DISCUSSION

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which became effective on January 1, 2019, was enacted “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The legislation accomplished this by amending sections 188 and 189 and adding section 1172.6 to the Penal Code. Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022 (Cal. Const. art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)), extended the procedure of section 1172.6 to individuals convicted of attempted murder (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2). “Senate Bill [No.] 1437 relief is unavailable if the defendant was either the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of . . . [s]ection 190.2.’ (Pen. Code., § 189, subd. (e)(3); see § 1172.6, subd. (a).)” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710.) Here, defendant’s jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Rather, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 600,

3 which required the jury to determine that defendant had intended to kill in order to find him guilty of attempted murder. Thereafter, the jury determined defendant had committed attempted murder, thus necessarily determining he had acted with the intent to kill. This precludes his eligibility for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.) Defendant does not contend otherwise. Rather, defendant attacks the propriety of the conduct enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) imposed as part of his original sentence. However, this argument misapprehends the procedural posture of this case. The propriety of defendant’s prior prison sentence is not cognizable from a denial of defendant’s resentencing petition. Only the propriety of the trial court’s section 1172.6 determination is properly before us. (See People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 713-714 [resentencing under § 1172.6 involves “prospective relief from a murder conviction that was presumptively valid at the time,” not the correction of past errors].) Accordingly, this appeal fails.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

/s/

ROBIE, J.

We concur:

/s/

EARL, P. J.

/s/

HULL, J.

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