BACKGROUND

1 A. The Alleged Offenses

One night in January 2019, Steve N. and his wife, Keren N., were walking near

their home when they saw three male teenagers dressed in black pants and hoodies

approaching. Steve told Keren to get behind him and placed himself between her and the

teenagers. The teens stopped in front of Steve and Keren and blocked their path. One

teenager, later identified as Miguel, pointed a gun at Steve’s head. Keren heard the

gunman and one of the other two say, “‘Hey, motherfucker, what you got?’” Steve

lunged toward the gunman, and a struggle ensued. Keren saw a flash, heard Steve yell,

1 We take the facts concerning the offenses from our prior opinion, which summarized the description of the offenses contained in the probation report. (In re M.R., supra, E078528.)

3 and realized that Steve had been shot. Steve was taken to the hospital, where he died

during surgery.

An officer searching the area shortly after the shooting stopped three teenagers

matching the suspects’ description, two of whom were detained, while the third fled on

foot. Other officers searching in the area where the third suspect had fled found a black

backpack that contained a loaded .38-caliber revolver with one spent casing under the

hammer, a black T-shirt, a black sweatshirt, a cell phone, and other items. In a nearby

parking lot, officers found a wallet containing Miguel’s California identification card,

and a few feet away they found six additional bullets matching the rounds in the revolver.

After initially providing officers with false information, both of the two detained

coparticipants made statements incriminating Miguel, identified the backpack containing

the gun as Miguel’s, and identified Miguel as the shooter in photo lineups. Miguel was

arrested at school the following morning. A search of Miguel’s home revealed shoes and

other clothing matching those worn by the shooter, as well as a box of .38-caliber

ammunition matching that found in the revolver.

Text messages found on Miguel’s cell phone and statements by his mother

revealed that Miguel had texted his mother shortly after the shooting, saying he was

hiding from the police. He could see police nearby and a helicopter overhead. Miguel’s

mother told him to stay hidden. She drove to find him and saw police and blocked

streets. The text messages included four maps showing locations where Miguel was

hiding, and their communications continued over the course of almost four hours before

Miguel’s mother was able to pick him up. Miguel’s mother identified the backpack,

4 wallet, and identification found by police as belonging to Miguel, but she denied having

seen the gun or ammunition before.

Surveillance video obtained by police showed Miguel, wearing a backpack

matching that found by police, boarding a bus heading towards Ontario with his two

coparticipants a few hours before the shooting. All three were wearing black hooded

sweatshirts, dark jeans, and black shoes. They can be seen sitting together and talking

before exiting the bus together. Other surveillance videos show the three youths at

various locations in the vicinity before and after the shooting.

B. The Petition and the Initial Transfer Proceeding

In January 2019, a juvenile wardship petition (§ 602, subd. (a)) was filed, alleging

that when Miguel was 17 years old he committed one count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187,

subd. (a)), one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and one count of

attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211 & 664).

The prosecution immediately moved to transfer Miguel to criminal court. In

April 2019, the probation department submitted a report pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of

section 707, recommending transfer.

The transfer hearing began in April 2021. The sole prosecution witness was

Cynthia Diaz, the probation officer who prepared the report. Diaz explained her

methodology, the interviews that she conducted, and the records that she reviewed in

preparing the report. The report described Miguel’s personal history and included

statements from Miguel and his mother. Miguel’s parents had been together for 30 years

and had six children. Miguel lived with his parents and two younger siblings, aged 10

5 and 11. Miguel said that he got along well with everyone, including his parents and

siblings, and his mother agreed. Before he was arrested, Miguel was a senior in high

school with grades ranging from several A’s to one D. Miguel was not involved in a

gang. Miguel denied using drugs and said that he did not like alcohol, which he tried

when he was 14 years old. Miguel had not been a victim of sexual or physical abuse.

The report recommended transfer to criminal court on the basis of four of the five

statutory criteria: the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor, whether

the minor can be rehabilitated before expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the

success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, and the

circumstances and gravity of the offense. The report determined that the fifth criterion—

the minor’s delinquency history—weighed in favor of finding that Miguel was suitable

for rehabilitation under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.

