facts and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors supported a time-served sentence. We

review Best’s unpreserved procedural claims for plain error, see United States v.

Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and his claim that the

sentence is substantively unreasonable for an abuse of discretion, see Gall v.

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

The district court did not procedurally err, nor did it abuse its discretion in

imposing the above-Guidelines sentence. The court provided a thorough

explanation for its sentencing decision, explaining that upward departures were

warranted for: (1) Best’s uncounted tribal convictions for conduct similar to the

offense conduct, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, and (2) the extreme psychological injury

Best caused his victim, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3. The court further explained that the

§ 3553(a) factors independently supported the upward variance given the harm

Best caused to the victim, his criminal history, his lack of remorse at sentencing,

and the need to protect the public. This explanation was more than sufficient. See

United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Moreover, the

2 22-30199 court permissibly relied on the presentence report and the victim’s sentencing

statement. See United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1102, 1104-05 (9th

Cir. 2013). Finally, the 46-month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of

the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

AFFIRMED.

3 22-30199