facts known to him.

7 See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d); Vera v. REL-BC, LLC, 281 Cal. Rptr. 3d 45, 51–52 (Ct. App. 2021). 8 See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d); cf. FDIC v. Dintino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 50 (Ct. App. 2008). 9 See Id. § 337(c). 10 See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 343; Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see also Internet Specialities W., Inc. v. Milon-DiGiorgio Enters., Inc., 559 F.3d 985, 990 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 11 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208; Loeffler v. Target Corp., 324 P.3d 50, 79 (Cal. 2014). 12 See Norgart, 981 P.2d at 88 n.2; Jolly, 751 P.2d at 929. 13 See Jolly, 751 P.2d at 926–27.

3 21-16681 Bamforth’s claims were not tolled under California Code of Civil Procedure

section 352 because he failed to adequately allege incapacity that rendered him

“incapable of caring for his property or transacting business or understanding the

nature or effects of his acts.” Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hosp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664 (Ct. App.

1968); see Pearl v. Pearl, 177 P. 845, 846 (Cal. 1918). Assuming without deciding

that federal law applies, Bamforth is not entitled to equitable tolling because his

initiation of and participation in a lawsuit in 201514 indicates a “proven ability to

advance and protect his legal interests.” Johnson, 653 F.3d at 1010; see also Kwai

Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the Appellees

are not equitably estopped from asserting the statutory limitations periods because

Bamforth did not allege that they misrepresented or failed to disclose “a material fact

bearing on the necessity of bringing a timely suit.” Doe v. Marten, 263 Cal. Rptr. 3d

547, 551 (Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis omitted).

The agreement between CIS Internet Ltd. (CIS) and Facebook, Inc. clearly and

unambiguously released Bamforth’s federal trademark claims against Appellees due

to his position as director of CIS at the time he signed the agreement and his current

14 This Court may take judicial notice of legal proceedings. See United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Appellees’ motion for judicial notice of the docket of Bamforth v. Seelhofer, No. RIC1508333, Superior Court of California, County of Riverside is granted. The remainder of Appellees’ motion is denied.

4 21-16681 status as successor in interest. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1638; La Jolla Beach & Tennis

Club, Inc. v. Indus. Indem. Co., 884 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Cal. 1994); see also M & G

Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 435, 135 S. Ct. 926, 933, 190 L. Ed. 2d

809 (2015). As discussed above, Bamforth’s arguments that the agreement is

unenforceable are untimely. The federal trademark claims were properly dismissed.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bamforth leave to

amend. We agree that any amendment of his claims would be futile. See Novak v.

United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2015). The state law claims are

barred by the respective statutes of limitations, and the federal trademark claims were

released by the agreement between CIS and Facebook, Inc. No amendment could cure

these deficiencies, and Bamforth’s suggested edits are inconsistent with his operative

complaint and contradict the allegations therein. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood

of L.A., 759 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655

F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

We decline to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters

not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v.

Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

5 21-16681