Diaz reviewed a number of the detention behavior summaries documenting

Miguel’s conduct in juvenile hall over the two years since she had prepared her report.

Miguel was involved in eight incidents described as “code reds,” all but one of which

involved assaultive behavior on other minors. Although Miguel had obtained his high

school diploma and enrolled in online community college courses, Diaz testified that

Miguel was currently “suspended until further notice” from participating in the college

program for having accessed unauthorized websites, and he had previously been

suspended for a semester because of a plagiarism incident. On the basis of her review of

Miguel’s detention behavior summaries, Diaz continued to believe that Miguel was not

amenable to treatment by juvenile services and should be transferred to adult court.

6 In December 2021, Shannon Johnson, Psy.D., a staff psychologist at Patton State

Hospital, testified on Miguel’s behalf. Johnson met with Miguel in July and August for a

total of about three and one-half hours and submitted a psychological evaluation report

and a risk assessment report.

Johnson testified that Miguel had demonstrated insight and expressed regret and

remorse for the impact of his behavior on his family and on the victim’s family, and

Johnson believed that Miguel’s contrition was honest and genuine. She testified that

Miguel had made progress in his rehabilitation, as evidenced by his ability to view his

detention as an opportunity to recreate himself and to consider how he would like his life

to be in the future. Regarding her risk assessment evaluation, Johnson opined that

Miguel was unlikely to seek out violence and that his strong family support mitigated his

risk of reoffending, although if Miguel were subjected to violent conduct by someone, he

was likely to defend himself. She believed that transferring Miguel to an adult

incarceration setting would be destabilizing and have a negative impact on his

functioning and eventual reintegration into the community. When asked if Miguel would

present a low risk of reoffending or engaging in violence if he were treated in a juvenile

facility, Johnson assessed Miguel’s risk as “moderate” rather than “low.”

On cross-examination, Johnson acknowledged that Miguel had continued to

engage in violent behavior during his detention, but she described that behavior as largely

“situational” and related to his incarceration. Johnson conceded that Miguel’s ongoing

use of aggression to manage conflict did increase his risk of reoffending and that he is

likely to respond with violence if he is challenged or approached in an aggressive way.

7 Johnson was also asked during cross-examination about an incident that occurred

in October 2021. A staff member had redirected Miguel to take it easy on the other team

during a soccer tournament, and Miguel responded: “‘You are telling me to chill out[?]

You know I’m a murderer on the set.’” When questioned about his response, Miguel

said, “‘I’m a murderer. I kill people. So what?’” Johnson acknowledged that the

statement was not something that Miguel would have said during their meetings, and she 2 stated that if he had said that to her, it would have changed her opinion. When asked if

the statement demonstrated that Miguel lacked remorse and empathy, Johnson said that

she could not tell without knowing more about the “situational factors” and

circumstances in which the incident occurred. She described ways in which the remark

may have been mere “posturing” or an expression of “hopelessness.”

After Johnson’s testimony, the prosecution offered to recall Diaz as a rebuttal

witness to testify regarding the detention behavior summary that reported Miguel’s

October 2021 statements and also to establish that Miguel was again not enrolled in

college classes that semester. Both counsel agreed to submit on the document containing

the October 2021 statements and stipulated to the fact that Miguel was not attending

online college classes that semester, so Diaz was not recalled. Miguel submitted 10

character reference letters, including one written in Spanish and not translated. Some of

2 The court overruled defense counsel’s objections to the line of questioning, explaining that it would not consider Miguel’s statement for its truth but would allow the question as a hypothetical regarding Johnson’s opinion: If Miguel had made such statements, how would that impact her evaluation, recommendation, and diagnosis?

8 the letters’ authors had known Miguel since he was a young child. The letters described

Miguel as smart, good, respectful, well-behaved, and polite.

