NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 27 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN C. STUART, No. 22-16722

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00538-GMS-ESW

v.

MEMORANDUM*

SHERRY K. STEPHENS; STATE OF

ARIZONA; KEITH MUNSON;

RICHMOND, First name unknown; named as Mrs./Ms. Richmond; JENNIFER RICHMOND, Librarian at Red Rock Private Prison; JENNIFER RYAN-TOUHILL, Judge at Maricopa County Superior Court; UNKNOWN PARTIES, named as John/Jane Does 1-99,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 21, 2024**

Before: FERNANDEZ, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Arizona state prisoner John C. Stuart appeals pro se from the district court’s

judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).

We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Stuart’s claims against defendants

Stephens and Ryan-Touhill as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),

because success on Stuart’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction, and Stuart has not demonstrated that his conviction has been

invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (holding that if “a judgment in favor of

the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence

. . . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”).

The district court properly dismissed Stuart’s claims against defendants

Munson and Richmond because Stuart failed to allege facts sufficient to show that

either defendant denied Stuart access to the courts or retaliated against Stuart. See

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-53 (1996) (explaining that an access-to-courts

claim requires a plaintiff to show that defendants’ conduct caused an actual injury

to a nonfrivolous legal claim); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.

2005) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context).

2 22-16722 The district court properly dismissed Stuart’s remaining claims because

Stuart failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v.

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that although pro se

pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations

sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

We reject as meritless Stuart’s contentions that the district court erred by

failing to construe Stuart’s action as a qui tam action or was biased against him.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 22-16722