NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM JERMAINE FLETCHER, No. 21-35128

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00267-BLW

v.

MEMORANDUM*

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION; IDAHO COMMISSION

OF PARDONS AND PAROLE; SANDY

JONES; KAREN CLIFFORD,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 11, 2023 Seattle, Washington

Before: BYBEE and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and SEEBORG,** District Judge.

William Fletcher appeals the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of his

claims for damages against Karen Clifford, a Deputy manager of the Idaho

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Richard Seeborg, Chief United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. Department of Correction (IDOC), and Sandy Jones, the Executive Director of the

Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole (ICPP), alleging that his due process rights

were violated when he was classified and subjected to supervision and treatment as

a sex offender. Fletcher also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment

for those same defendants on his claim for injunctive relief. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847

F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2017), we affirm.

1. Injunctive relief claims. “[T]he stigmatizing consequences of the

attachment of the ‘sex offender’ label coupled with the subjection of [a] targeted

inmate to a mandatory treatment program . . . create the kind of deprivations of

liberty that require procedural protections.” Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th

Cir. 1997). In other words, before a state classifies an individual as a sex offender

and subjects him to sex-offender treatment, the individual must be provided due

process. Id. at 829–31.

Fletcher pleaded guilty to felony injury to a child, which is not a sex offense.

See Idaho Code §§ 18-501, 18-8304. However, Fletcher’s amended information

detailed the sexual nature of his conduct underlying the charge, and he pleaded guilty

to the offense as alleged in the amended information.1 Additionally, under the terms

1 Defendants’ request for judicial notice, D.E. 55, is GRANTED. See Bennet v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). However, that judicial

2 of his plea agreement, Fletcher agreed to submit to a psychosexual evaluation and

be amenable to treatment. Thus, his actions during the plea proceedings undermine

any argument that he did not receive the process that he was due. By knowingly and

explicitly accepting evaluation and treatment, Fletcher also accepted the attendant

stigma associated with that evaluation and treatment and affirmatively waived any

further procedural protections required under Neal. See United States v. Navarro-

Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is not a due process violation for a

defendant to waive constitutional rights as part of a plea bargain . . . .”).

Accordingly, because the record establishes that Fletcher cannot show he was denied

due process, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Clifford and Jones on this ground.

2. Damages claims.2 The district court dismissed Fletcher’s damages

claims against Clifford and Jones with prejudice because they were asserted against

these defendants in their official capacity. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish &

Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] claim for damages against

state officials in their official capacities is plainly barred.”). Pro se plaintiffs are

entitled to a liberal reading of their complaint, notice of any perceived pleading

notice of these documents was not requested until the eve of oral argument was of great disservice to the court. We caution counsel to provide such judicially noticeable documents in a timely manner in the future. 2 Fletcher does not challenge the dismissal of his claims against the IDOC or ICPP, only against the individual officials identified herein, Clifford and Jones.

3 defects, and an opportunity to amend unless it is clear that amendment would be

futile. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). While the district court

failed to instruct Fletcher about his pleading deficiencies and grant him leave to

amend, we conclude that this was not reversible error. Any amendment would be

futile given our conclusion that the terms of Fletcher’s plea agreement fatally

undermine his asserted due-process violation. See Parents for Privacy v. Barr, 949

F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that a dismissal with prejudice is proper

where it is clear on de novo review that the complaint could not be saved by

amendment).

AFFIRMED.

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