C. The First Ruling and Appeal

In 2022, the juvenile court granted the People’s motion to transfer Miguel to

criminal court. Miguel appealed from the order, arguing that it should be reversed

because the juvenile court improperly relied on the evidence concerning the

October 2021 incident. (In re Miguel R., supra, E078528.) He argued that “absent any

evidence as to the ‘tone’ or ‘context’ of the remarks, they are ‘worthless as an indication

of [Miguel’s] purported state of mind.’” (In re Miguel R., supra, E078528.) We rejected

the arguments and affirmed in an unpublished opinion. (In re Miguel R., supra,

E078528.)

After the remittitur issued, the juvenile court transferred the matter to criminal

court in January 2023. The criminal court transferred the matter back to the juvenile

court to address recent amendments to section 707 under Assembly Bill 2361.

D. The Second Transfer Proceeding

The second transfer hearing was held in August 2023, when Miguel was 21 years

old. The parties stipulated that the court could take judicial notice of all of the evidence

from the initial proceeding. The prosecution introduced two documents prepared by the

probation department in April 2023: (1) a court memo prepared by probation officer

Miguel Ramirez-Gamboa addressing Miguel’s conduct while housed in county jail, and

(2) an Assembly Bill 2361 transfer memo prepared by probation officer Paul Vargas.

9 Three probation officers testified for the prosecution: Diaz, Vargas, and Shannon Kim.

No witnesses testified on behalf of Miguel.

In preparation for the hearing, Diaz reviewed the 2019 probation report that she

had authored and the 2023 transfer memo prepared by Vargas. Diaz understood the new

standard for transferring minors to criminal court. Diaz’s opinion about whether Miguel

could be rehabilitated by the juvenile justice system remained unchanged: She did not

“believe he’d be appropriate to remain in juvenile hall.” Diaz based her opinion on the

fact that Miguel was almost 22 years old and juvenile jurisdiction would end when he

turned 25. She explained that given the severity of the offenses and the sophistication

involved, Miguel “would not have enough time remaining to be rehabilitated in the

juvenile system.”

Vargas testified that he never directly supervised Miguel. In preparing the

April 2023 transfer memo, Vargas reviewed Diaz’s 2019 probation report, the police

report concerning the alleged offenses, and Miguel’s juvenile delinquency history.

Vargas also spoke with Kim about the ARISE program, which is the secure youth

treatment facility in San Bernardino County.

Vargas opined that Miguel could not be rehabilitated by the juvenile justice

system. Vargas based his opinion on the “severity of the crime, [Miguel’s] active role in

it, the sophistication, as well as the limited time that he has under the juvenile

jurisdiction.” Vargas explained that Miguel would age out of the juvenile system at 25

and thus would have about three and one-half years remaining in juvenile jurisdiction,

10 which was not sufficient time to rehabilitate. Vargas’s supervisor agreed with Vargas’s

analysis.

Kim worked in the field supervision unit of the ARISE program. She reviewed

the reports prepared by Diaz and Vargas and likewise opined that Miguel could not be

rehabilitated under juvenile court jurisdiction. Kim considered the factors relevant to

qualification for the ARISE program, including the severity of the crime, Miguel’s

criminal history, whether treatment or rehabilitative programs previously had been

offered and the status of any prior programs, and whether the treatment offered in the

ARISE program would benefit Miguel.

E. The Ruling

In August 2023, the juvenile court issued a detailed ruling and found “by clear and

convincing evidence that the youth is not amenable to the care, treatment and training

programs available through the juvenile court system under the statutory criteria,” and the

court accordingly ordered Miguel transferred to criminal court. The court adopted its

description of the offenses and various findings from its initial ruling in January 2022, as

modified by the new clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, and it addressed

each of the five statutory criteria in section 707, subdivision (a)(3) (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)).

The court found that the following factors weighed in favor of transferring Miguel

to criminal court: the degree of criminal sophistication, the success of previous attempts

by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, and the circumstances and gravity of the

offenses. The court found that the prosecution had not carried its burden of proving that

11 Miguel’s delinquency history weighed in favor of transferring him or that he could not

“be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.”

With respect to the degree of criminal sophistication, the court adopted its initial

ruling, as modified by the clear and convincing evidence standard, and found that Miguel

“possesse[d] a higher level of criminal sophistication” because Miguel armed himself,

participated in a preplanned armed robbery that was inherently dangerous and showed

indifference to human life, and “willfully [shot] the victim for his failure to comply.”

