United States v. Merl Simpson
Opinion
Opinion
facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
2253(a), and 2255(d). We review de novo dismissals based on statutes of
limitations, including whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. See Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm.
1. A § 2255 motion under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act is subject to a one-year statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
Relevant here, that period begins to run from the date on which the judgment of
conviction becomes final. Id. Simpson filed his motion on August 6, 2018, but his
judgment was entered on May 3, 2017, and it became final on May 17, 2017.
Accordingly, his motion was untimely.
Simpson argues that his one-year limitations period restarted on October 12,
2018, when the district court entered a new judgment that increased his total
restitution amount and altered the wording, but not substance, of the default
mandatory and standard conditions of supervised release. This argument is
foreclosed by our…