NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

APR 25 2023

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANTIAGO VAZQUEZ, No. 21-35759

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-01761-HZ

v.

MEMORANDUM*

MARTHA LEE WALTERS, Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court; THOMAS A.

BALMER; CHRISTOPHER L. GARRETT;

ROGER J. DEHOOG, Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court; MEAGAN A. FLYNN;

REBECCA DUNCAN; ADRIENNE

NELSON, Associate Justices of the Oregon Supreme Court, each sued in their official capacities,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 17, 2023**

Before: CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Santiago Vazquez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an equal protection violation in

connection with the temporary rules governing admission to the Oregon bar in

2020. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Gordon

v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Vazquez

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the classification

scheme in question was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See

United States v. Padilla-Diaz, 862 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining

rational bases review and recognizing that the challenger of a classification bears

the burden of “negativing every conceivable basis which might support it” (citation

omitted and alteration adopted)); see also Gallinger v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 1012,

1018 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “classifications that are to some extent both

underinclusive and overinclusive” may be upheld under rational-basis review

(citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Vazquez’s motion

for leave to file a supplemental complaint because Vazquez’s proposed complaint

failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation

claim. See Capp v. County of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053-58 (9th Cir. 2019)

(setting forth elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim and explaining that

2 21-35759 a plaintiff must plausibly allege that retaliation was the but-for motive for

defendants’ actions); see also id. at 1055 (recognizing that an allegation is not

plausible where there is an “obvious alternative explanation” for alleged

misconduct (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009)); Planned

Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (standard of

review).

Defendants’ motion to substitute party (Docket Entry No. 26) is granted.

AFFIRMED.

3 21-35759