The court also found that Miguel’s conduct after the shooting exhibited “a higher level of

criminal sophistication” in that he fled, attempted to conceal his involvement by changing

his clothing and appearance, and then lied to police about his involvement.

As for whether Miguel “can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile

court’s jurisdiction” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i) (§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i)), the court found that the

evidence was “simply insufficient for the Court to draw a conclusion as to whether or not

the youth can be rehabilitated.” The court noted that for this criterion it was evaluating

whether Miguel could be rehabilitated “within the time available.” The court described

evidence showing that Miguel could be rehabilitated within the time remaining, such as

Miguel’s behavior in county jail, to which he was moved after the initial transfer hearing.

But the court also noted that Miguel’s detention period in juvenile hall, including the

statements Miguel made in October 2021 about being a murderer, showed that “despite

having received rehabilitative services, [Miguel would] still be engaging in negative and

callous behaviors.” The court also expressed concern that the remaining available

12 juvenile jurisdiction was not a sufficient period for Miguel to be rehabilitated in the

ARISE program.

With respect to Miguel’s “previous delinquent history” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)),

the court found that Miguel had a single petition in 2016 alleging two nonviolent felony

counts. Because that history was minimal and “not aggravated,” it weighed in favor of

denying the transfer motion.

Regarding the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate”

Miguel (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)), the court found that Miguel had been provided with

the entire spectrum of services, including probation, community service, wraparound

services, gang intervention classes, house arrest, and a six-month out-of-home placement

that included counseling. Miguel did not take probation or “the services received

seriously and made no effort to modify his behavior.”

With respect to “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged” (§ 707,

subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)), the court found: Miguel “engaged in a highly dangerous activity that

he had to have known would result in harm to another person. Yet he not only willingly

engaged in the dangerous activity, but he was seemingly committed to completing it at all

costs. This conduct resulted in the death of [Steve]. [Miguel] inflicted the greatest injury

on a person that can be inflicted. He stole a person’s life. The consequences are

irreparable. [Steve] is dead and he shouldn’t be. There is no amount of restitution or

good will that can change that or adequately compensate [Steve’s] family. [¶] There are

no mitigating factors related to the circumstances and gravity of the offense. As such, the

13 factors related to this criteria weigh heavily in favor of a finding that the minor should be

transferred to adult court.”

DISCUSSION

Miguel argues that we should reverse the most recent transfer order because

(1) the juvenile court misapplied recent amendments to section 707, and (2) the evidence

was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that he “was not amenable to

rehabilitation in the juvenile court.” We are not persuaded.

A. Legal Framework

Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring a minor from juvenile court

to criminal court. It provides that whenever a minor aged 16 years or older is alleged to

have committed a felony, the prosecutor may move “to transfer the minor from juvenile

court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(1).) The prosecution bears the

burden of proving that the minor should be transferred. (Cal. Rules of Court,

rule 5.770(a).)

The Legislature amended section 707 in 2023 and 2024. Effective

January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill 2361 amended section 707(a)(3) by adding the following

italicized language: “Following submission and consideration of the report, and of any

other relevant evidence that the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit, the juvenile

court shall decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal

jurisdiction. In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal

jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not

amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In making

14 its decision, the court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E),

inclusive. If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall recite the basis for

its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons

supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while

under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707(a)(3), italics added.)

The five statutory criteria listed in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of

section 707(a)(3) were not amended by Assembly Bill 2361. Those criteria are (1) “the

degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i)),

(2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s

jurisdiction” (§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i)), (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history” (§ 707,

subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)), (4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate

the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)), and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the

offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor” (§ 707,

subd.(a)(3)(E)(i)). The statute sets forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors for the

court to consider with respect to each of the five criteria. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii),

(B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).)

