NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 25 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAMIAN RAFFELE, No. 22-55502

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:18-cv-01727-MAA

v.

MEMORANDUM*

VCA, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California The Honorable Maria A. Audero, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 18, 2023** Pasadena, California

Before: TASHIMA, CHRISTEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Damian Raffele (“Raffele”) appeals from a jury verdict

finding that his former employer, Veterinary Centers of America, Inc. (“VCA”),

(1) did not fail to accommodate his disability and (2) did not discriminate against

him. Raffele also appeals from the district court’s order striking his Rule 59

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Motion for a New Trial because of his failure to comply with Central District of

California Local Rule 7-3, which requires a conference with opposing counsel at

least seven days before the filing of such a motion. We review the jury verdict for

substantial evidence, Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Prods., Inc., 878 F.3d 794, 797 (9th

Cir. 2017), and we review the district court’s application of its local rules for abuse

of discretion.1 Miranda v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983).

For the reasons described below, we affirm both the jury verdict and the district

court’s order.

1. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that VCA did not fail to

accommodate Raffele when it refused to allow Raffele to work from home full

time. Substantial evidence review is deferential: We must affirm a verdict if there

is “evidence that is adequate to support the jury’s findings, even if contrary

findings are also possible.” Dunlap, 878 F.3d at 797.

Raffele argues that the jury’s verdict that VCA did not fail to accommodate

his disability is inconsistent with the jury’s finding that Raffele could perform his

essential job functions with a reasonable accommodation. We disagree for two

reasons. First, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Raffele is

not entitled to any specific accommodation; VCA’s only obligation is to offer a

1 We review de novo whether a district court’s local rule conflicts with a federal rule. Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 2013).

2 reasonable accommodation. See Raine v. City of Burbank, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1215,

1222 (2006). An accommodation is reasonable if it allows an employee to

“perform the essential functions of the job the employee holds.” Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 2, § 11065(p)(1)(B). The jury heard evidence that Raffele would not be able to

perform his essential job functions while working from home full time. Therefore,

the jury could have concluded that Raffele’s requested accommodation—working

from home—was not reasonable, but that other accommodations, such as those

offered by VCA, would enable Raffele to perform his essential job functions.

Second, an employer is not required to grant an accommodation if an

employee provides insufficient documentation to show the need for it.

Documentation can be insufficient if “the health care provider does not have the

expertise to confirm the applicant’s or employee’s disability or need for reasonable

accommodation, or other objective factors indicate that the information provided is

not credible or is fraudulent.” Id. § 11069(d)(5)(C). In such cases, “the employer

may require an employee to go to an appropriate health care provider of the

employer’s or other covered entity’s choice.” Id. The jury heard evidence that

VCA did not find Raffele’s medical certification credible, that VCA requested

Raffele undergo a medical evaluation by a VCA-selected physician, and that

Raffele never underwent that evaluation. Accordingly, the jury could have found

that VCA did not fail to accommodate Raffele because there was no valid medical

3 certification establishing that Raffele required accommodation.

2. Substantial evidence supports the jury verdict that VCA did not

discriminate against Raffele when the employment relationship ended because

VCA did not discharge him. Although Raffele argues that the fact of his discharge

is “undisputed,” the jury instructions did not define “discharge” and left to the jury

the question of whether Raffele’s separation was a discharge. The jury heard

evidence that VCA terminated Raffele’s position because it concluded he had

abandoned his job. The jury was empowered to conclude that a separation due to

abandonment does not constitute a discharge.

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Raffele’s Rule 59

motion. The district court applied the local rules as written and explained its

reasons for doing so. See United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir.

1979) (“Only in rare cases will we question the exercise of discretion in connection

with the application of local rules.”). Further, Local Rule 7-3 does not conflict with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 because it conditions, but does not eliminate, a

party’s right to file a motion for a new trial. See Marshall v. Gates, 44 F.3d 722,

725 (9th Cir. 1995). Finally, the district court’s decision did not violate Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a)(2). The district court did not strike Raffele’s motion

because of a requirement of form; instead, the court referenced Raffele’s failure to

include a statement of compliance under Local Rule 7-4 to conclude that Raffele

4 did not comply with the substantive conference requirement of Local Rule 7-3.

AFFIRMED.

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