied on equitable

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 considerations to fashion her final fee award instead of applying the terms of the

class counsels’ fee allocation agreements.

We review a district court’s decision to confirm an arbitration award by

“accepting findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous but deciding questions of

law de novo.” Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors LLC, 913

F.3d 1162, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Exercising jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

we affirm.

The district court properly denied Juntikka’s motion to vacate the arbitration

award. “The [FAA] enumerates limited grounds on which a federal court may

vacate, modify, or correct an arbitral award.” Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache

Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Arbitrators

“exceed their powers” under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA “not when they merely

interpret or apply the governing law incorrectly, but when the award is ‘completely

irrational’ or exhibits a ‘manifest disregard of the law.’” Id. at 997 (citations

omitted). Thus, a court may vacate an arbitration decision pursuant to § 10(a)(4)

only if the arbitrator “strays from interpretation and application of the agreement

and effectively dispense[s] h[er] own brand of industrial justice.” Major League

Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (first alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

3 Here, the arbitrator did not show manifest disregard of the law when she

applied equitable considerations in arriving at the fee award. The arbitrator relied

on our precedent in In re FPI/Agretech Securities Litigation, 105 F.3d 469 (9th

Cir. 1997), and Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002), to

conclude that a court may reject a fee allocation agreement if it “rewards an

attorney in disproportion to the benefits that attorney conferred upon the class,”

Agretech, 105 F.3d at 473. The arbitrator provided copious evidence that Juntikka

and his partner, Dan Wolf, failed to confer a net benefit on the class from their pre-

objection efforts. Because the arbitrator relied on Agretech and Vizcaino in

determining the ultimate award, she did not “dispense[] h[er] own brand of

industrial justice,” Major League Baseball, 532 U.S. at 509 (citation omitted), and

therefore did not exceed her powers in violation of § 10(a)(4).

Juntikka argues that the arbitrator’s reliance on Agretech is misplaced

because it merely recognizes a district court’s authority to override a fee

arrangement, not that of an arbitrator. However, “[m]anifest disregard . . . requires

something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part

of the arbitrators to understand and apply the law.” HayDay Farms, Inc. v. FeeDx

Holdings, Inc., 55 F.4th 1232, 1240 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Even if the

arbitrator incorrectly applied Agretech, “we may not reverse an arbitration award

even in the face of an erroneous interpretation of the law.” Collins v. D.R. Horton,

4 Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007); see also E. Associated Coal Corp. v.

United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) (“[T]he fact that a court is

convinced [an arbitrator] committed serious error does not suffice to overturn [her]

decision.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Juntikka maintains that, even if the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard

the law, the arbitrator exceeded her powers because her decision “fail[ed] to draw

its essence from the agreement.” Aspic, 913 F.3d at 1166 (citation omitted). To be

sure, we have vacated arbitration awards where the arbitrator blatantly disregards

express terms of the parties’ agreements. See Aspic, 913 F.3d at 1168; Pac. Motor

Trucking Co. v. Auto. Machinists Union, 702 F.2d 176, 177 (9th Cir. 1983); see

also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682–83 (2010).

But in those cases, the arbitrator “underst[oo]d and correctly state[d] the law, but

proceed[ed] to disregard the same.” Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th

Cir. 2009) (alterations in original) (citation omitted); see Aspic, 913 F.3d at 1167–

68. Here, the arbitrator understood the relevant law as permitting her to override

the contract and allocate fees in proportion to the benefit Juntikka and Wolf

conferred upon the class. Accordingly, the district court properly denied the

motion to vacate the fee award.

AFFIRMED.

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