NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 21 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GENEVA LANGWORTHY, No. 22-35397

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01615-RAJ

v.

MEMORANDUM*

SUPERIOR COURT FOR WHATCOM

COUNTY; GEORGE ROCHE, Senior Civil Prosecuting Attorney, Whatcom County;

DISTRICT COURT FOR WHATCOM

COUNTY; WASHINGTON STATE

COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION I,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 12, 2023**

Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Geneva Langworthy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing her action alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Disabilities Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003)

(dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

Langworthy’s claims against the Whatcom County District Court and Superior

Court and the Washington Court of Appeals because Langworthy’s action

constitutes a forbidden “de facto appeal” of prior state court judgments and raises

claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments. Noel, 341 F.3d at

1163-65 (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also

Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that claims are

“inextricably intertwined” with state court decisions where federal adjudication

“would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the same issues” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Langworthy’s claims against George

Roche as barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522

U.S. 118, 126 (1997) (explaining when prosecutorial immunity applies).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend

because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home

Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review

2 22-35397 and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be

futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Langworthy’s

motions for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See

Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of

review).

AFFIRMED.

3 22-35397