BACKGROUND

In December 2016, the family court entered a judgment regarding parental

obligations as to Victoria T. The judgment identified Kevin and Vanessa D. as the

parents of Victoria and ordered Kevin to pay $481 per month in child support.

In April 2022, Kevin filed a request to set aside a VDOP concerning Victoria.

Kevin checked the box on the form (Judicial Council form FL-280) indicating that he

wanted to set aside the VDOP for fraud. The request indicated that he and Vanessa

signed the VDOP in July 2015, one day after Victoria’s birth.

Kevin’s declaration in support of the request stated that the Department of Child

Support Services (DCSS) did not inform him of the legal consequences that arise from

signing a VDOP. The legal consequences that he identified included wage garnishment,

reporting of arrearages to credit agencies, seizure of assets held by financial institutions,

liens on property, seizure of income tax refunds, imprisonment and fines, and several

other claimed consequences. Kevin declared that he would not have signed the VDOP if

he had known of the legal consequences.

Kevin also submitted documents from DCSS. One document was a form showing

that DCSS had the VDOP on file, and the form indicated that Victoria’s parentage was

established on August 17, 2015. The second document was a letter dated February 2022

and addressed to Kevin. It appeared to be a response to his attempt to rescind the VDOP.

The letter stated that the rescission Kevin signed in December 2021 was not valid,

because he did not submit the rescission within 60 days of executing the VDOP.

2 According to the register of actions, Kevin filed an amended request to set aside

the VDOP. The record on appeal does not include that document.

The court held a hearing on Kevin’s request in September 2022. The record does

not include a reporter’s transcript of those proceedings. According to the minute order

from the hearing, the court determined that the request to set aside the VDOP was

untimely, and it therefore denied the request.

DISCUSSION

Kevin argues that the court erred by denying his request because “there is no

untimely filing when attacking a void judgment.” (Capitalization omitted.) The

argument lacks merit.

The Legislature authorized VDOP’s in part to implement a “‘simple system’” for

establishing voluntary parentage “as a ‘first step toward a child support award.’” (Kevin

Q. v. Lauren W. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1131.) An executed VDOP takes effect

when it is filed with DCSS. (Fam. Code, § 7573, subd. (c); unlabeled statutory citations

refer to this code.) Either signatory may rescind the VDOP within 60 days of execution

by filing a rescission form with DCSS. (§ 7575, subd. (a).) A signatory also has two

years from the effective date of the VDOP to commence a proceeding to challenge the

declaration on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. (§ 7576, subd. (a).)

In addition, section 7573.5 identifies a number of conditions that render a VDOP void at

the time of signing. (§ 7573.5, subd. (a)(1)-(6).) The two-year limitations period does

not apply to proceedings to challenge a VDOP as void under section 7573.5. (§ 7576,

subd. (b).) (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 545, 552.) We review the court’s ruling, not its reasoning, and

“we may affirm a decision correct on any theory regardless of the trial court’s reasoning.”

(Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 653, fn. 8.) The appellant bears the

burden of demonstrating prejudicial error. (Demara, supra, at p. 552.)

Kevin fails to show that the court erred. He challenged the VDOP on the basis of

fraud. Such a challenge is subject to the two-year limitations period. His evidence

demonstrated that he signed the VDOP in July 2015, and it became effective in August

2015. He accordingly had until August 2017 to challenge the VDOP on the basis of

fraud. The court correctly determined that his April 2022 request was untimely.

Although a challenge to a VDOP as void under section 7573.5 is not subject to the

limitations period, Kevin’s request did not challenge the VDOP under that statute.

Nothing in his moving papers established any of the conditions that render a VDOP void

at the time of signing. For example, he did not show that someone other than him or

Vanessa was already a presumed parent, that a court had already entered a judgment of

parentage, or that another person had already signed a valid VDOP. (§ 7573.5,

subd. (a)(1)-(3).)

Similarly, Kevin’s opening brief on appeal does not argue that the VDOP was void

under section 7573.5. He instead refers repeatedly to a “void judgment” and argues that

DCSS violated his due process rights in a number of ways. To the extent that Kevin is

seeking to challenge the judgment regarding parental obligations as void, such a

challenge is not properly before us. He did not file a motion to set aside the December

4 2016 judgment. He filed a request to set aside the VDOP. We are reviewing only the

order denying that request.

For all of these reasons, the court did not err by denying Kevin’s request to set

aside the VDOP.1

DISPOSITION

The order denying the request to set aside the VDOP is affirmed. Vanessa and

DCSS shall recover their costs of appeal, if any. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON

J.

1 Kevin requests that we take judicial notice of DCSS’s summons and complaint seeking the judgment regarding parental obligations, the agency’s proposed judgment, a summary of the child support guideline calculation, and purported screen shots from the California courts’ website and the Los Angeles County Superior Court’s website. We deny the request because the documents are irrelevant and unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. (County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, fn. 29.)

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