NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 25 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: MARK TECHNOLOGIES No. 21-56216

CORPORATION,

D.C. No. 5:21-cv-01160-PA Debtor. ______________________________

MEMORANDUM*

MARK G. JONES,

Appellant,

v.

HELEN RYAN FRAZER, Chapter 7 Trustee,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 20, 2024** San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellant Mark G. Jones appeals the district court’s order dismissing his

bankruptcy appeal and affirming the bankruptcy court’s order granting the Chapter

7 Trustee’s Final Application Allowing Payment of Fees and Expenses of Trustee

and Professionals (“Final Fee Order”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

158(d)(1). We affirm.

The district court concluded that Jones does not have standing to appeal the

Final Fee Order under the “persons aggrieved” doctrine because Jones does not

have a pecuniary interest in the Final Fee Order. We review the factual

determination that an individual is a person aggrieved for clear error. See Matter

of E. Coast Foods, Inc., 80 F.4th 901, 905 (9th Cir. 2023).

The district court did not err in concluding that Jones lacks standing to

appeal the Final Fee Order. We have long held that only someone who is “directly

and adversely affected pecuniarily” by a bankruptcy court’s order has standing to

appeal that order. Matter of Point Ctr. Fin., Inc., 890 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir.

2018) (citing Matter of Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)). We have

also held that “a hopelessly insolvent debtor does not have standing to appeal

orders affecting the size of the estate.” Matter of Fondiller, 707 F.2d at 442.

As the district court explained, the debtor in this case is “hopelessly

insolvent” and therefore would not have standing to appeal the Final Fee Order.

This is because the debtor’s bankruptcy estate had secured scheduled claims of

2 $24,962,169.91, unsecured scheduled claims of $8,483,370.91, and gross receipts

of just $3,732,972.26. Because the debtor itself lacks standing to challenge the

Final Fee Order, the district court correctly concluded that Jones, who is an indirect

owner of the debtor, also lacks a direct pecuniary interest and therefore lacks

standing to challenge the order. See id.1

AFFIRMED.

1 Because we conclude that Jones does not have standing to pursue this appeal, we do not reach the Trustee’s alternative argument that this appeal is equitably moot. See Rev Op Grp. v. ML Manager LLC (In re Mortgs. Ltd.), 771 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2014).

3