NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 21 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LATIFA KHAN, Individually and as heir No. 22-55715 and Successor in Interest to Nafiu Khan, Deceased, D.C. No. 5:22-cv-00526-JLS-MAR Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MEMORANDUM*

RIVERSIDE HEALTHCARE AND

WELLNESS CENTRE, LLC, DBA Alta Vista Healthcare and Wellness Centre;

PACIFIC REHABILITATION AND

WELLNESS CENTRE, LP,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

CITRUS WELLNESS CENTER, LLC;

ENSEMBLE HEALTHCARE, LLC;

PACIFIC WELLNESS GP, LLC,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted June 20, 2023**

Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Riverside Healthcare and Wellness Centre, LLC, doing business as Alta Vista

Healthcare and Wellness Centre, and Pacific Rehabilitation and Wellness Centre, LP

(collectively, “Alta Vista”) appeal the district court’s order remanding this case to

state court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Alta Vista argues that the

district court had three independent grounds for such jurisdiction: federal officer

removal, complete preemption, and the presence of an embedded federal question.

I

The district court did not have federal subject matter jurisdiction under the

federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because Alta Vista’s actions

were not “taken pursuant to a federal officer’s directions.” Saldana v. Glenhaven

Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 684 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). While Alta Vista

has demonstrated that, like the defendants in Saldana, it was subject to federal laws

and regulations throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, “simply complying with a law

or regulation is not enough to bring a private person within the scope of the [federal

officer removal] statute.” Id. (cleaned up). Similarly, recommendations, advice, and

encouragement from federal entities do not amount to the type of control required

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 for removal under the statute. See id. at 685.

II

The district court did not have federal subject matter jurisdiction under the

doctrine of complete preemption because the Public Readiness and Emergency

Preparedness (PREP) Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e, is not a complete

preemption statute—that is, it is not one of those “rare” statutes “where a federal

statutory scheme is so comprehensive that it entirely supplants state law causes of

action.” Saldana, 27 F.4th at 686 (cleaned up). While the PREP Act may preempt

some state-law claims, any such conflict preemption would be an affirmative

defense, and would not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 688.

III

The district court did not have embedded federal question jurisdiction because

the state-law causes of action in the complaint do not “necessarily” raise

“substantial” federal issues that are “actually disputed” and “capable of resolution in

federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Id.

at 688 (cleaned up). Although a federal defense may be available under the PREP

Act, “a federal defense is not a sufficient basis to find embedded federal question

jurisdiction.” Id.

IV

In short, all of Alta Vista’s challenges are controlled by Saldana. Alta Vista

3 argues that Saldana was wrongly decided, but cites no “clearly irreconcilable”

intervening authority permitting us to overrule it. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,

900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Accordingly, we apply Saldana.

AFFIRMED.

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