Effective January 1, 2024, Senate Bill 545 amended section 707 to require that

with respect to each of those five criteria the juvenile court “shall give weight to any

relevant factor,” including the specific factors listed as relevant to each criterion. (§ 707,

subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) The previous version of the statute

made consideration of those factors discretionary, not mandatory. (Former § 707,

subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) With respect to the degree of criminal

15 sophistication, Senate Bill 545 also added new mandatory factors for the court to

consider: whether the minor has had any involvement in the child welfare or foster care

system and whether the minor has been “a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or

sexual battery.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)

We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse

of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 680.) “The

abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies

according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of

fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo,

and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.”

(Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.) The juvenile court’s

findings with respect to each of section 707’s five criteria are findings of fact reviewed

for substantial evidence. (Jones, at pp. 682-683.) In conducting substantial evidence

review, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s findings. (People v.

Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102, 119, fn. 11 (Cardenas).)

Likewise, we review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s ultimate finding

“that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the

juvenile court.” (§ 707(a)(3).) Because the juvenile court must make that finding by

clear and convincing evidence, we “determine whether the record, viewed as a whole,

contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the

finding of high probability demanded by” the clear and convincing evidence standard.

(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.)

16 B. Assembly Bill 2361

Miguel argues that the juvenile court’s ultimate determination that Miguel is “not

amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” (§ 707(a)(3))

is incompatible with the court’s finding under the second criterion that the People failed

to produce sufficient evidence that Miguel could not “be rehabilitated prior to the

expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i)). He argues that

Assembly Bill 2361’s amendments to section 707 “make clear that the youth’s

amenability to rehabilitation constitutes the focus of and the single most important factor

in determining whether to grant the requested transfer.” (Italics added.) The People

counter that Miguel “incorrectly conflates the ultimate amenability finding with the

second factor, which is primarily concerned with time.” We agree with the People’s

interpretation.

“In interpreting a statute, our primary goal ‘“is to determine the Legislature’s

intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.”’ [Citation.] ‘“Because the statutory

language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words

themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.”’” (People v. Mendoza

(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294.) “‘“If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its

plain meaning controls.”’ [Citation.] We ‘avoid “interpretations that render any

language surplusage.”’” (Ibid.)

Section 707(a)(3) (as amended by Assembly Bill 2361) mandates that the juvenile

court “shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive” in

determining whether “the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the

17 jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Thus, according to the statute’s plain language, the

court is required to consider each of the five listed criteria in determining whether the

prosecution has carried its burden of proof to transfer a juvenile to criminal court.

(§ 707(a)(3).) “Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the

juvenile court’s jurisdiction” is the second of the five listed criteria. (§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i).)

The statute does not direct the juvenile court to afford any greater weight to that criterion.

(§ 707(a)(3).) Rather, the statute expressly requires the court to consider all five criteria

in making its determination, but the statute says nothing about the relative weight to be

given to any of the criteria. (§ 707(a)(3).) The statutory language accordingly does not

support Miguel’s interpretation that the statute elevates the second criterion to be “the

single most important factor in determining whether to grant the requested transfer.”

(Italics omitted.)

Moreover, the ultimate determination of whether “the minor is not amenable to

rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” (§ 707(a)(3)) is not the

same as the second criterion, which calls for consideration of “[w]hether the minor can be

rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”

(§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i)). Assembly Bill 2361 did not make any amendments to the five

criteria. “‘[W]hen the Legislature amends a statute without altering portions of the

provision that have previously been judicially construed, the Legislature is presumed to

have been aware of and to have acquiesced in the previous judicial construction.’” (City

and County of San Francisco v. Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1915.) As

courts have explained, the focus of the second criterion is whether there is enough time to

18 rehabilitate the minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile court

jurisdiction. (J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 721; see also Kevin P. v.

Superior (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 200, fn. 13 [in “evaluating the amount of time that

rehabilitation in the juvenile system will ultimately require” for § 707(a)(3)(B)(i), the

court should consider predisposition progress made toward rehabilitation].) Under the

second criterion, the prosecution accordingly “bears the burden of producing evidence of

insufficient time to rehabilitate the minor.” (J.N., at p. 721.)

