NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 21 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SEAN JEFFERY RICHSON-BEY, No. 22-16219

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00447-JLT-BAM

v.

MEMORANDUM*

CELIA BELL, Chief Executive/Medical Officer of CCHCS at CSP Corcoran,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Jennifer L. Thurston, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 14, 2023**

Before: SILVERMAN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Sean Jeffery Richson-Bey appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations

related to COVID-19 testing policies that arose while he was a California state

prisoner. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d

443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.

Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Richson-Bey’s individual capacity

claims because Richson-Bey failed to allege facts sufficient to show that placing

him in quarantine or testing him for COVID-19 violated any of his constitutional

rights. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (explaining that a prisoner

has no protected liberty interest when the sanction does not impose an “atypical

and significant hardship”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (setting

forth the requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation); Cruzan by Cruzan v.

Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (stating that a violation of an

individual’s right to refuse medical treatment “must be determined by balancing

his liberty interests against the relevant state interests”); Jones v. Williams, 791

F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating standard for a free exercise claim);

Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing factors for

assessing whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).

Dismissal of Richson-Bey’s official capacity claims was proper because

Richson-Bey failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he suffered a

constitutional violation as the result of an official policy or custom. See Castro v.

County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)

2 22-16219 (discussing requirements to establish municipal liability under Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d

712, 714 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Proof of random acts or isolated events is insufficient to

establish custom.”).

Richson-Bey’s assertion that he should have been allowed to identify any

unknown defendants through discovery is unavailing where his complaint failed to

state a claim for relief. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)

(“[T]he plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the

unknown defendants . . . unless . . . the complaint would be dismissed on other

grounds.”).

We reject as meritless Richson-Bey’s contentions related to the United

States-Morrocco Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 22-16219