NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 28 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CATARINA DE LEON No. 21-1153 GERONIMO; EMILY JOSEFIN DE Agency Nos.

LEON; JENS OLIVER FRANCISCO DE A209-870-448

LEON,

A209-870-486

A209-870-449

Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 26, 2023** Pasadena, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Catarina De Leon Geronimo and her two minor children,

E.J.D.L. and J.O.F.D.L., seek review of an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of their applications for asylum, withholding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Petitioners assert that if they are removed to Guatemala, they will be persecuted

and tortured because of their indigenous heritage.

The BIA held that petitioners’ asylum and withholding-of-removal claims

failed for lack of a nexus to a particular social group, and that their CAT claims

failed because they did not show that it is more likely than not that they would be

tortured if removed to Guatemala. We review legal questions de novo, and the

agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Singh v. Garland, 48 F.4th

1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2022). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we

deny the petition for review.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of petitioners’ asylum

and withholding-of-removal claims. An applicant for asylum or withholding of

removal must demonstrate a nexus between the persecution she suffered or fears

and a protected ground. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 356–58 (9th

Cir. 2017); Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2021).

Specifically, an asylum applicant must show that the protected ground is “one

central reason” for her persecution. Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 358; 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Meanwhile, the nexus standard for withholding of removal

is “less demanding,” requiring the applicant to show only that the protected

ground is “a reason” for her persecution. Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 360; 8

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C).

Petitioners contend that they suffered harm that rises to the level of

2 21-1153 persecution because of their indigenous heritage when, sometime between 2014

and 2016, their neighbors destroyed their coffee plants and cut off access to their

home’s electricity and water supply. And they argue that they experienced

persecution again in 2016, after they had moved to another town approximately

four hours away, when they received two separate threatening letters demanding

that they pay money or be killed.

But the record is devoid of any evidence to support the conclusion that

petitioners were harmed or threatened because of their indigenous heritage.

Indeed, De Leon Geronimo’s own testimony indicated that the neighbors likely

tried to harm their coffee plants because they were “jealous,” and “didn’t like that

[her partner] had [a] good harvest.” And as to the threats, she never testified or

indicated that she thought that the criminals targeted her and her children for their

indigenous heritage as opposed to their desire for money.

Substantial evidence thus supports the BIA’s conclusion that there was no

nexus between the harm petitioners suffered and petitioners’ indigenous heritage.

The BIA did not err in finding that the neighbors’ motive for destroying the coffee

plants and cutting off access to electricity and water was either jealousy over their

successful planting season or pecuniary gain. Either way, it was unrelated to

petitioners’ indigenous heritage. See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th

Cir. 2013) (noting that “mistreatment motivated purely by personal retribution

will not give rise to a valid asylum claim”). And substantial evidence supports

the BIA’s conclusion that the two threatening extortion letters petitioners

3 21-1153 received in 2016 were not connected to petitioners’ indigenous heritage. See

Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that an

applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or

random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”).

In addition, because petitioners’ family in Guatemala has remained in the

same house and has not experienced any harm, the BIA did not err in concluding

that petitioners failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See

Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. The procedural requirements of Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.

2011) do not apply to this case. Petitioners now argue for the first time that the

Immigration Judge (IJ) erred by not following Ren. Id. at 1090. But not only is

that argument unexhausted and thus not properly before this court, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(d)(1), Ren is inapposite here. Ren applies in cases where the IJ requires

corroborative evidence to supplement an applicant’s credible testimony and to

establish eligibility for relief. See Ren, 648 F.3d at 1090; see also Fon v. Garland,

34 F.4th 810, 816 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, the IJ did not deny petitioners’ claims

based on a failure to corroborate De Leon Geronimo’s testimony, nor did she

request that any additional corroborative evidence be presented.

3. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of petitioners’ CAT

claims. Under CAT, petitioners bear the burden of proving that they will more

likely than not be tortured if they are removed to Guatemala. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(2). Thus, they must demonstrate that they “would be subject to a

4 21-1153 particularized threat of torture, and that such torture would be inflicted by or at

the instigation of or with the consent of a public official or other person acting in

official capacity.” Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 840 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned

up).

Petitioners contend that the BIA erred in denying them CAT protection

because it failed to consider country-conditions evidence, which they assert

establishes “the Guatemalan government’s failure to protect indigenous people

from torture.” But the question of whether the Guatemalan government would

consent or acquiesce to petitioners’ torture is separate from the question of

whether petitioners established a particularized threat of future torture in the first

place. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014)

(explaining that CAT “requires a two part analysis”—first, whether there is a

likelihood of future torture; and second, whether there is “sufficient state action

involved in that torture” (cleaned up)). The BIA expressly declined to reach the

issue of government acquiescence, and thus that issue is not before this court. See

INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and

agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is

unnecessary to the results they reach.”). And substantial evidence supports the

BIA’s dispositive conclusion that petitioners failed to establish a clear probability

of future torture, as their family has remained in Guatemala unharmed. See

Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1094–95.

PETITION DENIED.

5 21-1153