NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 5 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GUO GUANG ZHUANG, No. 13-73422

Petitioner, Agency No. A087-694-731

v.

MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 5, 2024** San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

Guo Guang Zhuang, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal from the

immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s adverse credibility

determinations for substantial evidence. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,

1039 (9th Cir. 2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition.

The BIA’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial

evidence. When assessing a claimant’s credibility under the REAL ID Act, the

agency must consider the “totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,”

including any inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the petitioner’s statements. Alam v.

Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The BIA identified numerous inconsistencies and

implausibilities that bore on Zhuang’s veracity and that were supported by

substantial evidence, including Zhuang’s inconsistent accounts of his arrest and his

subsequent travel to the United States. The IJ addressed Zhuang’s explanations for

his inconsistent or implausible statements on these issues and offered specific and

cogent reasons for not accepting them. Munyuh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 750, 758 (9th

Cir. 2021).

We accord a “healthy measure of deference” to an agency’s adverse

credibility determination, which may be upheld unless the evidence compels—and

not merely supports—a different conclusion. Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th 1291, 1296,

1300 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041). Unsupported findings

2 must “all but gut” the agency’s determination under the totality of the circumstances.

Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2021).

Here, because the agency offered “specific, cogent explanation[s]” for not

accepting Zhuang’s reason for at least several inconsistencies that went to the

veracity of his claims, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is not all but

gutted. Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).

Although the evidence may have supported an alternative finding for some of

Zhuang’s claims, under the totality of the circumstances, the IJ’s explanations for

finding Zhuang not credible were adequately reasoned and supported by evidence in

the record, and thus the agency did not substantially err. Id.

The agency also did not err in finding that Zhuang failed to submit

corroborative evidence substantiating his claim that he would be imprisoned for life

for leaving China. Zhuang’s submitted evidence failed to corroborate the

plausibility and seriousness of his claimed persecution, as it was not specific enough

to show his experiences were shared by other similarly situated individuals. Cf.

Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that

petitioner’s claim was credible because petitioner testified of specific instances and

provided documentary evidence in which others were persecuted for similar

situations as his). The agency did not err in finding that Zhuang had not met his

evidentiary burden of proof.

3 Because a noncitizen who fails to establish a well-founded fear of persecution

for asylum purposes is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal, Zhuang’s

withholding of removal claim should also be denied. See Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332

F.3d 1245, 1255 (9th Cir. 2003).

Because the agency did not err in finding Zhuang not to be a credible witness,

Zhuang’s applications based on persecution necessarily fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft,

348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). We may not reach Zhuang’s CAT claim, as it

is unexhausted because Zhuang did not meaningfully challenge it on appeal. “A

petitioner’s failure to raise an issue before the BIA generally constitutes a failure to

exhaust, thus depriving this court of jurisdiction to consider the issue.” Sola v.

Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d

674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a petitioner cannot raise an issue on appeal

that was not raised before the agency).

PETITION DENIED.

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