NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 28 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BLANCA LUBIA PANGAN GONZALEZ No. 18-70265 DE RUIZ; et al., Agency Nos. A208-742-060 Petitioners, A208-742-061

A206-806-289

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 21, 2023**

Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Blanca Lubia Pangan Gonzalez de Ruiz, her daughter, Blanca Yesenia Ruiz

Pangan, and her son, Riwaldo De Jesus Ruiz Pangan, petition for review from the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of the Immigration Judge’s

(“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Convention Against Torture protection (“CAT”). Petitioners are natives and

citizens of Guatemala. Blanca Yesenia is a derivative on Blanca Lubia’s

application, and Riwaldo’s application was consolidated with his mother’s. The

BIA denied their applications because they did not show a well-founded fear of

persecution or that the Guatemalan authorities would be unable or unwilling to

control their persecutor. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not

recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the

petition for review.

We review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-

Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Under this

standard, the agency’s action should be upheld unless “any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (citation omitted).

1. To qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, the petitioner must

show, among other things, past persecution or a fear of future persecution

committed by the government or “forces that the government was [or is] unable or

unwilling to control.” Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir.

2020) (citation omitted). Where the persecutor is not affiliated with the

government, we examine “all relevant evidence in the record” to determine if the

government is unable or unwilling to control the persecutor. Bringas-Rodriguez,

850 F.3d at 1069 (citation omitted).

2 Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s holding “that the record does not

establish that the authorities would be unable or unwilling to protect” petitioners.

In the over two decades during which Blanca Lubia was living with her abusive

and alcoholic husband, it appears that she reported his beatings to the police only

once. On that occasion, the police immediately returned with her to her home in

the middle of the night and arrested her husband for drunkenness. He was released

the next day and was not charged. While the record is arguably unclear on this

point, both the IJ and BIA found that Blanca Lubia did not make any further police

reports because, according to her testimony, her husband threatened to kill her if

she did. Even if there was a second report, there is no evidence in the record as to

how the police responded. Nor did Riwaldo report his father’s abuse of his mother

or himself. The State Department Human Rights Reports submitted by petitioners

state that police often do not respond to domestic violence complaints and

convictions for intrafamily violence are rare, but also that legal protections exist

and the government is working to provide services for survivors of domestic

violence.

Considering the positive police response after the only undisputed report, the

lack of any indication that the police would not assist if called again, and the legal

protections and services discussed in the country reports, it was reasonable for the

BIA to decide that the authorities were able and willing to protect petitioners. That

3 the government arrested a persecutor does not necessarily imply that it is able and

willing to protect the petitioner. See J.R. v. Barr, 975 F.3d 778, 781-84 (9th Cir.

2020). But here, the fact that the police arrested and briefly detained Blanca

Lubia’s then-husband and did not express any unwillingness to assist in the future

strongly supports the BIA’s decision. And although the Human Rights Reports cut

both ways by identifying some of Guatemala’s failures in controlling domestic

abusers, they also highlighted ways in which Guatemala protects women from

domestic violence. See Velasquez-Gaspar, 976 F.3d at 1064-65 (discussing the

2014 State Department Guatemala Human Rights Report—very similar to the

reports in this record—and holding that the report suggests that the government is

able and willing to protect women from domestic violence).

Thus, “we cannot say that the record compels a finding contrary to the

agency’s.” Velasquez-Gaspar, 976 F.3d at 1065 (upholding the BIA’s decision

that the Guatemalan government was able and willing to protect a survivor of

domestic violence who had not reported her abuse to the police). Accordingly,

petitioners are not eligible for asylum or withholding. Id.

2. CAT is only available if the petitioner shows a clear probability of

torture by or “with the consent or acquiescence of” government officials. B.R. v.

Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 844 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)).

Because petitioners did not show that Guatemalan authorities would be unable or

4 unwilling to protect them, they cannot show a clear probability of torture with the

acquiescence of the government. Thus, we similarly uphold the BIA’s denial of

CAT protection.

PETITION DENIED.

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