In contrast, the ultimate finding that the juvenile court must make under

section 707(a)(3) concerns a global assessment of the minor’s suitability to rehabilitation

within the juvenile court system, and not just a comparison of the time needed with the

time remaining. (§ 707(a)(3).) The prosecution bears the burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that the minor is “not amenable to rehabilitation while under the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707(a)(3).) As explained by In re S.S. (2023) 89

Cal.App.5th 1277 (S.S.), “[t]his language resembles earlier versions of section 707,

which, from the enactment of the Juvenile Court Law in 1961 until the approval of

Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, required juvenile courts

to analyze whether minors are ‘amenable to the care, treatment, and training program

available through the facilities of the juvenile court.’” (Id. at p. 1286.)

Section 707(a)(3)’s focus on the minor’s amenability to rehabilitation under the juvenile

court’s jurisdiction thus requires the court to consider not only time but also other reasons

why the minor might or might not be responsive to the available rehabilitative services.

19 Time is only one of the five statutory criteria that the court must consider in making the

determination. (§ 703(a)(3)(B)(i).)

We accordingly conclude that the express terms of section 707(a)(3) require the

court to evaluate five criteria in determining whether “the minor is not amenable to

rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” and that the statute does

not require that any of those criteria be afforded any greater weight than any other.

(§ 707(a)(3).) We further conclude that the second criterion–“[w]hether the minor can be

rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”

(§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i))—is distinct from the ultimate determination “that the minor is not

amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court”

(§ 707(a)(3)).

In support of his contrary interpretation, Miguel relies on E.P. He claims that E.P.

reversed the juvenile court’s transfer order because the juvenile court’s “‘totality of the

circumstances’ approach, and its reliance on the other factors under [section 707(a)(3)],

failed to properly consider the effect of” Assembly Bill 2361’s amendments.

(Underlining omitted.) Miguel’s reliance on E.P. is misplaced. In E.P., the transfer

hearing was held before Assembly Bill 2361 took effect. (E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at

p. 411.) Because the court concluded, and the parties agreed, that Assembly Bill 2361

applied retroactively to the case because there was not yet a final judgment, E.P. reversed

for the juvenile court to hold a new transfer hearing applying the new law. (E.P., at

pp. 416-417.) E.P. explained: “Under the amended statute, like the previous version, the

court has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as

20 to determine the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a

different result. The prosecution is entitled to a new fitness hearing so that the court can

determine, considering all five factors, whether [the minor] is amenable to treatment.”

(Id. at p. 417.)

E.P. does not support Miguel’s interpretation of section 707. E.P.’s description of

the effect of Assembly Bill 2361 on section 707 does not imply that the amendment gives

greater weight to the second criterion, nor does E.P. suggest that the second criterion and

the ultimate determination are the same. On the contrary, E.P. clarifies that

section 707(a)(3), as amended by Assembly Bill 2361, requires the juvenile court to

consider all five of the listed criteria in making the ultimate determination about the

minor’s amenability to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. (E.P.,

supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 417.)

Because the juvenile court is not required to give greater weight to the second

criterion or to deny the transfer motion if that criterion does not weigh in favor of

transfer, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err by not according the second

criterion greater weight than the other criteria. We further conclude that the juvenile

court’s finding that Miguel was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile

court’s jurisdiction (§ 707(a)(3)) was consistent with its finding that the prosecution had

not established that the second factor (§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i)) weighed in favor of transfer.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Miguel concedes that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court’s

findings under the previous preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. But he

21 argues that the evidence is insufficient under the new clear and convincing evidence

standard of proof because (1) the juvenile court relied on Miguel’s statements in

October 2021 about being a murderer, and (2) there was new evidence of his progress

toward rehabilitation. We disagree.

Miguel argues that the court “excessive[ly]” relied on the statements Miguel made

in October 2021, “despite the continued lack of evidence of the tone and context of the

alleged comments” and “despite [purported] criticism of the relevance of those comments

by not only the defense but also this Court.” The argument lacks merit for two reasons.

First, Miguel mischaracterizes our prior opinion. We did not question the relevance of

the October 2021 statements. In fact, we expressly rejected “Miguel’s argument that the

absence of evidence as to the tone or context of the statements renders them ‘worthless as

an indication of’ Miguel’s state of mind reflecting a lack of remorse.” (In re Miguel R.,

supra, E078528.)

