NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 5 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YEHORAM UZIEL, No. 21-56303

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-07320-MWF-AFM v.

GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor of the State of MEMORANDUM* California,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 30, 2023** San Francisco, California

Before: D.W. NELSON, SILVERMAN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Yehoram Uziel, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of

declaratory and injunctive relief in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against California

Governor Gavin Newsom. Uziel alleges that Governor Newsom violated his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Fourteenth Amendment right to companionship with family through enforcement

of patient discharge provisions of California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (“LPS

Act”), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 500 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We affirm.

We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Coal. to

Def. Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012). The district

court properly dismissed the claims as barred by sovereign immunity, and as not

within the exception for enjoining state officials from the enforcement of state law,

because Governor Newsom lacks a “fairly direct” connection with enforcement of

the patient discharge provisions of the LPS Act. L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979

F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A] generalized duty to enforce state law or general

supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged

provision will not subject an official to suit.”); see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§§ 5150(a), 5152(a), 5250, 5304(b).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Uziel’s motion for

injunctive relief because Uziel failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits

or that he would suffer irreparable harm. See Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (explaining requirements to obtain a preliminary

injunction).

2 The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Uziel’s motion for

reconsideration of the order denying his motion for a temporary restraining order

because Uziel did not provide new evidence or any other ground for

reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.

1993) (“[Absent] other, highly unusual, circumstances,” “[r]econsideration is

appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence,

(2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) there

is an intervening change in controlling law.”); see also C.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-18.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hear oral

argument on Governor Newsom’s motion to dismiss or Uziel’s motion for

reconsideration because Uziel has not shown prejudice resulting from those

decisions. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer Cnty. Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200

(9th Cir. 1999), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (Apr. 28, 1999)

(finding no abuse of discretion in refusing oral argument where the only prejudice

alleged “was the district court’s adverse ruling on the motion”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Uziel’s motions to

recuse Judge Fitzgerald. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)

(“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or

partiality motion.”); Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 2015) (standard

of review).

3 Uziel’s motion to recuse Judges Goodwin, Canby, Thomas, Silverman, and

Tallman, filed on February 24, 2022 (Docket Entry No. 12), is DENIED.

AFFIRMED.

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