facts, we do not recount them here, except as necessary to provide context to our

ruling. We affirm.

We review for abuse of discretion an order granting or denying

compensation. In re Mednet, 251 B.R. 103, 106 (9th Cir. BAP 2000). When

awarding compensation, a bankruptcy court must consider the nature, extent, and

value of the services rendered and may not award compensation for services which

were unnecessarily duplicative, not reasonably likely to benefit the estate, or

unnecessary to the administration of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3–4).

In opposing the Compensation Order, Coeptis contends that the Subchapter V

trustee should not be compensated for actions taken after Coeptis was removed as

debtor-in-possession or for actions the trustee took in order to convert this case to

Chapter 7 because, according to Coeptis, removal and conversion were improper.

As we held in separately filed memoranda dispositions, the bankruptcy court did not

abuse its discretion in removing Coeptis as debtor-in-possession and converting the

case to Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in awarding

compensation in these matters.

Coeptis also contends that the trustee should not be compensated for its efforts

2 to sell two properties belonging to the estate because one of the properties (the

“Stockton Property”) could have been sold for a higher price and the other property

(the “Denham Springs Property”) was sold unnecessarily. At the time of the

trustee’s motion to sell the Stockton Property, creditors had filed for relief from the

bankruptcy stay in order to proceed with foreclosure on the property. The court’s

order allowing the trustee to sell the Stockton Property ensured that the sale proceeds

would accrue to the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, rather than the individual

creditor. Coeptis did not provide any evidence to support its claim that the Stockton

Property could have been sold for a higher price. The sale of the Stockton Property

was therefore “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate.” 11 U.S.C. §

330(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I).

As to the Denham Springs Property, Coeptis contends only that there was “no

good reason” for the trustee to proceed with the sale of the property. The trustee

provided a reason, indeed, a good one: counsel for a lender had informed the trustee

that it would seek relief from the bankruptcy stay, presumably to commence

foreclosure. Coeptis has not supported its argument that the sale was unnecessary.

Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the Compensation Order.

AFFIRMED.

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