Second, Miguel’s argument that the juvenile court unduly emphasized the

October 2021 statements is not supported by the record, just as it was not supported by

the record in the prior appeal. (In re Miguel R., supra, E078528.) The court’s

consideration of the October 2021 statements was limited to its analysis of the second

criterion, namely, whether Miguel could “be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the

juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” (§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i).) But the court determined that the

second criterion did not weigh in favor of transfer. Miguel’s argument that the court

unduly relied on the October 2021 statements as a basis to grant the transfer motion

therefore fails.

22 Miguel’s only other argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence is that

the record contains evidence that Miguel did not have any recent disciplinary issues,

completed a substance abuse program, and obtained his GED, all of which tends to show

his “progress toward rehabilitation.” The argument fails because the existence of

contrary evidence does not show that the trial court’s findings were not supported by

substantial evidence. In conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable

inferences in support of the court’s findings, not against them. (Cardenas, supra, 53

Cal.App.5th at p. 119, fn. 11.) We consequently are concerned only with whether “‘“the

circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings.”’” (People v. Kraft (2000)

23 Cal.4th 978, 1054.) When evidence reasonably justifies the trier of fact’s findings,

“‘the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be

reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” (People

v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514.)

For these reasons, we conclude that Miguel has failed to demonstrate that the

juvenile court’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence.

D. Senate Bill 545

Senate Bill 545 became effective while this appeal was pending, so we asked the

parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the effect of the new legislation on this

appeal. The parties assume and we agree that the amendments are ameliorative and

accordingly apply retroactively to Miguel’s case because there is not yet a final judgment.

(See People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 304; S.S., supra, 89

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1288-1289 [applying Assembly Bill 2361 retroactively].)

23 With respect to the new factors that must be considered in connection with the first

criterion (i.e., the degree of criminal sophistication), Miguel acknowledges that the record

“does not disclose any indication that [he] was involved in the child welfare or foster care

system, or was a victim of violence, trafficking, or abuse[], and [he] specifically denied

being sexually abused.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).) But Miguel argues that because

there previously “was no reason to determine or consider whether [those factors] in fact

existed in this case,” we should reverse and remand so that the parties can develop the

record accordingly and the juvenile court can reconsider the motion in light of the new

factors. The contention lacks merit.

Before Senate Bill 545, “the effect of the minor’s family and community

environment” and “childhood trauma” were among the listed factors for the court to

consider in analyzing the minor’s “degree of criminal sophistication.” (Former § 707,

subd. (a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).) Likewise, before Senate Bill 545, “the effect of the minor’s

family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous

delinquent behavior” were listed as relevant to the court’s analysis of “[t]he minor’s

previous delinquent history.” (Former § 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)-(ii).) Any evidence of

Miguel’s involvement in the child welfare system or any history of sexual abuse, sexual

battery, or human trafficking would be relevant to his family and community

environment and childhood trauma, so such evidence would have been relevant even

before Senate Bill 545. The parties therefore had an incentive to develop and present

such evidence at Miguel’s transfer hearing.

24 Accordingly, the 2019 probation report includes sections about Miguel’s family

background, personal history, and statements from both Miguel and his mother about his

family life. No one reported that Miguel was ever involved in the child welfare or foster

care system. The report affirmatively states that Miguel was not a victim of sexual or

physical abuse. Likewise, none of the reference letters submitted on Miguel’s behalf

states that Miguel had any child welfare history, had been sexually abused, or was a

human trafficking victim. Thus, even though Miguel had an incentive before

Senate Bill 545 to introduce evidence concerning child welfare history and any history of

sexual abuse or human trafficking, the record contains none and actually contains

contrary evidence.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the

juvenile court would have reached a result more favorable to Miguel if it had applied the

current version of section 707. (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1289 [failure to apply

amendments to section 707 is reviewed for harmlessness under People v. Watson (1956)

46 Cal.2d 818, 836].)

DISPOSITION

The order transferring Miguel to criminal court is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

MENETREZ

J. We concur:

MILLER

Acting P. J.

FIELDS

J.

25