UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAN 18 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ANGELA WILLIAMS; et al., No. 22-16859

Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01676-APG-VCF v. District of Nevada, Las Vegas STEVE SISOLAK, Governor of Nevada, in his official capacity; et al., ORDER

Defendants-Appellees,

and

JAMAL RASHID; et al.,

Defendants,

RUSSELL G. GREER,

Intervenor-Defendant.

Before: S.R. THOMAS and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,* District Judge.

The memorandum disposition in the above-captioned matter filed on

December 7, 2023 and reported at 2023 WL 8469159 is AMENDED as follows:

At *1, replace the sentence beginning with

court’s dismissal . . .> with

* The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. claims against Nevada state and local officials for abuse plaintiffs allegedly suffered

in Nevada’s commercial sex industry.>

With this amendment, the panel unanimously voted to deny the petition for

panel rehearing. Judge Bress voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc and

Judges Thomas and Ezra so recommended. The full court has been advised of the

petition for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear

the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, Dkt. No. 52, is

DENIED. No future petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc will be entertained.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

2

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 18 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANGELA WILLIAMS; et al., No. 22-16859

Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01676-APG-VCF v.

STEVE SISOLAK, Governor of Nevada, in AMENDED MEMORANDUM* his official capacity; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

JAMAL RASHID; et al.,

Defendants,

RUSSELL G. GREER,

Intervenor-Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 5, 2023** San Francisco, California

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: S.R. THOMAS and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,*** District Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims against Nevada

state and local officials for abuse plaintiffs allegedly suffered in Nevada’s

commercial sex industry. The district court determined that plaintiffs lacked Article

III standing to assert these claims against the government defendants. We review

the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss and questions of Article III standing

de novo. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th

Cir. 2008); City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Garland, 42 F.4th 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2022).

We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Garmon v. Cnty. of

L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We affirm.

To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must allege “ (i) that [they] suffered

an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the

injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be

redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203

(2021) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). The

second element, traceability, is at issue here. To meet that requirement, plaintiffs

must allege that their injuries are “fairly traceable” to the defendants’ conduct and

*** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

2 “not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.”

Namisnak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 971 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Lujan,

504 U.S. at 561). Although this does not require a showing of proximate cause, it

does require plaintiffs to “establish a ‘line of causation’ between defendants’ action

and their alleged harm that is more than ‘attenuated.’” Maya v. Centex Corp., 658

F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984)).

Particularly relevant here, “[i]n cases where a chain of causation ‘involves numerous

third parties’ whose ‘independent decisions’ collectively have a ‘significant effect’

on plaintiffs’ injuries, the Supreme Court and this court have found the causal chain

too weak to support standing at the pleading stage.” Id.

The district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs lack Article III standing

to sue the government defendants because plaintiffs’ injuries are the result of

allegedly illegal third-party conduct in Nevada’s commercial sex industry. While

the government defendants have various roles in regulating that industry, the injuries

plaintiffs suffered were allegedly inflicted by the “independent action[s]” of third

parties, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560—namely, the traffickers, escort agencies, strip clubs,

and brothels who were also named in their complaint. Plaintiffs’ allegations are

therefore insufficient to support traceability under Article III. See id. When

plaintiffs raise claims based on government action or inaction, they must sufficiently

allege that government defendants’ actions “exert[] a ‘determinative or coercive

3 effect’ on the third-party conduct that directly causes the[ir] injury.” WildEarth

Guardians v. United States Forest Serv., 70 F.4th 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997)). Plaintiffs’ allegations do not

meet that standard, especially when by the allegations of the complaint certain third

parties engaged in conduct that violated federal and state laws against sex

trafficking.

The record does not support plaintiffs’ assertions that the district court failed

to consider all their allegations. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in

denying leave to amend because amendment as to the government defendants would

have been futile. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility

of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.”).

AFFIRMED.

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