NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 20 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES KEVIN SHELTON; BEN No. 22-35647

SHELTON III; SAMI SAAD,

D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05135-BHS Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. MEMORANDUM*

LIQUOR AND CANNABIS BOARD OF

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, AKA

LCB; RICK GARZA, Director of LCB, In his Individual and Official Capacities; CITY

OF SEATTLE; STEVE HOBBS,

Washington Secretary of State,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 20, 2024**

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

James Kevin Shelton, Ben Shelton III, and Sami Saad (“the Owners”) appeal

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). pro se from a district court order dismissing their complaint. Because the facts are

known to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.

I

The district court did not err in dismissing the federal claims and tortious

interference claim because these claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

Washington imposes a three-year statute of limitations for tort and personal injury

claims, Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2), and the same limitation applies to claims

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal.,

766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014) (§ 1983); Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 653

F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 2011) (§ 1981); McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942

F.2d 668, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1991) (§ 1985). The Owners knew of their alleged injury

in 2016 when, they allege, agents of the Liquor and Cannabis Board improperly

caused them to cease operations. But the Owners did not bring their complaint until

2022, long after the three-year statutory period had run. See Bird v. Dep’t of Human

Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing the discovery rule); Green v.

APC, 136 Wash. 2d 87, 95-96 (1998) (same).

II

The district court did not err in dismissing the Owners’ claims for the offenses

of leading organized crime and criminal impersonation in the first and second

degree. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.60.040, 9A.60.045, 9A.82.060. The statutes

2 cited in the complaint are criminal statutes and do not create a private right of action.

See Schorno v. Kannada, 167 Wash. App. 895, 900-01 (2012); accord Chrysler

Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979).

III

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to

allow a court reasonably to infer that the defendants are liable. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Here, the complaint does not include sufficient facts to

allow a court reasonably to infer that Saad and the Sheltons lost their business

licenses because of actions by the defendants. Accordingly, the district court did not

err in dismissing the claim for declaratory judgment.

All pending motions are DENIED.

AFFIRMED.

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